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我一个人住
——亚洲单人户的趋势

由于当前不断降低的生育率和结婚率，不断高的离婚率以及人口迁移的趋势，在未来几十年，亚洲的单人户将会越来越多。

在亚洲甚至于全球，单人户是增长最快的一种家庭类型。除了丧偶及失婚，不婚不育以及劳动力迁移，也是单人户增长的原因。

我是国大亚洲研究所亚洲家庭变迁分支的学术带友人。2015年，我与张乐博士等人口研究杂志社邀请，合编了一系列关于亚洲单人户的论文。这是欧亚国家以外第一次针对单人户所做的大规模研究。这十篇论文针对亚洲15个国家，根据人口普查及长期追踪数据，做了深入的分析，对于了解单人户可能面世的经济困境及社会疏离感，重视这种疏离感可能带来身心健康的影响，以及国家如何制定社会政策，有一定的帮助。

在挪威、芬兰、丹麦、瑞士和德国等发达国家，超过三分之一的家庭仅有一名家庭成员（见图）。单人户目前在亚洲的普遍程度远不及欧美国家，但有研究推测，到了2020年，全球单人户最多的十个国家中，将有四个来自亚洲，而中国与印度名列前茅。

尽管现代社会的文化在亚洲国家及地区存在已久，但亚洲各国的家庭类型分布，仍然有一定的差异。在东亚几个发达国家和地区中，日本的单人户比率最高，达到32.4%，韩国与台湾则分别为23.9%和22%。至于东南亚及南亚一些国家，比如越南、马来西亚、菲律宾、尼泊尔和印度，单人户比率远低于10%。

哪些人选择独居？

与西方国家相似，年龄与性别也是区分亚洲单人户的两个主要因素。亚洲单人户中分为两大类：独居老人与独居年轻人。老年人独居很大程度上是因丧偶，而年轻人独居则主要归结于未婚、离婚和迁移。由于女性预期寿命普遍高于男性，且独居老人多为女性为多，因此有女性因工作而迁徙的女性。

此外，亚洲的研究显示，单人户分布并不存在明显的城乡差异，单人户并不局限于城市，农村也存在这一现象。

在新加坡，由独居老人（65岁及以上）构成的单人户，在所有家庭类型中的比率，从2000年的8%增长至2010年的12%，增幅达到50%。根据2009年与2011年老年人健康与老龄化的追踪数据，新加坡独居老人的孤独感——其表现为缺乏陪伴，独自留居以及隔离——有提高的趋势。

新加坡的趋势

在新加坡，由独居老人（65岁及以上）构成的单人户，在所有家庭类型中的比率，从2000年的8%增长至2010年的12%，增幅达到50%。根据2009年与2011年老年人健康与老龄化的追踪数据，新加坡独居老人的孤独感——其表现为缺乏陪伴，独自留居以及隔离——有提高的趋势。

在新加坡这样一个高度城市化的城市国家，许多子女虽然与父母分开居住，但居住距离相对较近，同时由于新加坡的医疗体系相对先进与便利，因此独居本身并不一定会产生孤独感。社会隔离则是一种生活状况，孤独感是一种心理体验；以往的研究发现，它们都会增加死亡率。因此，我们需要加以关注。不过，并非所有独居的老人都会感到孤独或孤立。相反的，那些与他人住在一起的人，有时候也会感到孤独；重要的是鼓励独居老人参与社会活动，促进身心健康，使他们不会被孤立。

由于当前不断降低的生育率和结婚率，不断高的离婚率以及人口迁移的趋势，在未来几十年，亚洲的单人户将会越来越多。以中国为例，快速的人口老龄化将导致独居单人户数量的上升。此外，中国推行的计划生育政策，导致人口性别比例严重失衡。目前在中国的适婚人口中，将有超过3000万至4000万的“剩男”面临着“婚姻危机”。基于这种情况，我们预计未来中国会出现一批由失婚男性所组成的新兴单人户群体。眼下大约有8000万个中国独居者。据我们估计，这人数可能会增加至2050年的13000万个。为了深入了解不同社会情境下的单人户，我们还将进行进一步探讨居住安排、社会网络与社会福利之间的关系。与此同时，我们也将更深入地分析独居如何影响人们的身心健康，并探讨公共政策在调节独居的动因以及独居的影响上，能够起什么样的作用。

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Due to the trend of continuously declining fertility and marriage rates, increase in divorce and migration, one-person households in Asia will continue to increase in next few decades.

The one-person household is the fastest-growing household type in the world, particularly in Asia. The prevalence of one-person households is growing not only because of the rising widowhood and divorced population but also due to an increase in the never-married population and labor migration.

I recently edited a special issue with Dr. Adam Ka-Lok Cheung in Demographic Research that included a series of articles on one-person households in Asia. This research is the first systematic work on the phenomenon of one-person households that is conducted outside of Europe and North America. The in-depth analysis in fifteen countries across Asia use census data, population survey, and longitudinal data. The results help reveal that those who live alone are more likely to experience financial distress and social isolation. They also show how living alone could affect one’s psychological well-being. These results have implications for policies that aim to mitigate the impact of a growing population who live alone.

In many developed countries such as Norway, Finland, Demark, Switzerland, and Germany more than one-third of households contain only one person (see Figure). Even though one-person households in Asia is generally lower than in Europe and North America, research predicts that by 2020, 4 out of the top 10 countries with the highest number of one-person households will be in Asia, with China and India leading the trend.

Even though living with multi-generation in one household is a traditionally valued norm in Asia, the proportion of one-person households varies among Asian countries. Among the most developed countries in East Asia such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, Japan has the highest proportion of one-person households in Asia, measuring 32.4%. The proportion of one-person households in South Korea and Taiwan is 23.9% and 22% respectively. The proportion of one-person households in countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines. Nepal and India is well below 10%.
Who choose to live alone?

Similar to Western countries, age and gender are the main stratifying factors in the patterns of one-person households in Asia. The one-person households in Asia consist primarily two groups: elderly and young adults. The Asian elderly people are living alone due to widowhood, and the young adults are living alone because of delayed marriage, divorce, and increased geographic mobility. Since women have higher life expectancy compared to men, women are the majority population who live alone among elderly. Among young adults who live alone, young men are the majority who choose to live alone, and it also includes a smaller proportion of women who migrate because of employment.

Nevertheless, Asian studies have shown that the distribution of one-person households does not differ significantly between urban and rural region: one-person households does not only exist in urban areas, but this phenomenon also exists in rural areas. The rural areas in Vietnam and Myanmar, family splits into multiple one-person households due to migration of a spouse or children moving to cities for employment.

The reasons why Asians choose to live alone are closer to Europe in the 18th century than those in contemporary Western societies. In contemporary Western society, living alone is labeled as a middle-class lifestyle. Young adults who are economically independent with wide social networks are more likely to living alone.

In contrast, in Asia, young adults in one-person households are more likely to be migrant workers and working-class, and the reason why they choose to live alone is more likely because of financial distress rather than to pursue a middle-class lifestyle. Moreover, the lifestyle of Asian one-person households is different from Western society. Furthermore, in Asia, due to the relatively high living expenses, urban young adults usually live in group quarters with no core family members. In Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Thailand, nearly 60% to 80% who are aged 15 to 25 live alone in urban areas and live in group quarters.

Trends in Singapore

In Singapore, the proportion of elderly (aged 65 and above) one-person households has increased by 50%, from 8% (in the year of 2000) to 12% (in the year of 2010). The longitudinal data (the Panel on Health and Ageing of Singaporean Elderly) in 2009 and 2011 show that the feeling of loneliness – that is the absence of companionship, being left-out, and isolated – has increased among elderly who lived alone.

Living in a highly urbanized city-state like Singapore, even though children might live apart with their parents, the geographic distance is relatively close. Meanwhile healthcare system is advanced and accessible, so living alone does not necessarily lead to loneliness.
Social isolation is a living condition, whereas loneliness is a psychological experience. Past research found that social isolation and loneliness tend to increase mortality, therefore, it is important to reduce these risk factors. Whereas not all older adults who live alone feel lonely or isolated, sometimes they may feel lonely. Thus, it is important to encourage living alone elderlies to attend social activities, boost their physical and mental health, and help them not feel isolated.

Due to the declining marriage and fertility rates, and a continuous increase in divorce and migration, one-person households in Asia will keep increasing in the next few decades. In China, for instance, the sharp growing population will lead to a substantial increase in the widowed one-person households. Moreover, the one-child policy has led to a substantial gender imbalance; more than 30 to 40 million of men will face the “bachelor crisis” when they are approaching the family formation age. Based on this situation, we expect to see an increase in a new group of one-person households consisting of disadvantaged men in the next few decades. As of now, nearly 80 million people are living alone in China and this number is estimated to increase to 130 million people by 2050.

We will further explore the relationship between living arrangements, social network, and social welfares to understand one-person households under different social context. Meanwhile, we need to better understand the impact of living alone and on physical health and psychological well-being. We also need to examine how public policies can influence both the motivations and impact of living alone.
称职的祖父母——新日跨代关系比较

在亚洲文化中，祖父母照顾孙子女是一种传统，尤其是祖母。他们经常被尊称为“玉皇大帝”或“皇太后”，对孙子女的教育和生活有重要影响。然而，随着社会发展，家庭结构的变化，祖父母的角色也在发生变化。在新加坡，祖父母的角色越来越重要，他们不仅在经济上支持孙子女，还在精神上给予支持。

在新加坡，祖父母的教育方式更加多样化，他们不仅关注孙子女的学业，还会关注他们的兴趣和爱好。然而，祖父母教育方式的多样化也带来了一些问题，如与孙子女的代沟。因此，如何处理祖父母和孙子女的代沟问题，成为了现代家庭面临的一个重要问题。

新加坡政府和社会组织也在积极努力，通过各种方式来帮助祖父母和孙子女建立良好的关系。例如，政府提供各种培训课程，帮助祖父母了解孙子女的教育方式；社会组织也开展各种活动，帮助祖父母和孙子女建立良好的关系。

在新加坡，祖父母的角色越来越重要，他们不仅在经济上支持孙子女，还在精神上给予支持。因此，如何处理祖父母和孙子女的代沟问题，成为了现代家庭面临的一个重要问题。
When speaking about the caregiver role in Asian families, the image of grandparents as providers of grandchild-care, especially grandmothers, are frequently brought to mind. This is particularly so in Singapore where increased longevity, coupled with changes in family structure, the trend toward nuclear families, and dual-earner families, have heightened the awareness of grandparents’ roles and intergenerational bonding. A 2005 survey from Singapore children’s society has shown that 40% of children in Singapore from birth to three years old are cared for by their grandparents. The government recognizes and supports the role of grandparents as caregivers for grandchildren because they are important in helping promote birth rates. The grandparent caregiver tax relief introduced as part of a new procreation package in 2004 is a scheme which enables working mothers (Singaporean citizens with children age 12 and below) whose children are being cared for by unemployed grandparents to receive income tax relief of S$3,000.

Although most dual-earner families consider the grandparents as a potential help for raising grandchildren, grandparents clearly differentiate between parenting and grandparenting, and feel the need for their children to employ full time domestic workers to help them cope with the strenuous role in caring for children. Nonetheless, even if grandparents do not see it as their responsibility to care for their grandchildren, they recognize the lack of options available to their children and many will step forward to help. Research has shown that the willingness of older women to help their daughter or daughter-in-law in childcare reveals the social expectation for women - especially tertiary-educated mothers - to remain in the workforce, and to willingly quit their jobs is seen as a waste.

When comparing grandparents in Singapore and Japan, there appear to have lower expectations for grandparents in Japan to raise their grandchildren. The distance between grandparents’ and their children’s households influence how often the grandparents interact with their grandchildren and whether grandparents will help in providing care. Unlike Singapore where the small size of the country allows for relatively easy travel and other arrangements in caring for grandchildren by their grandparents even if they do not live under one roof, in Japan the fall in three-generational households reduces the availability and intergenerational contact.

However, this does not mean that Japanese grandparents are totally hand-offs in grandparenting. A study revealed that grandmothers continue to be heavily involved in childrearing, often serving as an invisible pillar of support behind the working mothers in Japan. On the other hand, the same study discovered that grandmothers in Japan have become much more active nowadays - many are active outside the family such as by working as instructors of traditional arts and culture.

In both Japan and Singapore, which both have the highest rate of aging and are among the richest in Asian countries, a new generation of elderly has emerged, having distinctly different expectations and aspirations from their earlier cohorts. In a study in Japan during the 1990s, a new senior culture made up of middle-class, rich urban elderly - mostly retired salarymen - wanted to be self-reliant and did not want
to live with their children. More recently, the older Japanese, especially the baby-boomers from the 1960s, increasingly wish to lead an active "second life" after their retirement. More grandmothers are actively seeking ways to enhance their purpose of life outside the family, such as work, hobbies, traveling and volunteering. Similarly in Singapore, active, outgoing grandparents face challenges with having to balance between their grandchildren-caregiving responsibilities and social/leisure activities.

In a qualitative study that I conducted with Professors Kalyani Mehta, Tsuneo Usui and Mari Tsuruwaka (2011) in Singapore and Japan, grandparents from both countries were unanimous in their non-interfering roles as grandparents; they refrained from interfering for the harmony of family relationships. However, non-interference does not mean that they do not care, but instead it is perceived as a way to show respect to the younger generation.

**Grandparents are ‘(cushy) cushions’**

The principle of non-interference seems more strictly adhered to among the Japanese grandparents than the Singaporean grandparents. One Japanese grandparent said that interfering too much would result in being told off by the daughter-in-law, and another said that the daughter-in-law views the things she says as a bad influence.

For both Singaporean and Japanese grandparents, the non-interference rule places them in a passive role where they will not make the first move until their children approach them for help. The Japanese parents, in particular, seem to agree that grandparents should not interfere in the way they raise their children, with one mother insisting that she will bring up her own children the way she wants, and refuses to listen to her mother-in-law. This has seen a decline in traditional practices such as naming the grandchildren, which one grandfather laments as a loss of traditional authority. On the contrary, a Chinese daughter-in-law in Singapore accepts her mother-in-law's assertion that she should name her own grandchildren, although it was no longer a practice, and she in fact saw it as an honor and was proud of it. However, except for the naming of grandchildren, the mother-in-law did not interfere with the raising of her daughter-in-law's child, and she saw it as a mutual respect that maintained a harmonious relationship between the generations in the family.

While grandparents mostly do not interfere when raising grandchildren by drawing a boundary of responsibility, they often assure the parents that they will be there to help if asked.

Grandparents want to be a good grandparent and a friend to the grandchildren. Grandparents do not want to be involved in disciplining the grandchildren as this is seen as the parents' responsibility. Instead, their responsibilities are to love them, comfort them and be their friends. The grandchildren also recognize the role differentiation between parents and grandparents, with one grandchild talking about how his grandfather mediate whenever his father scolded him, and how his grandparents will soothe the parents whenever they scold him for doing something wrong. The parents are also aware of the differences between the relationship and how they complement each other with one Japanese parent describing grandparents as a cushion who are always being kind and never scold the grandchildren, giving them comfort as opposed to the parents who scold them.
Although grandparents tend not to interfere, they still provide instrumental help such as cooking for the grandchildren and picking them up from school. Most Singaporean grandmothers interviewed above have provided childcare for their grandchildren when they were younger, especially if they live in the same household.

Despite the seeming lack of interference in raising grandchildren, all the interviewees agree that grandparents play significant and intangible roles in teaching traditional values and morals to the younger generation. One Japanese grandparent taught national culture, tradition, history and customs in non-disciplinary ways, such as making mention of characters in historical dramas. A Singaporean parent comments how his children benefits from his father’s knowledge of botany and Hindu scriptures, with the grandfather often telling the grandchildren stories and legends.

Yet there still exist tensions within the family, with parents being unhappy when the grandparents attempt to correct them on the correct way of raising a child. The grandparents also may have problems with the maids, something more specific to Singapore, which cause the latter to be upset when the former tell them what to do. The grandparents also have to be careful treading around the in-laws, with one Singaporean grandparent explaining how he could not tell his in-laws what to do in the same manner as he would his own biological children.

Grandparenting, like any other relationships, is about relationship building. In Singapore, grandparents today face more challenges with generational differences and expectations, their efforts at co-nurturing the younger generations should be more recognized and appreciated by the middle generations. Whether they choose to commit to caring for their grandchildren or not, grandparents will always love their grandchildren and want to be perceived as good grandparents.

亚洲女性新角色

在亚洲，由于“男主外女主内”传统性别分工观念的影响，平衡家庭与工作的责任，更多地落到了女性的肩上，因此多重角色所带来的压力，对女性而言尤为突出。

我曾与来自美国、香港、中国的学者进行田野工作。过去30年，我们的研究团队考察了多项关于性别角色认知与女性、对亚洲女性家庭生活与精神健康状况影响的研究。我们的研究在亚洲城市化地区，例如中国、香港、新加坡、台湾等地展开。研究结果显示，越来越多的亚洲女性在不同的人生发展阶段，投入到了家庭之外的工作中去。

与西方国家的情况相似，我们发现亚洲男性与女性的比例不同，女性的工作状态，更容易受到她们的婚姻状况与家庭生命周期的影响，尤其是孩子与家庭责任的影响。

在经济不景气时，亚洲女性更可能从事兼职工作或是面临失业。失业。女性在管理、行政、立法与政府高层中都属于少数群体。在女性集中的服务行业，年轻漂亮的女性也比中年已婚妇女更具优势。然而女性在晋升到高级职位时所面临的障碍，常常与她们的家庭责任联系在一起。虽然大多数亚洲国家如新加坡，都有相应的法规与政策，来保护孕妇与有其他照顾家庭责任的女性权益，雇主的偏见以及女性对家庭的付出，依旧形成了障碍。女性晋升的玻璃天花板。

我们的研究团队发现，亚洲女性仍然对性别角色有刻板印象，对工作家庭角色的制度延续。我们注意到许多亚洲人还是认为，女性应该待在家中，料理家务，相夫教子。随着家庭的兴起，现代家庭成员在家庭生活中的多重角色，既企业的雇员，也是家庭中的配偶、家长等。在亚洲，由于“男主外女主内”传统性别分工观念的影响，平衡家庭与工作的责任，更多地落到了女性的肩上，因此多重角色所带来的压力，对女性而言尤为突出。例如我们的研究发现，尽管家庭中有保姆，职业女性仍然需要照料一家老小，承担大部分的家务负担。

另一方面，亚洲女性自身也依然遵循传统的性别角色观念，来衡量自己的角色与表现，尽管角色增多，家庭角色仍居核心地位。香港张妙清教授与其合作者基于对美国、中国大陆及香港等地区10名女性的访问，合著了《登台巅峰的女性：女性领导力发展与工作平衡》（Women at the top：powerful leaders tell us how to combine work and family）一书。书中指出，女性领导人仍须把家庭与子女放进首位。尽管少数女性领导人认为，工作需求与生活需求之间存在冲突。在亚洲，家庭幸福也被视为衡量女性事业成功的一个标志。

在中国，一些资深女性领导人会把他人对自己事业与家庭的认可，视为足以自傲的成就。与美国文化不同，亚洲文化里男性与女性角色界限模糊，女性的角色是为家庭与生活利益服务的。因此，工作与家庭不必然冲突的。同时，个人在家庭和工作中的投入和幸福感，也受到另外两个因素影响：来自家庭的期待，以及工作收入对家庭生活的支持。

社会对性别角色的预期，也对女性心理健康产生影响。我们的研究团队在对在职女性所做的研究中发现，那些保持传统性别角色观念的在职女性，比较容易对自己角色做出负面评价。她们也更容易出现“身心”症状，即心理健康问题。

我们的研究团队及其他研究者都发现，社会角色的差异并不影响个人的心理健康，可社会角色的质量，却会对心理健康产生影响。

不同社会角色对心理健康的影响不尽相同，与母亲、妻子这些角色相"比”，职业女性这一角色更可能对心理健康产生积极影响。心理学家Barrett & Hyde的理论认为，职业女性能够通过工作，为家庭带来额外的经济收入，因此她们在寻求配偶支持与雇佣女佣等家庭问题中，拥有了更多的话语权。此外，工作还扩展女性的社交网络，提升她们的自尊心与控制力。然而对于那些工作收入低、工作强度高的女性来说，职业女性这一角色，则会对她们的心理健康产生负面影响。

研究表明，个人的社会角色之间会产生“溢出效应”，即个人的某一社会角色，可能会对其他/她的另一角色产生影响，进而影响到是否或加剧人的心理健康问题。在对职业女性而言，游走在家庭与工作之间，既能可能提升也可能伤害她们的心理健康，这主要取决于溢出效应的本质与方向。

对在对香港在职研究的发现中，我们发现，社会角色会对心理健康产生积极的溢出效应。与此同时，工作与家庭间的相互影响是不对称的。具体而言，积极的工作经历能够提高职业性的家庭生活质量，缓解她们的心理压力。相反，良好的家庭生活也确保能促进职业女性的工作质量，提升心理健康。

一项对台湾雇员的研究显示，家庭冲突主要由工作需求所引起，然而家庭工作冲突的起因，既可能是家庭需求也可能是工作需求。在新加坡的研究发现，工作与家庭的失衡与已婚女性的心理问题息息相关。在亚洲社会，配偶的支持、灵活的工作环境，对帮助家庭工作与家庭之间的关系，以及提升个体的心理健康至关重要。

社会研究结果，对许多亚洲国家都有社会与政策方面的影响。鉴于性别角色的认知，对女性的工作家庭生活与心理健康影响深远。我们有必要开展公共教育，推广平等与灵活的性别角色观念，以促进灵活的家庭分配与责任。推行各种亲家庭的政策，如灵活工作制度、职场平权、工作-生活平衡。

（作者是新加坡国立大学心理系教授）
Asian Women’s Gender Role, Work-family Balance, and Mental Health
Professor Catherine Tang, Department of Psychology and CFPR Deputy Director, NUS
As featured on Lianhe Zaobao, 2 October 2016

I have collaborated with researchers from the United States, Hong Kong, and China. Over the last three decades, our research team has conducted a number of studies on the influences of gender role perception and paid employment on Asian women’s family experience and mental health condition. Our research, which has been conducted in urbanized Asian regions, such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, etc., has indicated that in recent decades an increasing number of Asian women have participated in paid employment outside their homes at various life stages. Similar to other Western countries, we find that the employment status of Asian women as compared to Asian men is more affected by their marital status and family life-cycle stages, and is typically contingent on children and domestic responsibilities. Asian women are more likely to hold part-time jobs and to be unemployed or underemployed, particularly during adverse economic conditions. Women constitute the minority in managerial, administrative, legislative, and government ministerial positions. In service industry where women are more likely to be concentrated, youthful and feminine women are often valued more than middle-aged women. Regardless, the barrier facing women getting into senior positions at work is often related to their family responsibilities. Although most Asian countries such as Singapore do have legislations and policies in place to protect the employment rights of women during pregnancy and those with family responsibilities, biases of employers and actual family commitment create the glass ceiling for many women aspirating for work advancement.

Our research team also finds that gender stereotypes and conservative attitudes toward family-work roles are still endorsed by the general public in Asian societies. We note that many Asians still believe that women’s proper place should be in the family where they are primarily responsible for household chores and caring of husbands and children. With the increasing number of dual-earner families, men and women nowadays lead very full lives combining their social roles as paid workers, spouses, and parents. Multiple social role involvement is particularly stressful for women in the Asian Countries including Singapore, as the duty of balancing demands of work and family falls disproportionately on them. For example, our research has shown that employed women still shoulder most of the burden of domestic work in providing care for children, sick, and elderly family members even though they hire domestic/household helpers. Asian women themselves also typically evaluate their role experience and performance according to internalized feminine gender role message, and family roles remain the most central among various social roles (Tang & Tang, 2001).

In a recent book on top women leaders with family responsibilities, Halpern & Cheung (2008) found that women leaders in Asia still considered children and/or family their priority. Only a few of these women leaders considered work and family demands to be in conflict. In particular, some of the senior women leaders in China took pride in the recognition of their success in work and family. A happy family was regarded as a measure of the success of their work. Other researchers have also argued that in contrast to American culture, social roles of the individual and family are blurred in Asian culture, where work serves a utilitarian function for the long-term benefits of the family. Thus, family-work conflict is not
considered as inevitable. The support of the extended family and the contribution to the family through work may facilitate commitment and satisfaction of both family and work roles.

In line with gender role stress research, Tang and Tang (2001) found that employed working women in Asia who held traditional gender role beliefs tended to report more negative mother role quality and experienced more somatic symptoms than those who endorsed liberal gender role beliefs. Tang, Lee, Tang, Cheung, and Chan (2002) noted that the quality of social roles rather than the number of roles per se was related to psychological health of Asian women. These researchers also found that not all social roles had similar mental health benefits, and paid worker role seemed to have more advantage on women’s mental health as compared to intra-familial roles such as wife and mother roles. The expansionist theory (Barnett & Hyde, 2001) reasons that this may be related to the fact that as paid workers, women can bring in additional financial resources to the families, have more negotiation power in obtaining additional help from their spouses or hire domestic helpers, and have increased opportunity to contact with people who can provide social support. Moreover, employment also brings women additional sources of self-esteem, control, and social support outside their families. However, for women who worked in low-reward but high-demand jobs in mainland Asia, their worker role was found to adversely affect their psychological health.

Research has indicated that experiences in one social role may spill over to another social role to bring about exacerbation or buffering of psychological health. Juggling family-work roles can have either beneficial or detrimental impacts on individuals’ well-being, depending on the direction and nature of the spillover. In a study on employed mothers in Hong Kong, Tang (2008a) found spillover effects of role experiences on psychological health as well as asymmetrical permeability of family and work boundaries. In particular, positive work experience was found to permeate through family boundaries to the overall quality of family experience to reduce psychological distress. However, positive family experience did not spill over to influence the overall quality of work experience to enhance psychological health. For Taiwanese employees, work demands were related to work-family conflict, whereas both work and family demands were related to family-work conflict. Inability to fulfill conflicting demands from work and family were related to mental ill-health of married employed women in Singapore. In almost all Asian societies, spousal support and workplace flexibility are consistently found to be important in influencing the work-family interface and its mental health outcomes.

The above research findings have social and policy implications for many Asian countries. Given the fact that gender role perception influences work-family experience and mental health status, public education is necessary to promote egalitarian and more flexible gender role attitudes to foster flexible division of labor in the family and parental duties. Polices that facilitate flexible working schedule, gender equity at work, job sharing, child care assistance, work at home and reduced work hours would enable the promotion of better work-family balance. Various business corporations and related service providers can form partnership to provide programs and services for child care services and referral in order to meet work-family challenges.
被忽视的社交网络不平等

蔡锦鸿

我们大多数人熟知贫富差距带来收入不平等，也熟知教育不平等，但常常忽略另一种不平等，即人们在“社会资本”或重要社会关系上的“社交网络不平等”。在新加坡，这种现象尤为明显。在现实生活中，有的人呼朋引伴，左右逢源，而有的人则孤单一人，郁郁寡欢。社交网络不平等这一问题，已经引起了研究者的广泛关注。

社交网络不平等成为研究盲区，部分缘于我们对重要社会关系的忽视。我们坚信个人成就很大程度上来自于勤奋和能力，或者说是个人的努力。这些自然非常重要。然而，我们必须承认：哪又有多少人能够获取什么样的人脉网络？

美国社会学家詹姆斯·科林告诉我们，“我们认识谁（社会资本）”往往在“我们认识谁”的过程中至关重要。”他列举了家族、学校等社会网络，政治经济学家兼公务员约翰·斯图尔特·密尔的例子：他一生成就斐然，很大程度上归功于他的父亲詹姆斯·密尔的影响。这位学者家教良好，非常重视和他人的交流，这种人脉网络对他的成就起到了关键作用。

因此，我认为社会关系网络不平等值得研究，基于以下三个原因。

第一，社会资本，即人脉，并不是等同的，是根据个人、群体和等级社会关系，形成收入不平等，形成不均。第二，不同社会网络的不平等，反映人群建立社会资本的不同方式。第三，社会网络的不平等，往往依靠各类社团、社会组织等纽带，形成社会网络的重要渠道。不同社会网络之间的差异，往往在于其影响收入不平等。人脉网络好的人往往在劳动市场占据优势，收入收入更高，晋升更快。

通过对新加坡社交网络数据（包括2005年和2012年数据）的研究，我得出如下结论：

一、性别、种族和阶层等因素对社交网络有重要影响。分析显示，有优势的人脉关系既非随机分布，也非毫无规律可循，而是集中在某些社会群体。比如男性与女性的关系，男性与印族的关系，印族与华族的关系，华族与英族的关系等。这些社会关系之间存在相互关系，相互影响。这些社会关系网络不平等现象，即“关系”和“社会关系”被忽视了。

第二，社会关系网络不平等等现象。根据2005年的调查数据，相较于华族和印族，马来人较少受到他们与大学生和私营雇员（即富裕阶层）的联系，他们也较少与华族和印族“接触”。到了2012年，数据仍然显示，与其他族群相比，马来人较少与职业声望高的人有联系。因此，种族间的网络不平等现象有明显影响。

第三，社会关系网络与经济不平等。经济关系不平等与其他形式的社会关系不平等密切相关，特别是收入不平等。我的研究发现，拥有更多社会资本的人（如同大学毕业生和有工作的人）有助于增加收入水平。这带来几个不同，首先，社会资本对于获得经济资源至关重要。其次，社会关系的密切联系，缩小集团之间的“关系网络鸿沟”，有利于缩小它们之间的收入差距。

各国政府采取相应的宏观杠杆来调节收入差距，比如累进税收制度和各种针对穷人的援助项目。然而，我们建议一个在人际关系中的杠杆，即思考缩小社会群体所面临的社会网络不平等的策略，因为这与经济福祉有直接的联系。为此，我们需要建立一个阶层融合的社会，以便资源可以在人与人之间、群体与群体之间，通过社会网络流动。在新加坡，我们通过建立各种社团和组织，比如学校等网络，来促进社会关系的融合。我们可以期待关注如何通过社会网络，汇集来自各个社会阶层和背景的人群，以达到阶层融合的社会关系。

有关论文的网址如下：www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X13006028

（本文为新加坡国立大学社会学系助理教授）
Inequalities extend to ‘network’ inequalities

Most of us would be familiar with income inequality as the gap between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’. We may also be familiar with educational inequality. Yet one type of inequality that seems to elude our attention is ‘network inequality’ – the fact that some groups of people have more ‘social capital’ or valuable social connections than others. Some are better connected than others, while some have become lonely and depressed. Network inequality has, until more recently, has received only scant research attention in Singapore.

The blindsiding of network inequality must arise partly from the meritocratic ideals of our society; we believe that achievement is largely a matter of hard work and ability – in short, human capital. These matter, of course. But we must ask: What, in the first place, determines a person’s acquisition of human capital? The world-renowned American sociologist, James Coleman, teaches us that ‘who we know’ (social capital) is a critical factor in ‘what we know’ (human capital). The capitals are intertwined. He cites the example of John Stuart Mill, the philosopher, political economist, and civil servant, who became the accomplished man he was, due - to no small part - to the devotion of a dedicated father (James Mill) who spent much of his time and efforts honing the intellectual prowess of his son.

In this brief note, I argue the point that ‘network inequality’ deserves to be studied for at least three compelling reasons: First, social capital - the valuable connections that people have - are unequally distributed in the population, along lines we are all familiar with: gender, race and class. Second, network inequalities among groups arise from their unequal access to organizations that facilitate the forging of social capital, such as: families, schools, workplaces and voluntary associations. Third, network inequalities matter precisely because they influence income inequalities. People who have better networks tend to enjoy better attainments in the labour market in the form of better earnings, getting a promotion, and the like.

My elaboration of these points will invoke a range of research findings, all culled from the systematic analysis of social network data in Singapore (including data from the years 2005 and 2012).

(1) Network inequalities unfold along lines we are all familiar with: gender, race and class

My analysis of network data in Singapore reveals that the spread of valuable connections is neither random nor haphazard, but concentrate in certain groups. For example, men have a greater number of connections to weak-ties and to non-kin connections than women do. Scholars tell us that these kinds of ties are very useful for procuring new information including information related to the changing of jobs.
My studies have also discovered network inequalities by race, e.g., minorities such as Malays are less likely than Chinese and Indians to mention having connections to university graduates and private housing dwellers (i.e., wealthy connections). Malays are also less likely to have weak tie connections than Chinese and Indians according to the 2005 data. A later study – in 2012 – has showed that Malays are less likely than other ethnic groups to indicating knowing people in high-status occupations. Therefore the network inequalities by race do seem rather durable with time.

I also found network inequalities to occur on the basis of class. People with more education are more likely to have ties to university graduates, ties to people who are wealthy (e.g., who live in private housing), and ties to non-kin, compared with people who have less education. People who are wealthier tend also to have better quality connections than those who are less wealthy. All these findings illustrate the importance of one’s social location, whether gender, race or class, in shaping access to valuable social connections. One’s circumstances play a major role in paving or inhibiting access to social capital.

(2) Uneven access to social capital linked to unequal access to social contexts that facilitate social capital

Why do some groups have more social capital and some less? My research has shown tertiary education to be a major factor paving access to social capital. Indeed, Malay are less likely to have ties to university graduates and less likely to have wealthy connections because of their lower representation in places such as universities.

The workplace is another arena for the forging of social capital. Indeed women’s lower participation in paid work surfaces as an important reason for why they have less weak-tie and non-kin connections in their network.

Being part of a voluntary association (e.g., places of worship or a hobby club), increases one’s access to a wide range of valuable contacts – ties to well-educated people, ties to wealthy people, ties to non-kin, and access to weak ties. As women are more likely to participate in voluntary associations, this arena represents an especially important site of social capital for them.

Interestingly, although minority groups such as Malays have less social capital than Chinese due to their lower representation in critical arenas such as higher education, the few Malays that have higher education do see a bigger increase in their social capital than the many Chinese (who have tertiary education). Likewise, although women have less access to non-kin social capital due to their lower participation in paid work than men, women do forge social capital at faster rates than men when they join voluntary associations. These findings illustrate that one way to narrow network inequalities among social groups is to make more equal their access to organizations – schools, workplaces, voluntary associations and the like – that facilitate the formation of social capital.

(3) Network inequalities linked to economic inequalities

The third reason why we should study network inequality is its close link to other forms of inequality, most critically, income inequality. My research shows that having more social capital – such as having ties to
university graduates – facilitates better earnings on the job. This means several things: first, accessing social capital is critical for accessing economic capital. Second, since one is closely related to the other, narrowing the ‘network gap’ between groups will facilitate narrowing the income gap between them.

Governments have sought to narrow the income gap in their respective societies, using large levers such as progressive taxation and various targeted assistance schemes to the poor. In this brief article, I suggest that another lever – at a more interpersonal level – would be to think up strategies to narrow the network inequalities facing social groups, as these have a direct link to economic well-being. To that end, we need to foster a ‘class-integrated’ society so that resources can be shared around, traveling from one person to another, from one group to another, through the network. While much attention has been paid to fostering an ethnically-integrated society in Singapore, more attention could be paid to fostering a class-integrated society - a society where social networks are bringing together people from different class and social backgrounds.
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马来族的婚姻教育

对马来族群而言，婚姻很大程度上是一种社会契约，是双方履行对子女和近亲的义务和责任。

在2016年5月一场为期两天的婚姻家庭研讨会上，题为“我的爱情不是写在纸上的”马来族讨论小组，吸引了为数众多的回教感情参加。通常较为含蓄的回教教义，这次并不忌讳在大众面前表达爱意。讨论小组涉及“如何保鲜爱情”和“在婚姻中加强承诺”，甚至“美化爱的表达方式”等话题。活动轻松愉快的游戏中进行，包括让情侣用身体夹住一个充满空气的气球，为了防止气球爆炸或滑落，情侣的移动节奏必须同步，而且既不能靠太近又不能离得太远。这个游戏的目的是让参与者了解平衡的重要性——气球代表了婚姻的脆弱性。

马来家庭有他们自己的婚姻家庭失败的历练，因此这些婚姻预备课程，希望能对他们提供改善的机会。过去马来族群的离婚率偏高，但现在有所下降。但为什么过去的离婚率那么高，现在却下降了呢？要保持婚姻稳定长久，是否需要学习能够使婚姻保鲜的技巧呢？

在1950年代，极少数本地马来人会终身不婚。大部分马来妇女在16岁至19岁结婚，而男性则在19岁至23岁。当时的择偶条件，是看媒人基于两者相似的语族、华族和收入而定。当时研究新加坡马来族马来婚姻的文化人类学家朱利亚（Julia Jamour）发现，婚姻并非因为其宗教性而得受尊重，而对马来族群而言，离婚很大程度上是一种社会契约，是双方履行对子女和近亲的义务和责任。杰米尔称新加坡马来人重视“亲密个人关系”的和谐。即便是很小的不满，诸如粗鲁和矛盾方面的不满足，都会导致冲突。离婚似乎成为解决冲突的捷径。

在1950年代之前，马来人的离婚率很高。当时马来半岛上的马来人离婚率是全世界最低的。在新加坡，大约一半的马来婚姻以离婚收场。杰米尔的研究表明，离婚的原因包括无爱、性格不和及对一些问题的争执，诸如双方对婚后生活有不同主张等。尽管马来人希望婚姻天长地久，但他们也对婚姻有某种程度的准备。离婚率也可能与儿女结婚可以再婚的回教个人法（Muslim Personal Law）有关。而且，离婚并不一定加重个人负担，因为家庭亲属早已准备好，为随时可能发生的离婚所造成的经济和子女照料方面的问题提供支持。再者，离异后的家家长即便不与子女同住，也通常可轻易继续介入子女的生活。


这些年来，马来新娘的初婚年龄也提高了。在1965年，绝大多数的马来新娘年龄小于20岁；1985年，女性初婚年龄提高至20岁至24岁；2013年则为25岁至29岁。同时，30岁至34岁时初婚的马来女性人数也增加了。

另一个有意思的是由回教妇女向政府提出婚姻的离婚，是回教离婚法诉讼中数量最多的。不论男女，婚姻出轨是起诉原因之首。我们推测其中一个原因是因
Marriage and Divorce among Malays in Singapore:
‘Nurture’ Rather than ‘Nature’ as Key to Building Intact and Resilient Families
Associate Professor Maznah Mohamad (CFPR Steering Committee Member) and
Dr Suriani Suratman, Department of Malay Studies, NUS
As featured on Lianhe Zaobao, 4 December 2016

At a two-day Marriage Convention in May 2016, a Malay language session titled “My Love is not on Paper” attracted a sizeable crowd of Muslim couples. Normally reticent Muslims were not holding back their show of romantic affection towards each other. There were tips on how to “rejuvenate love”, “strengthen vows in marriage” and even “beautify the language of love”. The facilitation was light-hearted interspersed with fun games, such as using a full-blown balloon sandwiched between each couple. To prevent the balloon from bursting or flying away, couples had to synchronize their movements, neither coming too close to each other nor veering too far in separate directions. The key idea is balance – the balloon symbolizing how fragile a marriage can be.

Malay households have had their share of broken-down family histories, so a marriage preparatory course may offer some help in turning the tide. A striking feature of Malay marriages in the past was their high rate of divorce although this trend is declining. But why was there a high rate of divorce and what could explain this change? To have a lasting marriage should there be a nurturance of skills rather than merely dependence on common wisdom and natural instincts?

In the 1950s, few Malays in Singapore remained unmarried throughout their life. Most women would be married between the ages of 16 to 19 years while for men they would be between 19 to 23 years. In terms of choice of marriage partners, there would be a match between families with similar linguistic, residential and income background. However, marriage was not necessarily a sacred union meant to last forever. This was observed by anthropologist Judith Djamour who studied Singapore Malay families during that period. Among Malays it was largely a social contract between two people fulfilling obligations and responsibilities to their children and close kin. Djamour described Singapore Malays as valuing harmony in “personal intimate relationships”. Even small measures of discontentment, such as emotional and sexual dissatisfaction could lead to conflict. Divorce seemed to be the easiest solution to this.
Before the 1950s, the frequency of divorce amongst Malays was very high. In fact, rates of divorce among Malays in peninsular Malaysia was among the highest in the world. In Singapore, about half of all Malay marriages ended up in divorce. Reasons for divorce recorded by Djamour included childlessness, personal incompatibility and conflict over issues such as place of residence after marriage. While Malays hoped that their marriage would last forever they were also prepared that it would not. This high rate of divorce could also be due to the Muslim Personal Law which made it easy for divorce to take effect, as well as re-marriage to take occur soon after that. Divorce was less of a personal burden given that the extended family was ready to provide economic and childcare support whenever the marriage breaks down. Both parents had an easier access to their children even if no longer living together.

Today, family life, marriage and divorce patterns among Singapore Malays have changed drastically. Well-known demographer Gavin Jones has studied marriage and divorce trends in Muslim Southeast Asia and noted the sharp drop in divorce rates after the 1950s, from more than 15 divorces for every 1000 population to less than 5 in 1960. By the year 2000 there were less than 2 divorces per 1000 population. Similarly, a report by the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) recorded a decline in Muslim divorce rates from 14.0% for the 2003 and 2004 marriage cohorts to 11.4% for the 2008 marriage cohorts. More Malay couples also tend to stay longer in their marriages before divorcing. In 1985, 45% of Malay divorces occurred among those married for less than five years. By 2013 the overall divorce rate for Malays was comparable to those of other ethnic groups at about 30%.

Over the years, age at first marriage among Malay brides has also risen. While most Malay brides were under 20 years of age in 1965, those who married in 1985 were between 20 and 24 years old. By 2013, the age range further increased from 25 to 29 years. A greater number of older Malay women aged between 30 to 34 years were also getting married for the first time.

Other findings of interest include the role of Muslim women in initiating their divorces. They comprised the highest number of applicants in Islamic divorce court proceedings. Infidelity is cited as the main cause for divorce among both males and females. We speculate that one of the reasons for infidelity being the case may be due to the Islamic provision for polygamy. This may have led to the high tendency among Muslim men to engage in relationships with women who could be their subsequent spouses. Financial problems was cited to be the next highest cause for divorce followed by domestic violence.

Perhaps in response to the distinctive trend and rate of Muslim divorce in Singapore, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) launched its Family Development Department in August 2004 with a focus on building “strong and cohesive families”. By 2011, Malay educational organisations such as the MENDAKI Community also started to emphasize the importance of the “intact” and “resilient” family.

The stress on how to nurture lasting marriages could be traced to the early 1980s. The then Ministry of Social Affairs (now renamed MSF) was already running its Marriage Preparation Programme for first-time married Muslim couples. By 2004 the ministry received 27,000 referrals in their counselling programmes. Perhaps as a result of such focused counselling, 44% of the referred couples did not proceed with their intention to divorce. Currently, the Muslim marriage preparatory programme is held under the auspices of the MSF and is given the moniker Cinta Abadi, or “Marriage of a Lifetime”.
The range of topics covered in these courses include communication skills, and financial and stress management. However, some courses tend to over-emphasize the unequal role of husbands and wives – males as providers and females as caregivers. Given the realities of Malay dual-income households where both men and women contribute materially and socially to the welfare of their households, this may need to be revised.

The Families for Life Council conducts an annual poll to gauge attitudes of couples towards marriage. In two successive annual polls, the majority of respondents in hindsight felt that it was important for couples to attend programmes that could prepare them for marriage. A majority also agreed that couples should improve their quality of marriage by attending marriage enrichment programmes. It goes to show that marriage is not a union in which two people can ‘naturally’ build their relationship merely based on love and attraction for each other, but an enterprise in need of careful nurturance. Perhaps it is like learning how to invest in it wisely. If a wedding can be hugely costly today, a divorce may even be more so.
我们是否对孩子管教太严？

新加坡的教育体系，因其培育了学优优秀又具备竞争力的学生而享誉国际。在2015年经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的一项针对76个国家的15岁青少年的调查中，新加坡学生在自然科学与数学成绩上名列前茅。毫无疑问，新加坡普遍存在一种通过父母与老师的标准高、期望高，来促使学生在学业上脱颖而出的氛围。因此，新加坡学生常常面临巨大的学业压力，甚至连小学生也不能避免。

对于我们是否让孩子置身于过度的学业压力这一问题，近期因为一个11岁男孩的自杀悲剧而广受公众注目。这男孩因为考试发挥不佳，害怕告诉父母自己的成绩而选择轻生。这起自杀案例，发生在2015年新加坡一个青少年（10岁到13岁）自杀率急剧增加的大背景下。虽然每个青少年或少年选择轻生的原因各不相同，许多案例似乎都指向了为达到学业要求这重要因素。

父母常常对孩子的学业抱有较高的期望，一些父母表现在教诲孩子的学习以取得好成绩。而对子女的学业及期望，过度的期望确实会在成长过程中产生负面影响。我们希望在孩子身上看到他们为自己设定高标准，而且努力达到这些标准。然而，追求成功的程度中，我们也希望能够避免一些负面影响，如过分关心自己所犯的错误、过分关注自己的表现是否满足了他人（如父母与老师）所设立的高标准。过分关注自己的错误与过于期望的表现，在心理学上被称为适应不良性完美主义。

研究表明，这些具备适应不良性完美主义倾向的个体，常常表现出焦虑、压抑，长期而言容易产生倦怠的情绪。这些人通常缺乏创造

力与创新能力，倾向于保守的处事方式。更重要的是，目前在学术上还不能充分解释：孩子最初是如何形成适应不良性完美主义？

在一项为期五年的针对新加坡小学生的研究中，我们的研究团队发现，大部分的孩子都认为，父母之间的关系，对自己有达到完美的期望值。此外，那些父母具有较强自我控制欲的孩子，倾向于对自己过分严格，且这趋势还将与日俱增。控制欲较强的父母，常常剥夺孩子在没有威胁性的环境中的学习机会，甚至受到错误中学习的机会。当父母介入孩子的生活时，它会传递出“孩子不够优秀”的信号，因此父母、老师介入孩子生活的各个方面。孩子可能因此而变得对一切都小心翼翼，不让自己犯下任何的错误。久而久之形成适应不良性完美主义观念，并表现出日益明显的压抑与焦虑症状。

一项在美国与德国展开的研究显示，父母对孩子的期望，可以成为一种积极的推动力，提升孩子在学业上的表现。然而，当父母对孩子期望过高时，长期而论，孩子的成绩反而会下降。总体上，研究显示当父母为孩子制定不切实际的高要求，并过度介入他们的学习空间时，孩子无论在学习上还是情绪上都表现不佳。当孩子形成了适应不良性完美主义观念，遇到问题时，他们更倾向于不同他人寻求帮助，因为他们不想让别人知道自己也会有脆弱的一面。这样的想法，也将进一步加剧这些孩子的心里压力。

在预防孩子出现这种问题，父母能做些什么呢？父母当然可以对孩子抱有一定的期望，但需要注重一些期望是否符合孩子的实际能力，同时还要注意与孩子的沟通方式。父母常常认为，他们是为了孩子的未来，才对孩子学业要求严格。然而，父母应该反思这样的做法，是否会减少孩子体验自主思考的乐趣和机会。对此我们的建议是：了解孩子的能力，并为设定更加实际可行的标准。

父母如何向孩子表达自己的希望也十分重要。父母可以从小帮助孩子制定切合实际的目标，并以帮助他们达到这些目标的方式，来表达自己的支持。父母应培养孩子从错误和失败中学习的支持性氛围，并认识到犯错误也是学习过程的一部分。切勿害怕设定高期望，并要求孩子有良好的表现，而不为孩子提供精神上与学习上的支持。切勿拿自己的孩子与他人比较，以免打击他们的自信心。切勿向孩子传达“要么全部，要么没有”这样的思想（例如：要考到第一名，第二名永远不够好）。父母应当认可并赞扬孩子所付出的努力与所取得的成功。

在2016年的国庆群众大会上，李显龙总理回忆了他曾在的他对新加坡的三个愿望。他说他只有两个愿望。第一个愿望是希望新加坡总是能处于安全状态，拥有更好的生产力。第二个是新加坡领导人对人民的自豪和骄傲，知道我们的国家有多宝贵，才选择珍惜它并保护它。在许多方面，总理所说的话，都可被应用到我们对孩子的看法。我们希望孩子能够有勇气去做他们的本分，而我们也要赞扬他们的成就，把他们当作最亲的孩子一样珍惜。我们在孩子的生活教育上所给予不断鼓励与支持，才能真正地帮助他们实现潜能的方式，并促使他们能够拥有一段快乐的学习旅程。

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（本系列是国大家庭研究中心提供的研究摘要，由不将专家联合撰文，每月第一个星期天刊登）
Are We Pushing Our Children Too Hard in Academics?
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Singapore’s educational system enjoys an excellent international reputation as one that produces students who are highly knowledgeable and competent. In 2015, Singapore came in first place in science and mathematics scores of 15-year-olds in a ranking survey of 76 countries done by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Undoubtedly, there is a pervasive climate of ensuring high standards and expectations from parents and teachers to excel academically. Singaporean students are often faced with immense academic stress and even young children attending primary schools are not exempted from this stressful environment.

The question of whether we are subjecting our children to excessive stress in school came sharply into public focus recently due to the tragic case of an 11 year-old boy who committed suicide because he did not do well in his exam and was afraid of telling his grades to his parents. This particular case of suicide occurred against the backdrop of a spike in suicide rates among children and adolescents (aged 10-19 years) in 2015. Although the underlying reasons for ending one’s life differ from case to case, a number of cases seem to point to reasons where children fail to meet academic expectations.

Parents often have high expectations of their children’s academic performance and some may demonstrate this by urging the child to achieve good grades, while others may overreact when the child makes mistakes and falls short of expectations. Such parental behavior can potentially influence a child’s self-views, in particular their beliefs about how perfect they should be when it comes to schoolwork. Setting high standards and striving to achieve those standards are definitely behaviours that we hope to see in our children. However, in this pursuit of excellence, we want to avoid a potential downside – to become overly concerned of one’s mistakes and whether one’s performance is matching up to high standards imposed by others (such as parents and teachers). This concern of making errors and falling short of expectations is known as maladaptive perfectionism.

Research has shown that individuals who are high on maladaptive perfectionism are often anxious, depressed, and suffer from burnout over the long term. They are also less creative and innovative, often sticking to the tried-and-tested way of doing things. A more important question that has yet to be adequately addressed in research is how does maladaptive perfectionism emerge in children in the first place?

In a five-year study on primary school children in Singapore, a team of us from the Department of Psychology at the National University of Singapore found that a majority of children felt that others such as parents and teachers have high expectations on them to be perfect. Furthermore, children with intrusive and controlling parents had a higher tendency to be overly critical of themselves and this tendency increased over the years. Controlling parents often deprive children the opportunities to learn (even from making mistakes) in a nonthreatening environment. When parents intrude, it signals to
children that they are not good enough that parents have to intervene in various domains of their lives. As a consequence, these children may become overly concerned about committing even the slightest errors. Over time, children develop maladaptive perfectionistic beliefs and show elevated depression or anxiety symptoms.

A study done in the United States and Germany has shown that parents’ aspirations for their children’s academic achievement can be a positive motivating force for the children, enabling them to perform well in studies. However, when parents have excessive expectations (i.e., over-aspirations) on their children’s achievement, the children’s academic performance suffers over time.

In general, research suggests that children do not do well academically and emotionally when parents place unrealistically high demands on them and intrude into their learning space excessively. When children develop maladaptive perfectionistic beliefs, they become less inclined to seek help for problems as they do not want others to know that they can be vulnerable at times. This could further exacerbate the emotional distress in children with such beliefs.

What can parents do to prevent their children from developing maladaptive perfectionistic beliefs? While parents definitely can have expectations about their children, parents need to be mindful of whether their expectations are realistic given the children’s ability and the way they communicate their expectations. Parents often think that by pushing their children hard in studying, they are doing it for the sake of the children’s future. However, parents need to ask themselves if doing so is undermining their children’s joy of learning and discovery at their own pace. The advice is: know your child’s ability and set realistic standards for him or her.

How parents communicate their expectations is also very critical. Parents could show support to their children’s learning process by helping them set realistic goals and work towards achieving those goals. Foster a supportive climate of learning from mistakes and failing, recognizing that making mistakes are part and parcel of a learning process. Do not simply set high expectations and demand high performance from your child without providing emotional and learning support. Do not compare your child to others and put him or her down. Do not communicate “all-or-nothing” thinking to your child (e.g., “Getting second place is not enough, you need to get first place”). Acknowledge and celebrate the achievements and efforts put in by your child.

In his 2016 National Day Rally speech, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong recounted a moment when he was asked about three wishes he had for Singapore. He said that he had just two wishes. The first was that we could be blessed with a “divine discontent” and always be driven to do better in what we do. The second wish was that we have the wisdom to count our blessings, knowing how precious our country is and we know how to protect and treasure it. In many ways, what the PM has said can be applied to how we see our children. We hope to inculcate in them a motivation to strive for the better, but at the same time, to celebrate what they have achieved and treasure them as our beloved children. Demonstrating that we are always supporting our children in their journey of learning will go a long way in helping them achieve their potential and making their journey an enjoyable one.
怎样变老才算成功？
——新加坡人的看法

成功老龄是西方社会近年在研究人口老化时，被广泛地讨论和使用的概念。这个概念是否完全适用于亚洲社会呢？新加坡人对成功老龄又有什么不同的看法呢？

人们一般认为，疾病和残疾是衰老过程中的必然结果，而如何治疗疾病和改善残废，也就成为了大多数老龄研究的主题。1987年，两位美国教授罗文（John W. Rowe）和卡恩（Robert L. Kahn）在《科学》杂志发表了一篇影响深远的文章《人类老化的正常和成功的》。他们认为，单纯关注疾病和残疾，会忽略老年群体中的巨大差异，因为在那些无病无残的老年人中，存在一部分健康风险低且身体功能水平高的“成功老龄者”，其老化进程有别于其他那些“正常老龄者”。

这个观点启发了对“成功老龄者”的众多后续研究。尤其是近年来，随着人口老化成为世界范围内的普遍现象，人们开始不仅仅追求寿命延长，而更加希望提高长寿的生活质量，这就进一步促进了成功老龄研究的学术和社会价值。具体来说，什么是成功老龄者呢？这两位美国教授提出了这样的标准，即较少的疾病和残疾风险，较高的认知功能和身体机能，以及活跃的社会参与。如果说一位老人满足了全部这些标准，就可以被认定为一个成功老龄者。

成功老龄是否可能有专家算了算吗？这是一个好问题。有些老年人虽然没有通过专家设定的标准，却可能认为自己是成功老龄者；而也有些老年人虽然可以被学术认定为成功老龄者，但却有可能从来没有认为自己的老年生活有什么“成功”可言。在最近的一个研究中，联合国人口司的顾大男博士及其同事发现，对于成功老龄，老年人的自我评价，和学术标准的专业评价之间存在重要分歧，而其各自的影响力因素也不同。这些为成功老龄的自我评价应该得到充分的重视，因为只有学术意义却不能被老年人本身认可的标准，可能无法全面反映老年群体的真实需求。

有趣的是，成功老龄的自我评价，往往受到文化的影响。有学者指出，成功老龄这个源自美国的概念，其实包含着强烈的美利坚文化气息。这种文化将实现成功老龄视为个人的成就，其实核心的观念，是避免老龄化所带来的一切问题；而其保持老年生活的独立性。这种状况在亚洲人眼中就是“成功”吗？恐怕未必。学者们发现，印度老年人的成功老龄观念中，并没有特别重视晚年生活的独立性；在韩国，很多老年人将子女事业的成功，视为自己成功老龄的标准；在日本，一些老年人认为，老年人应不再对社会有所贡献，而将精力集中在自己的生活和家庭。不过，学者们也发现，香港的老年人对于子女的孝顺、老有所养作为成功老龄的标准。这不同于西方的标准的成功老龄观念，有着独特的亚洲文化价值基础，使老年人开始研究新加坡人的成功老龄观念。

自2011年开始，我参与了教育部资助的由新加坡国立大学社会学系教授宝燕盛博士领导的一项社会调查，对新加坡的成功老龄进行了研究。我们系统地访谈了大约50名不同种族和社会阶层的新加坡老人，并提炼出了12个成功老龄的标准，然后又对大约1500名新加坡老年人进行了问卷调查，而且他们对这些标准的看法。研究结果发现，新加坡老年人认为成功老龄基本上应该有三个标准：第一组大体涉及
What is Successful Aging? Views of Singaporeans

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Singapore elderly people wish for healthy, happy and independent lives, and meanwhile are eager for love from children, care from family and respect from society.

Successful aging is a leading concept of the aging studies in the Western societies. Is this concept applicable to Asia? How do Singaporeans perceive about this notion?

People tend to believe that diseases and disability could not be avoided in the aging process, and thus how to cure people with disease and disability becomes a long pursuit of medical science. However, in the year of 1987, two American scholars, Rowe and Kahn by distinguished “successful” aging from “normal” aging. They propose that successful agers could be free from disease and disability. Their views divert research attention from pathologically impaired elderly individuals to “successful agers”, who are defined as those with less disease and disability, high level of cognitive and physical function, and active social engagement.

Should successful aging only be defined by professionals? This is a good question. Researchers found out that self-evaluated outcomes of successful aging often do not match the professional assessments. Old individuals with disability and disease, who are then unqualified as successful agers by academic criteria, may report a good quality of life and self-identify as successful agers; some successful agers classified by Rowe and Kahn’s definition may however report otherwise. These incongruities imply that lay perceptions of successful aging may go beyond the indicators established by the professional model.

Interestingly the lay perception on successful aging often vary by culture. Researchers found out that solo-living elders in Hong Kong tended to highlight filial piety of children in their perceptions of successful aging; Ogimi villagers in Japan considered the traditional weaving as one means towards successful aging; in Korea, many elders take the success of their children as the marker of their successful aging.

These interesting patterns encourage us to investigate how Singaporean perceive successful aging. In the MOE-funded project, we interviewed about 50 elderly Singaporeans by different ethnicities and summarized 12 themes of successful aging from their narratives. Next, we conducted a national survey of about 1500 participants, in which respondents evaluated the importance of each theme. We found out these themes have three groups. The first group was mainly about self-sufficiency in later life, consisted of a series of idealized individual characteristics of old age such as “to be happy”, “to be physically mobile”, “to be free of diseases”, “to be financially secure”, and “to be independent in life”. The second group was basically about the maintenance of social function, with items such as “to be able to take care of other family members”, “to have friends”, “to be able to continue working” and “to engage in social activity”. The last group was concerned about availability of family support, with three items of “to have my spouse with me”, “to have children living together with me”, and “to have children taking care of me”.

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The first group shows that the Singapore elderly holds similar ideas with the western standard; however the third group reveal some distinct values. We further found out that there should be at least half of elderly Singaporeans who simultaneously valued independence and dependence for successful aging. Such ambivalence in perception captures the complexity of lay views on successful aging in Singapore. The coexistence of two opposite attitudes was indeed not odd, because old Singaporeans expect care from children in old age, but at the same time do not want to become a burden for family.

In recent years, Rowe and Kahn further proposed Successful Aging 2.0 as the society-level evaluation standard of successful ageing. We argue that building a society of successful aging needs to be cautious about the local culture. Based on the findings of our study, as the eldercare function of family is highly valued by elderly Singaporeans, we think whether family delivers eldercare as expected by elderly should be used as a main marker of the society-level successful aging.
孝道是防老的可靠基础吗？

在大多数所谓的儒家社会中，孝道是“代际扶持”（intergenerational support，下-代奉养上-代）的基本，这一价值观念规定成年子女有义务在父母有需要时供养他们。这种做法也符合抚养孩子长大成人，是为了让年老的以父母为中心的社会架构。

值得肯定的是，大多数新加坡人都通过社会化过程，将孝道内化为一种价值观。因此，这被普遍认为是理所当然，无可厚非的社会期望。假设他们不能贯彻这一价值观，将会受到道德谴责和法律制裁，以法治孝的新加坡正是如此。

然而，这并不意味着孝道必然是一种艰难的义务。当父母富有时，孝顺可能实际上对子女有益。如果父母在经济上独立，或当他们的成年子女有足够的能力扶养父母，遵从孝顺的价值观，在很大程度上是没有问题的，甚至会产生自我满足感。然而，如果成年子女缺乏一定的经济能力，即使有道德或法律制裁，也很可能会不赡养父母。简而言之，孝道不一定是成年子女赡养父母的可靠基础。

什么是更可靠的供养父母的基础呢？我认为是经济为中心，而不是以自我为中心。从这个角度来看，人们选择赡养年迈父母，不是因为他们是父母退休计划的一部分，或者道德约束，甚至法律强制要他们偿还父母抚养他们成人的债务；而是由于他们关爱父母。同样，人们选择生孩子，是因为他们希望给予一个。这是一个以孩子为中心的关系，把培养孩子看作是情感性而非工具性的关系。

如果爱的是确保父母得到赡养的更可靠的基础，我们有合理理由去判断新加坡人的赡养行为，究竟在多大程度上受到爱而非义务的驱动。

让我们从2011年社会分期调查的主要发现，来看看新加坡人的行为取向。56%的样本选择“爱父母”作为“为父母提供经济支持”的理由；而17%的人认为代际转移是一种交易形式（“报答父母培养他们成人”）；另有27%的人认为供养父母是一种义务或社会期望。相应地，54%的样本认为养育孩子是“付出爱”和接受爱作为副产品；而25%的人认为这是退休计划的一部分；另外21%的人认为它符合社会期望。

我们还可以观察到，在阶级和代际转移的基础之间，存在一种相当清晰的正相关关系。调查发现高收入人群（68%）比低收入人群（45%）更有理由认为，“爱父母”是照顾年迈父母的主要动机。同样，75%的高收入人群认为，“爱孩子”是照顾孩子的主要动机，低收入人群则占35%。

我们可从上述的观察中得出一项重要启示：随着新加坡成为中产阶级社会，可以推断，在未来占主导地位的是“爱”，而非孝道。此外，由于与孝道相捆绑的社会义务，不是代际转移的可靠基础，在公共运动和教育中，强调爱是建立强大的家庭纽带的关键因素，因而变得十分有意义。采取这样的方针，也能够确保家庭内部的互相扶持，这包括代际扶持，甚至可能能间接地促进生育率。无疑地，如果把本文所讨论的问题，简单地归结为到底是“因爱建立感情纽带”还是“义务导致束缚”的竞争的话，哪一方能更胜一筹，答案很明显。

（作者是新加坡国立大学社会学系副教授，本系列是国大家庭人口研究中心提供的研究摘要，由不同专家学者执笔，每月第一个星期天刊登）
Is Filial Piety a Reliable Basis for Intergenerational Support?

A/P Tan Ern Ser, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology; Academic Adviser, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) Social Lab, NUS

As featured on Lianhe Zaobao, 5 March 2017

Is filial piety a reliable basis for intergenerational support?

In most so-called Confucian societies, the basis of inter-generational support is filial piety, a value which prescribes that adult children have an obligation to support their parents if they are in need. This practice also corresponds to a rather parent-centric institution in which children are produced and raised as part of one’s retirement planning.

Most Singaporeans have, to their credit, internalized filial piety as a value through the process of socialization. It is therefore a much taken for granted, uncontestable social expectation. Should they fail to inculcate this value, there is the force of moral sanction—and legal sanction, as in the case of Singapore—to enforce compliance.

However, this is not to suggest that filial piety is necessarily experienced as a difficult obligation. Where parents are wealthy, being filial may actually be beneficial to their children. Where parents are financially independent or when their adult children have sufficient capacity to support their dependent parents, compliance to the value of filial piety would be largely unproblematic, even intrinsically satisfying. However, where adult children lack the capacity to support their dependent parents, there is a strong likelihood of non-compliance, notwithstanding the force of moral or legal sanction. In short, filial piety is not a reliable basis for ensuring that adult children would take care of their dependent parents.

Is love a more reliable basis for ensuring support of parents?

What then is a more reliable basis for the support of parents? I would argue that love is a more reliable basis than filial piety.

Love is relationship-centric, as opposed to self-centric. Seen from this perspective, people choose to support their dependent parents, not because they are part of the latter’s retirement planning or they are morally obliged, even compelled by law, to repay a debt they owe their parents for having raised them, but because they are motivated by love for their parents. By the same token, people choose to have children because they desire to have someone to whom they could give love. This is a child-centric orientation, which sees raising children in expressive, rather than instrumental terms.

Intergenerational transfers: love, repayment, and social expectation

If love is indeed a more reliable basis for ensuring that parents in need are supported, then there are good justifications to find out the extent to which Singaporeans are driven more by love than by obligation.
Table 1 indicates that 56 percent of the sample select “love for one’s parents” as a reason for “providing financial support to parents in old age”, compared with 17 percent who see intergenerational transfers as a form of transaction (“repayment for raising one from young”), and another 17 percent who view support for dependent parents as an obligation or social expectation.

Correspondingly, 54 percent of the sample view raising children as about “giving love” and receiving love as a by-product, compared with 25 percent who consider it as a part of one’s retirement planning, and another 21 percent who see it in terms of meeting social expectation (see Table 2).

Class differences in orientation towards love and filial piety

It can also be observed that there is a rather clear-cut, positive correlation between class and the basis of inter-generational transfers. Table 1 shows that people with higher income (68 percent) are more likely to see “love for one’s parents” as a basis for providing financial support to dependent parents, than those in the lower income categories (45 percent). Somewhat similarly, while 75 percent of high-income people consider “love for children” as the main motivation for raising children, that for low-income people is 35 percent. (Table 2).

Emphasize love in public campaigns and education

An important implication from the above observations is that as Singapore becomes more of a middle-class society, we may extrapolate that “love”, rather than filial piety will predominate in the future. Moreover, because the social obligation associated with filial piety is not a reliable basis for inter-generational transfers, it makes sense to emphasize love in public campaigns and education as the key ingredient to building strong family bonding. Taking this approach would also indirectly encourage intra-familial support, which includes inter-generational support, or even promote fertility as a by-product. Clearly, if the issue here boils down to a contest between “love leading to bonding” and “obligation leading to bondage”, it is obvious which of these ought to win.

1 Tables 1 and 2 are extracted from Tan, ES (2015), Class and Social Orientations: Key Findings from the Social Stratification Survey 2011. IPS Exchange Series, no. 4.
### Table 1: Reasons for providing financial support to aged parents %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Income ($)</th>
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<td>Reason Overall sample</td>
<td>Overall sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($)</td>
<td>$1999 or lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love for one’s parents</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A repayment for raising one from young</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is expected of children to support their parents financially</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Reasons for raising children %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Income Category ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason Overall sample</td>
<td>Overall sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Category ($)</td>
<td>$1999 or lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have someone we could give love to</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have someone to take care of us in old age</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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<td>It is expected of people to have and raise children</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
孩子究竟带给父母什么？

当父亲更加主动自发地参与到育儿之中时：当母亲不必再处于权衡事业与家庭的矛盾中痛苦无助，生育率的升高也就不那么远了吧。

新加坡在年初推出全新的父亲陪产假。根据人力部的相关条例，2017年1月1日及之后出生的孩子，其父母可享有两周政府补贴的带薪陪产假。此外，从今年7月1日起，父亲还可从母亲16周的带薪产假中，共享四周的产假。从只有母亲才享有产假，到今年两项新变化，反映了父亲照顾幼儿的责任越来越得到重视，以及政府、社会和家庭对改变新加坡长期低生育率的共同努力。

新加坡的生育率自1975年之后一路下降，总和生育率在1970年时为3.07，即每对育龄女性生育3.07个子女。这一数字在1975年为2.08，而在1977年更是降至1.82，低于更替生育率——总和生育率2.1才能维持无迁移状态下平衡的人口水平。新加坡2016年的总和生育率仅1.20。

新加坡低迷的生育率受到个人化的生活方式、教育周期的延长、生活压力的增加和育儿成本上升等多方面因素的影响。其中不容忽视的是女性在工作和家庭生活中角色的变化。一方面，现代化进程给予了当今女性更多发展空间。女性可以延展自己的机会，女性教育、社会和经济地位的提高，使她们能够在职场上扬长避短，独具特色。但同时，不可否认的是，家庭之中，女性照料孩子、打理家务的传统责任却未有丝毫变轻。新加坡女性，需要越来越两地肩负起家庭外的双重压力。

新加坡女性的日益吃重以及与之相伴的低生育率，在亚洲其他国家也普遍存在。今年初在新加坡国立大学的一场演讲中，哈佛大学社会学系教授玛丽・布林顿（Mary Brinton）基于女性在家庭和工作中的角色变化，将社会划分为四种类型：“男主外、女主内”的传统型；亲工作型，即女性可以自由地选择她们在家庭和工作中扮演的角色，以及如北欧国家一般的全面平等主义，即男性和女性对等地享有发展事业的权利并分担家庭责任的义务。

新加坡和日本等亚洲国家都非常重视男性参与育儿。在这些社会中，女性面临着同时兼顾家庭与工作的巨大压力。布林顿在其研究中进一步提出，几个以男性参与育儿型为主的国家，都在面临着生育率走低的局面。相对的，以全面平等主义和全面平等主义为主的国家，总和生育率大多高于1.50。

基于相关研究，与其他东亚国家比，中国的性别平等问题相对较弱。即便如此，近年来中国相关研究也开始重视女性在职场上日益增长的压力，和在家庭生活和职业生活中的沉重负担。2015年10月，中国政府全面放开二孩政策，结束了它自上世纪80年代初的一孩政策。尽管全面二孩政策实行后，2016年的出生人口高达2015年，然而，这一政策的成效仍不显著，这更是受到育儿成本等多方面因素的影响，用有些冷淡，它与男性角色在家庭和事业上的不对等关系密切相关。

我与普林斯顿大学社会学系教授克瑞斯・司徒研究出2016年的研究发现，相比生育一个孩子的父母，生育两个孩子父母会更加多地在时间上投入在工作上，而更少地照顾家人。对于母亲而言，这些影响并不显著。同时，不仅在父母的经济生活方面，生育两个孩子对父母主观感受的影响，也具有鲜明的性别差异。具体而言，生育两个孩子的父母会将自己的事业和未来更加充满信心，而生育两个孩子的母亲会感觉自己更快乐、对生活拥有更高的满意度，同时对自我的社交交往能力有更高的评价。
Earlier this year, progress has been made on paternity leave. Based on relevant regulations of Singapore’s Ministry of Manpower, from 1 January 2017, eligible working fathers are entitled to 2 weeks of paid paternity leave funded by the Government. Moreover, from 1 July 2017, working fathers get to share up to 4 weeks of their wife’s 16 weeks of Government-Paid Maternity Leave. Moving from maternity leave only, to fathers sharing 1 week of their wife’s maternity leave, then to this year’s two major changes, what can be seen is fathers’ increasing involvement in childcare, as well as the joint efforts of the government, society and families to ameliorate the continued decline in fertility.

Singapore’s fertility levels have fallen since the early 1970s, especially after 1975. Specifically, Singapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) was 3.07 in 1970, which means that each woman of childbearing age would have an average of 3.07 children in her lifetime. This figure dropped to 2.08 in 1975, and in 1977 to 1.82, falling below the replacement fertility. In general, a TFR around 2.1 is needed to maintain a stable population level without migration, that is, the replacement fertility. In 2016, Singapore’s TFR was only 1.20. It is true that Singapore’s depressed fertility has been affected by many factors, such as individualized lifestyles, lengthened education completion, increased pressures of living, and rising cost of childcare. However, one factor that cannot be ignored is the changing role of women in work and family life. On the one hand, the process of modernization has given women more opportunities to pursue personal growth and expand their careers. Women's improved status in education and socioeconomic status has enabled them to prosper and thrive on the workplace. Despite these changes, it is undeniable that the responsibilities for caring for the family and managing household chores still fall largely on women’s shoulders. Singaporean women have been faced with increasing difficulty in balancing work and family.

The rising pressures shouldered by women and the accompanying low birth rates are also common in other Asian countries. In a speech delivered at the National University at the beginning of this year, Mary Brinton, Professor of Sociology at Harvard University, divided the society into four types based on the relationship between husband and wife in family and work: the traditional type, that is, the conventional model of “breadwinner husband and homemaker wife”; pro-work conservative type, that is, women need to thrive in both work and family; the flexible egalitarian type, such like in the United States, where women can autonomously choose their roles in family and work; the full egalitarian type such as in the Nordic countries, where men and women equally enjoy the right to develop their careers and share the burden of family responsibilities. Asian countries such as Singapore, Japan, and South Korea are all classified as pro-work conservative societies. In these societies, women are faced with immense pressure to take care of both family and work. Prof. Brinton further discovered in her research that, indeed, the countries that are mainly pro-work conservative tend to have lower fertility levels; whereas, countries that mainly adopt flexible egalitarianism and full egalitarianism, TFRs are almost all higher than 1.50.
Based on research, compared with other East Asian countries, China’s gender relation is relatively equal. However, even so, in recent years research on China has generally pointed to the increasing pressure on women in the workplace and the ever heavier burden on family life. In October 2015, the Chinese government implemented the universal two-child policy, thus ending its one-child policy since the early 1980s. Although the actual number of births of 2016 was higher than that of 2015 after the policy change, the scale of the effect is still lower than expected. Although this is affected by many factors such as the cost of childcare, it cannot be ignored that it is closely related to the unbalanced relationship across gender in family and career. In a 2016 study conducted by me and Professor Yu Xie of the Department of Sociology at the Princeton University, we found that fathers who have two children spend more time on the job and less time taking care of family members than parents who have one child. For mothers, these effects are not significantly different for those with one and two children. Not only in the economic life of parents, the impacts on parents’ subjective well-being are also gendered. Specifically, a father who had two children had more self-confidence in his career and future, and a mother who had two children felt happier, had a higher degree of life satisfaction, and had better self-rated social skills. That is to say, although more children bring gains in subjective well-being to both parents, the clear gender differences indicate that in contemporary China, gender division of labor within the family still exists. Apart from the differential distributions of parents’ time, because mothers have more responsibility than their fathers for taking care of and raising children, their positive subjective well-being are all about the overall feeling of life and social interaction. Meantime, the responsibilities of providing for the family are still more borne by the fathers. Accordingly, fathers are only gaining better subjective well-being related to the development of themselves and their careers.

To conclude, it takes the joint efforts of the society and family to promote higher fertility. First, on the basis of existing policy support, how the government and employers can further cooperate with each other and provide young parents with longer-term and more flexible parental leaves is very important. What is more important is whether the society, families, and individuals can fully understand the different pressures brought about by children on the mothers and fathers, so that all can strive to establish more equal gender relations in the workplace and in the family. When the entire society and every family can willingly agree that men and women have the same right to work and are equally responsible for taking care of the family and children; when fathers are more proactively involved in childcare; when mothers can be relieved from the difficulty in juggling between career and family, the rise in fertility will not be so far away.
培养双语儿童的益处、挑战及成功策略

人文亚洲
Leher Singh

培养孩子说两种语言能够让孩子从小年纪就受益匪浅。会说双语的人能够更擅长同时处理多项任务，更有效地过滤冗余信息，更快地获取新资讯，以及更灵活地对待接纳和解决问题。即使在晚年，会说双语的老年人的大脑之老化过程也更为健康，这表明双语可以成为老化大脑的保存剂。

新加坡国立大学婴幼儿语言中心研究双语的儿童，试图更好地理解双语如何影响儿童的早期发展。最新研究发现，和只说一种语言的儿童相比，同时学习英语和中文的儿童，掌握更多中文发音声调的知识。这些优势在幼儿甚至2岁甚至3岁（刚开始叫一个单词时）就被出现。我们还发现，在2岁宝宝当中，中英双语宝宝和中文单语宝宝对中文词汇的识别能力同等。这个发现和之前的很多研究一致，显示了学习双语并不会限制儿童对其中一种语言的掌握程度。最后，我们还发现，18个月大的双语宝宝在学习其它新语言时有一定的优势，即使这些新语言和婴儿的双语几乎没有什么关联。

一项新近的研究中，我们教中英双语宝宝和英语单语宝宝一些他（她）们从未听过或学过的恩德贝莱语（一种南非语言）的词汇。经过数分钟的训练，只有双语宝宝能够学会恩德贝莱词汇。这一发现帮助我们提高双语能够培养儿童拥有更大的语言灵活性，帮助他们学习更多的语言。

虽然双语主义能够让孩子获得语言学习和认知上的益处，培养一个双语小孩却不是一件容易的事情。下面列出了双语儿童家长常问的问题，并基于双语主义的研究结果提供一些建议。

第一个问题是，是不是最好等到小孩掌握了一门语言之后再教第二门语言？小孩会觉得困惑混乱吗？有很多研究显示，人类的大脑可以充分地同时学习两门语言，小孩最好能够早点开始语言学习。学习双语的儿童并不比只学一门语言的儿童更容易感到困惑。比方说，只学英语的儿童也容易混淆“ho”和“she”。同样地，学习双语的幼儿有时候会犯两术性的错误。比方说，使用其中一种语言的时候，借用另一种语言的词性（即使用规则，pass me the bag）。不过，这些错误会逐渐得到修正，而非语言障碍或混乱的表现。

第二个问题，双语主义会带来语言障碍或混乱吗？不会。双语主义并不会导致儿童的差异或其它发展障碍。表示，当开始，双语儿童在两门语言中的进步要比单语儿童慢，因为双语儿童懂单一语言的接触平均比单语儿童少。比方说，2岁和3岁儿童单语和双语各学一个词。约翰的英语词汇量很少，可能比马汀少。这是因为约翰的词汇库包含了中文和英文。但是并不表示约翰的语言学习落后了。如果词汇库的计算包含双语，马汀和约翰的词汇量很有可能一样大，甚至更大。我们不应该去比较马汀和约翰，而应该关心他们各自的发展，是否处在正常范围内。如果实在要进行比较，我们应当也考虑儿童学习的类型。总之，我们无需担心儿童在早期语言上的差异，这是一种双语学习过程中的一个阶段。

最后一个问题是，为什么要学习两门语言？父母一方和孩子说一种语言是必要的吗？虽然父母各用一门语言，但有多少研究支持这一点？大型研究发现，和父母用一种语言说，儿童更容易学会一种语言，即母语。父母各用一门语言说，孩子更容易学会两种语言。父母各用一门语言说，家庭并没有显著优势。父母同样应该考虑的是如何让儿童在双语中得到等同、相互平衡的语言接触。如果父母和孩子同等地相处，父母各用一门语言不失为一种好策略。其它可供考虑的策略包括，父母使用一种语言，尤其是说另一种语言，每个星期的不同天里交替使用语言。

想知道如何帮助自己的孩子变成双语通的父母，可以考虑采取下面一些建议，研究发现的

建议。

首先，双语学习要趁早。在0到3岁之间学习双语的儿童通常被称为“摇篮双语”。和先学一门语言后学第二门语言的孩子相比，摇篮双语有更大的可能性在双语方面都达到母语水平。虽然后来者掌握两门语言是可能的，但效果在很大程度上取决于孩子学习的天赋和努力。

其次，努力一以贯之。孩子受益于持续的双语环境，比如有一个人会说两种不同语言的儿童，每天都在双语环境中，学习语言上的表现都更优异。

第三，保持耐心，持之以恒。使用两种语言的孩子可以称之为“积极的双语者”，而能听懂两种语言却只会说一种语言的孩子，则可称之为“消极接受的双语者”。两者相似，“积极的双语”对双语者的掌握更好。然而，孩子学好一种语言，而拒绝另一种语言的情况很常见。孩子常常会表现出对某一语言的偏好，这一偏好通常是因为参与说话的伙伴所知的语言。家长该如何培养孩子的双语兴趣？方法之一是尽量在双语环境中使用双语。换句话说，家长要努力为孩子营造双语环境。

第四，努力确保孩子觉得每种语言都同样有趣。如果孩子只从某一方家里学习一门语言，而从第二方家里学另一种语言，他们很难学会用这种语言。让孩子欣赏到每种语言在日常生活中的意义和作用。双语主义是一种家庭的承诺，且是个人说一种语言的孩子相比，和不同人讲两种语言的孩子表现出来的差异更小，家庭成员的双语环境是能够实现双语主义的目标。

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Raising Bilingual Children: Advantages, Challenges and Strategies for Success
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Raising children to speak two languages can endow a child with several advantages from a very early age. Babies, children and adults who speak two languages are better able to multi-task, to filter out distracting information when doing a task, to learn new information, and to think more flexibility about situations, people and problems. Even in their twilight years, elderly adults who speak two languages demonstrate healthier aging in the brain, suggesting that bilingualism can act as a ‘preservative’ for the aging brain.

Studies at the NUS Infant and Child Language Centre focus on how children’s development changes on account of learning two languages. Our focus is on developing a better understanding of how bilingualism influences early child development. Our recent research findings demonstrate, for example, that children who are raised to speak English and Mandarin can show better knowledge of Mandarin tones in comparison to children learning Mandarin alone. These advantages were evident as early as 12 to 13 months, right when children begin to produce their first word. Secondly, bilingual English-Mandarin and monolingual Mandarin toddlers at 2 years of age show similar abilities to quickly recognize vocabulary items in Mandarin. This adds to past research showing that learning two languages does not limit how well a child will learn one language. Finally, bilingual infants at 18 months may be better positioned to learn new languages, even if they bear little relation to a child’s native languages. In a recent study, we taught bilingual English-Mandarin babies and English monolingual babies words in a South African language, Ndebele, which they had never heard. However, within a few minutes of training, bilingual infants were able to learn words in far-off Ndebele whereas monolingual toddlers were not. This suggests that learning two languages may endow children with greater linguistic flexibility and open their systems up to learning additional languages.

Even though bilingualism presents children with language learning and cognitive advantages, raising a bilingual child is not always easy. Here are some common questions raised by parents of bilingual children and some answers provided by research studies on bilingualism.

Firstly, is it better to wait until children have learned one language to add a second? Will children get confused? There is a lot of evidence to suggest that early exposure is best. The newborn infant is not a monolingual at birth and the human brain is just as good at learning two languages it is at learning one. Children do not get confused on account of learning two languages any more than they get confused by learning one. For example, it is very common for monolingual English learning toddlers to confuse ‘he’ and ‘she’ even if they are just learning English. Likewise, bilingual toddlers sometimes show ‘intrusion’ errors, where they borrow from one language when using the other (e.g. pass me the ‘bao’). However, these errors usually self correct over time and do not signify a language delay or confusion.
Secondly, does bilingualism cause a language delay? No, bilingualism does not predispose a child to speech or language or any other developmental delays. Research suggests that growth in each language will initially be slower in bilingual children as bilingual children hear less of each language. For example, if 2 year-old Ben is only learning English and 2 year-old John is learning English and Mandarin, it is highly possible that John will have fewer words in English than Ben as a toddler. This is because John’s vocabulary is distributed over two languages. This does not mean that John has a language delay. However, if vocabulary is calculated in both languages, research suggests that John’s vocabulary size is likely to be equal to or greater than that of Ben. This does mean that we should resist comparing 2-year-old Ben and John in English and instead focus on whether both children fall within the normal range. If at all, comparisons should be made factoring in vocabulary in all of the child’s languages. Early differences in single language vocabulary should not cause alarm; they are a part of the early bilingual journey.

Lastly, to learn two languages, do children need to hear one language from each parent to avoid becoming confused? Although the one-parent/one-language (OPOL) strategy is popular, there is little research to promote this as advantageous. Large scale research studies reveal no advantage associated with OPOL families over families where both parents speak both languages, and families where one language is spoken at home and the other at school. What matters more is that children receive equal and balanced exposure to both languages. OPOL can be a good strategy to equalize exposure to each language if both parents engage equally with their children. Other strategies include using one language exclusively at home and one at school, or alternating languages by days of the week.

Parents often wonder how they can help their children to become bilingual. Here are some research-based suggestions to promote childhood bilingualism. First, start early. Children who learn two languages between birth and 3 years of age are called ‘crib’ bilinguals. Crib bilinguals are more likely to learn both languages to native levels than those who learn one language and add a second later in childhood. While late acquisition of two languages is possible, this is heavily influence by a child’s propensity for language learning and motivation.

Secondly, try and be consistent. Children benefit from sustained bilingual exposure, not a ‘crash course’ one month before before the grandparents visit. Children who hear daily exposure to both languages fare better with bilingualism than those with intermittent concentrated exposure to a second language.

Third, be patient and persevere. Children often demonstrate a preference for one language, and this preference is usually for the language of the peer environment. It is important for children to continue to speak in both languages: ‘active bilinguals’ do better in acquiring both languages than ‘receptive bilinguals’ who understand both languages, but only speak in one. However, it is very typical for children to prefer one language and even to refuse to speak in a second language, placing the onus on parents to enliven the child’s interest in both languages. It is helpful to create situations where both languages are useful and relevant for the child (e.g. through valued family bonds, friendship groups, language clubs),
such that he/she speaks both languages on a regular basis. In other words, try to build a bilingual world for your child.

Fourth, try to ensure each language is equally engaging. Children who learn one language exclusively from friends, family and peers and the other exclusively from textbooks are unlikely to be equally engaged in each language. It is important for children to appreciate the relevance of each language in their lives, such that both languages are ‘living languages’ in their world. Bilingualism is best viewed as a family commitment. Children who hear both languages spoken by different people do better than children who, for example, only speak a mother tongue with one person. Family and community engagement in both languages can promote bilingualism.
杨李唯君：新时代的父亲

亚洲的父亲普遍缺乏仿效对象，因为他们自己的父亲或男性长辈以前较少主动照料孩子，而且比较不会向孩子展示自己温柔感性的一面。

研究显示，父亲积极主动养育孩子，有利于孩子的身心健康、本身的婚姻关系、父亲自己的健康和全方位发展。积极主动履行父亲责任，也有助于培养和塑造他们在社区里扮演导师、培育者及领袖的形象。同时，男性参与抚育儿童也会增加夫妻生育第二个小孩的概率。

随着更多妇女进入职场、性别意识变得更加平等，人们对“新时代父亲”的期望越来越高：一个好父亲不仅需要工作挣钱养家，还需要积极主动养育孩子。研究表明，自1970年代以来，父亲的角色已经超越了传统的“赚钱养家”和“施以严教”。不过，这种变化在不同文化和政策背景下快慢不一。

在北欧国家，父亲承担相对更多的养育小孩的职责，也有更高比例的男性休产假。和西方社会的男性相比，亚洲父亲在养育小孩方面参与程度较低，尤其是在实际照顾和情感支持方面，虽然亚洲女性工作比率相当高。挣钱养家的角色是亚洲男性角色的核心，他们工作时间之长也妨碍他们和孩子相处。很多亚洲父亲感叹没有花足够时间陪伴孩子。

父亲花费最多时间陪伴孩子玩耍，比较少参与个人护理、与孩子教育相关的活动和家务活动。美国的研究显示，被自己的亲生父亲带大的男性、受过更多教育的男性，以及伴侣有工作的男性，会更多地参与换尿布、给孩子洗澡及喂养孩子等基本的日常养育行为。

很多因素会影响父亲如何养育孩子。无数研究反复指出，父亲所受教育是影响他养育行为的最重要因素。教育和性别观念有关：性别观念越平等的男性会承担更多的家务和养育活动，并在孩子出生时休更多的产假。
父亲自己的童年经历也会影响他们日后的养育行为。如果他们成长在一个家务分工较为平等的家庭环境，自己的父亲曾经积极主动地养育孩子，他们也会承担更多的养育职责。其他影响父亲养育行为的因素包括：收入和工作时长，还有母亲的收入。具体而言，挣钱较多、工作时间较长的父亲，和孩子在一起的时间较少；不过，教育程度高的父亲，周末会花较多时间和孩子在一起。有趣的是，母亲的工作时长对父亲和孩子相处的时间长短并没有影响。但是，如果母亲收入可观，父亲通常会更积极地养育孩子。

父亲的年龄也是影响养育行为的重要因素，毕竟随着年龄增长，男性在精力、健康、社会经济资源和生活方式上都会发生变化。除此之外，父亲的动力、知识和技能也会影响他的养育行为。更有动力、知道自己是什么对孩子发展好，相信自己有能力照顾好孩子的男性，会更积极地养育孩子。另外，当父亲能够从自己的配偶或者社交圈子得到更多的支持和帮助，他们也会更积极地养育孩子。母亲可以促进或阻碍父亲的养育行为。有些母亲会认为养育孩子是只有女人才可以胜任的事情，她们可能会限制父亲照料孩子的行为。

和西方的父亲相比，亚洲父亲的角色还受到一些独特因素的影响。比如深深根植于儒教、伊斯兰和印度教文化的传统性别规范和价值观念仍然十分强大；因而，父权制和代际等级秩序仍在强有力地塑造关乎父亲身份的观念和行为。其次，亚洲的父亲普遍缺乏仿效对象，因为他们自己的父亲或男性长辈以前较少主动照料孩子，而且比较不会向孩子展示自己温柔感性的一面。再次，在诸如台湾、香港和新加坡这样的亚洲地区，大家庭成员（比如祖父母）和家佣承担了很多养育儿童的责任，这样的模式对不同经济文化背景家庭里的父亲的观念和行为会有不同的影响。

当代父亲在不同的社会经济、人口及文化背景下，探索、挑战和创造身为人父的意义。不同阶级、种族和宗教背景的父亲经历各异。我们需要更多的研究来理解男人身为人父的过程和体验，来了解当他们在不同的文化背景下经历身为人父的不同阶段时，他们的态度和身份认同如何随着时间的变化而改变。

虽然总体而言父亲花越来越多时间照料孩子，在亚洲，有越来越多的儿童在成长过程中仍缺乏父亲的陪伴。这可能是因为父母亲离婚或从未结婚，或是父亲迁移到别处工作，也可能是因为父亲过早离世。随着家庭体系逐步转型，我们需要更多地关注那些不和孩子一同居住的父亲、低收入的父亲和“代理父亲”（祖父、继父、或叔伯）这些特别群体。此外，在台湾、新加坡、香港、日本、缅甸和韩国，大约20%到30%
的男人到40岁时仍然未婚无儿女。这样的趋势给男人、他们的家庭以及社会带来一些独特的社会心理和结构上的挑战。

男人需要支持才能积极地参与养育孩子。提供为人父和儿童发展的知识，还有来自社交网络比如母亲、其他男人以及社区的支持，都会帮助男人变成既自信又快乐的父亲。越来越多的人意识到，家庭服务需要男人的参与，需要反映他们的需求。以下政策将是一个好的开始：帮助男人获得稳定的工作和收入，鼓励父母亲合作养育孩子，实行父亲产假和有弹性工作时间，以及改变职场氛围。这些政策在不同文化背景的社会中产生了不同的效果。北欧国家从1970年代开始，实施的各种全方位鼓励父亲参与养育孩子的政策，取得了一些明显的成绩，而东亚国家实施的“补丁”政策则收效甚微，后者需要有更多支持和鼓励父亲积极主动养育孩子的政策和措施。

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（本系列是国大家庭与人口研究中心提供的研究简要，由不同专家学者执笔，每月第一个星期天刊登）
Research has shown that fathers’ involvement is beneficial to children’s well-being, marital relationship, as well as father’s own health and other aspects of development as an adult, such as adopting mentoring, nurturing, or leadership roles in a community. Recent findings also show that there may be a positive association between men’s involvement in child care and an increase in the likelihood of a couple having a second child.

As labor market participation among women with young children grows, and gender ideologies become more egalitarian, a heightened expectation for “new fathers” to be more actively engaged in the physical and emotional care of children in addition to their provider role has also grown around the world. Studies have shown an increase in fathers’ involvement in childrearing since the 1970s, and that fathers’ roles have expanded beyond that of traditional financial provider and disciplinary figure, albeit at varying rates and in different cultural, and policy contexts.

Time diary data show that fathers in Scandinavian countries take on more child care responsibility and there is a highest level of men taking family leave. Compared to men in Western societies, Asian fathers have a relatively lower level of involvement despite the equally high participation of Asian women in the labor market in many countries. Their level of involvement remains considerably lower than that of mothers, especially in terms of caregiving activities and emotional support. The breadwinner role remains central to the identities of Asian men and their long work hours keep many of them from spending more time with their children. However, many contemporary Asian fathers feel they are not spending enough time with their children.

In terms of the type of child care activities, fathers spend the most time in play and companionship activities and significantly less time in personal care, achievement-related activities, and household activities. Research in the U.S. found that fathers who were raised by a biological father received more education, and those who had a working partner engaged more in the basic and routine aspect of caregiving such as changing diapers, washing, and feeding a child.

Many factors are related to how fathers are involved in child care. Studies over studies have shown that a father’s education is the most important factor that determines his caregiving activities. Education is related to gender ideology; men with more egalitarian attitudes share more housework and child care and take more parental leave when their children are born.

Fathers’ childhood experiences are also found to be linked to their adult caregiver role. If men’s own fathers were more involved in caregiving and if they grew up in a household where housework were shared more equally, then they tend to take on more caregiving responsibilities. Other factors that align
with father involvement in child care include his income and work hours, and mothers’ earnings. Specifically, fathers who earn more and work longer hours during the week may spend less time with their children during the week though not necessarily so during weekends. Interestingly, mothers’ work hours have no effect on children’s time with fathers. However, when mothers earn a substantial portion of the family income fathers are found to have a higher involvement.

Other scholars also note that a father’s age is also an important factor in their involvement, as men at different life stages vary in their energy levels, health status, socioeconomic resources, and lifestyles. Younger Asian men are more involved in a wide range of activities than their own fathers were. In addition, a father’s motivation, knowledge, and skills are linked with his fathering behavior. Men who are more motivated, who know what is good for children’s development, and who believe that they are capable of taking care of children tend to be more involved. Further, when fathers have a more supportive relationship with their partner or with their wider social network, they tend to be more involved fathers. In this regard, a mother can be either a facilitator or a “gatekeeper” to the father’s involvement with his children.

Compared to fathers in the West, some factors are found to be unique in shaping Asian fathers’ caregiving roles. For example, deep-seated traditional gender norms and values ingrained in Confucian teachings, Islam, and Hinduism remain strong; thus, patriarchy and intergenerational hierarchies shape fatherhood ideology and behavior powerfully. Second, Asian fathers feel they lack role models of involved fathers. Third, extended families and domestic helpers play a greater role in child care in Asian families in regions such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore compared to Western countries. These can have varying effects on fathering ideology and behavior in families of different socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds.

Contemporary fathers are negotiating, challenging, and creating meanings of fatherhood under different socioeconomic, demographic, and cultural contexts. Significant variation exists among fathers of different social classes, ethnicity, and religions. More research is needed to understand men’s fatherhood trajectory and how their attitudes and identities change over time as they move through different fathering stages and under different cultural contexts.

Although fathers’ involvement is generally increasing, it should be noted that there is an increasing number of children growing up with their fathers absent due to paternal divorce, migration, or death in Asia. Attention to special groups such as non-resident fathers, low-income fathers, “social father” figures (grandfathers, stepfathers, or uncles) is needed as the family system undergoes transition. Men need more support to be active caregivers.
In countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Myanmar, and South Korea, a substantial portion of men (about 20–30 percent) remain unmarried by the age of 40, thus have never entered fatherhood. These experiences present unique socio-psychological and structural challenges for men, their families and for the society as a whole.

Providing knowledge of fathering and child development, support from social networks such as mothers, other men, and within the community, will lead men to be more confident and happier caregivers. There is an increasing recognition that family services need to engage men and respond to their needs. Policies that help men to secure stable jobs and income, promote collaborative parenting, and facilitate fathers’ caregiving roles such as paternity leave, flexible work hours, and attempts to change work culture have had varying effects in different cultures. Scandinavian countries provide the most expansive and fundamental provisions, which are shown to have had significant impact on men’s family roles since the 1970s while the more recent and more limited provisions in most East Asian countries have been found to have no or limited impact so far. Therefore, greater consideration should be given to policies and programs that support Asian fathers.
当生命临近终点时，生命的意义需要延续下去，人们希望能在世界上留下永恒的存在，追求一种普世的价值。

捐赠行为是人类社会的普遍现象，在筹集社会资金、缩小收入分配差距、缓解政府财政压力等方面有着重要作用。世界的大量著名高校得益于民间捐助，人们因捐赠而得以渡过灾难和困难时期，社会因此更加和谐。这种纯粹的利他行为有着深远的社会意义，但其产生的心理和进化基础却一直困扰社会科学家。

从纯粹经济学角度，理性人的假设认为，让自己利益最大化是行为的主要动机，为什么人们会愿意把自己的钱给别人呢？更有意思的是，当人们越年老时，捐赠行为越多。根据世界捐赠指数（World Giving Index）关于153个国家的调查，发现捐赠最多的人群是那些年过50者。当然，有可能是他们积累了更多的财富，相对于年轻人更有实力去捐赠。但即使排除财富收入的因素，老年人仍然普遍上捐赠更多，这背后的心理动机和社会意义值得深入探讨。

在捐赠中，一个普遍的现象是人们更愿意给离自己社会距离近的人捐更多的钱。同样的灾难，如果出现在新加坡，相信新加坡人会最为积极援助同胞。如果发生在中国或其他亚洲国家，相信新加坡人也会大量支援；如果发生在那些不常听到名字的国家，捐赠强度会远弱于给本国人的捐赠。可见，捐赠不是不分对象的，随着社会距离越远，人们捐赠会越少。这种现象被称为社会距离折扣。

我所带领的研究团队近期对新加坡老年人的捐赠和社会距离折扣现象进行了实验性研究。研究招募了当地年龄在55岁以上的老年人参加，每人把自己认识的人分成不同的社会距离程度，从1、2、3、5、10、20、50到100。在这个距离量表中，1代表最亲近的人，可能是家族成员，2可能是好朋友，以此类推。参加实验者把这些
人的名字写上。距离很远的如 50 和 100 的等级是完全的陌生人，由实验者决定。实验者会面对两个选项，一是自己一个人拿到一个金额，如 150 元，另一个选项是自己和对方平分一定金额，例如自己拿 120 元，对方拿 120 元。

在研究中，这些金额会不断变化，以便在统计上可能让研究者通过老年人的选择，计算出他们愿意在多大程度上牺牲自己的金钱，以达到给他人利益的目的。这个他人会是不同社会距离程度上的人。如上面的例子，参加实验者实际上牺牲了 30 元，成就了对方 120 元的利益。研究者通过心理物理算法，可以知道每个参加者愿意捐赠的程度，以及捐赠多大程度上受社会距离的调节。

作为对照，研究者也招募了大学校园的年轻人作了同样的实验。研究结果表明，新加坡的年轻人和老年人都表现出对社会距离的敏感，也就是更愿意捐赠近距离者。同时，研究数据清楚显示，在社会距离很近时，年轻人和老年人的选择没太大差异。但当社会距离大于 40 时，老年人比年轻人明显地更愿意捐赠。

换句话说，年轻人对社会距离更敏感，打的折扣更大，而老年人即使是远在他人国的陌生人，也会有很强的捐赠意愿。他们对于社会距离的打折并不像年轻人那样的强烈，表现出远超过年轻人的利他行为。这个发现与我们的日常社会观察是一致的。当年轻人在为自己和自己周围的人奔波时，老年人似乎对陌生人也有着很高的关怀。这也一定程度上解释了为什么调查表明，老年人更愿意捐赠给社会公益组织，即使受益人不是自己的亲友邻里。

站在经济学和进化论的角度，这个结果和现象并不容易解释。由于老年人生命有限，在资源固定的情况下，为什么他们不一味地把自己的资源给亲友，让他们过得更好，自己的基因更好的传给下一代？表面上看，资助陌生人对个体的生存贡献并不如资助所谓的“自己人”。传统的心理学理论认为，人在老年时，相对于追求知识，更愿意去追求做那些让自己精神情绪快乐的事情。老年人会系统地调整社交网络，只和那些亲近的、能给自己带来快乐的人来往多些；他们更关注积极的反馈而忽略消极的信息。

我们的研究为老年人的精神需求提供了新视角。
我们认为老年人对于超越自我（Ego-Transcendence）的认可和满足有着强烈的需要。当生命临近终点时，生命的意义需要延续下去，人们希望能在世界上留下永恒的存在，追求一种普世的价值。这种普世情怀的追求意味着不是单纯的为“自己人”着想，而是把自我与大众、大自然、大社会联系在一起，打破社会人为划定的边界，把人类看作一个整体的更为宏大宽广的认知。

有趣的是，我们近期的另一项研究还发现，给人们喷一定剂量的催产素也能促进对陌生人的捐赠。催产素不仅是帮助母亲分娩的人体荷尔蒙，同时大量动物研究表明，它也有促进父母牺牲自己利益、渴望照顾下一代的功能。毕竟捐赠的本质是一种对社会的回报和给予，以及对自己生命价值的体现。捐赠的利已性越少，其对个体所带来的精神性触动会越大。捐赠更多的是一种生命的投入而不是纯粹理性的投资，是自我生命的延展而不是局限。也许无疆的大爱才更能给老年人生命带来深刻的意义。

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（本系列是国大家庭人口研究中心提供的研究简要，由不同专家学者执笔，每月第一个星期天刊登）
Donation Behavior in Singaporean Older Adults
Dr Yu Rongjun, Department of Psychology and CFPR Research Associate, NUS
As featured on Lianhe Zaobao, 2 July 2017

Donation behaviors are a common sight in society where people are willing to sacrifice some personal interests to give others without asking for returns. Donation is an act of generosity that plays an important role for raising social funds, narrowing the income distribution gap, and alleviating financial pressure for governments. In doing so, this cultivates a more harmonious society. Donating for the interest of others is an altruistic behavior, but social scientists have been puzzled by the psychological and evolutionary basis for this behavior. From the behavioral economic perspective, people make rational decisions that maximize their personal interests. Then, why do people make anonymous donations that will not benefit them in the short or long term, thereby violating the behavioral economic perspective? Moreover, it seems that as people age, their generosity increases. The World Giving Index 2016 reported that across 153 countries, donations were the highest among older adults (aged 50 years and above). A possible explanation for this finding could be that compared to younger adults, older adults have accumulated their wealth during their working years. However, this finding was consistent even after controlling for the individual’s income. Thus, it is of great value to investigate the psychological motivation and social meaning behind donation behaviors.

A commonly sighted phenomenon in donation is that people donate more to those who are nearer in social distance to them. In cases of catastrophe such as an earthquake occurring in Singapore, locals will definitely be seen to actively provide aid to fellow citizens as they have closer social distance to one another. Similar but slightly less support will be given if this happens in China or other Asian countries because the social distance is greater. As social distance increases, such as earthquakes in further Western or remote countries, less support is given. Hence, the amount donated is subjected to psychological or social distance instead of just being people-oriented. As social distance increases, for instance from close relatives, to compatriots and finally to strangers on other side of the globe, the amount donated is significantly reduced. This phenomenon is termed as the social discounting effect, because as social distance increases, the help rendered is discounted.

A research team led by NUS Assistant Professor in Psychology Dr. Yu Rongjun investigated the social discounting effect on older adults in Singapore aged 55 years and above. Participants were told to write down people’s names in their social environment whose social distance was measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 100 (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100). In this scale, 1 represents the person closest to the participant – e.g. family, 2 represents close friends and so on. The social distance of 50 and 100 represents strangers. In the experiment, older adults were given two options: 1) the selfish option – taking a specific amount of money (e.g. $150) and 2) the generous option – splitting money equally with a partner they previously recalled and assigned to one of the eight social-distance levels (e.g. $240 split between two persons). The monetary amount and the partner for each round was changed at random in order for researchers to analyze the amount of money older adults were willing to sacrifice. Drawing from the
example mentioned earlier, if the older adult were to choose the generous option, he would sacrifice $30 (of the initial $150) to give $120 to the partner. Hence, through computational modelling, researchers calculated the degree of willingness each elderly was willing to donate while considering the social distance.

The research study also recruited a sample of younger adults from the university campus as a control group. It was found that both groups of older and younger adults displayed social discounting effect as they were more willing to donate to those whom they had closer social distance with. This showed that older adults’ decisions are consistent with younger adults to this extent. In addition, there were no differences between both groups for the amount given to the partner that was closer in social distance. However, when their partners had a social distance of greater than 40, older adults were more willing to donate when compared to younger adults. In other words, younger adults are more sensitive to social distance as they showed greater discounting while older adults are more willing to donate despite the increase in social distance. This implies that older adults display stronger altruism as the social discounting effect does feature as strongly as in younger adults. This finding coincides with our daily social observations as it seems that while younger adults tend to show greater concern for themselves and their loved ones, older adults show a significant amount of concern for strangers. This may explain why older adults are more inclined to donate to charity organizations despite not knowing the beneficiaries.

From the behavioral economic and evolutionary perspectives, it is difficult to explain this phenomenon. Why would older adults, who have fixed resources and limited time, not spend their resources on their kin to improve their child’s reproductive success, thereby passing on their own genes? The evolutionary perspective states that older adults are more willing to spend resources on beneficial things, such as learning, social networking or interact with people they like. Hence, our findings provide a broader perspective for research on emotional needs of older adults. We observed that older adults have a stronger ego-transcending motive. This motive refers to an orientation towards sources of greater emotional gratification in later life. That is, when older adults have constrained time horizons, they are more likely to orientate away from instrumental-extrinsic goals associated with long-term rewards, to present-oriented goals that are more emotional meaningful. It seems that greater generosity in later life may provide emotional gratification and sense of purpose for older adults.

Interestingly, we found in another study that people who were administered a dose of oxytocin through a nasal-spray gave significant donations to strangers as well. Research has shown that oxytocin is a hormone that promotes parental behavior in sacrificing their own interests and desires for their next generation. Being generous to socially distant others, such as donating to charities, is regarded as a significant contribution to the society and gives a greater sense of purpose in life. It may be the case that when less interest is involved, the act becomes more emotionally meaningful for the individual. Thus, donation behaviors can signify a life investment rather than a rational monetary investment, highlighting that an elderly’s life can have greater meaning when love has no boundaries.
封磊：如何预防失智症？

文化和人格修养对心理健康和长寿的影响毋庸置疑，但迄今为止，所有的研究局限于生物医学而忽视了社会人文。

随着人口的快速老龄化，本地罹患失智症（俗称老人痴呆）的老人数目，预计在今后的10年内会迅速增长。如何预防失智症，保持认知功能良好和心理健康，实现寿而康的目标是很大的挑战。到目前为止，治疗失智症的药物研究进展不尽人意，各大药厂投入了巨额资金进行了几百个临床试验，还没能发现任何能够治愈失智症的药物。越来越多的注意力，现在集中到生活方式和行为改变为途径的早期预防上来。

预防的思想在中医领域源远流长，古人讲“上医治未病”，《黄帝内经》中说“夫病已成而后药之，乱已成而后治之，譬犹渴而穿井，斗而铸锥，不亦晚乎！”司马迁在《史记》中生动记载了三国名医扁鹊给齐桓侯看病的故事。扁鹊的医术高明在能够于无症状的阶段准确诊断疾病，可惜齐桓侯的盲目判断“医之好利也，欲以不疾者为功”和武断结论“寡人无疾”，使其错过了治疗的机会。

现代医学研究经常和中医文化传统不谋而合，最经典的例子就是屠呦呦老师发现青蒿素的传奇研究经历。通过对老龄认知健康10多年的研究和观察总结，笔者认为对于失智症来说，预防应该是重中之重。一旦进入认知损害的临床期，很多干预手段的效果将大打折扣。所以，从源头着手未雨绸缪，进行早期干预，才能达到保持认知健康，降低失智症风险的目的。
本地研究为失智症的预防提供了一些很好的线索。笔者和本地科研合作者通过基于社区队列研究，发现了一系列的危险和保护因素。重要的危险因素包括了心脏病、糖尿病、高同型半胱氨酸、忧郁症状。而保护因素包括了积极规律的运动、规律的脑力活动、积极参与社交活动、拥有伴侣，以及规律喝茶。

对于个体来说，如果针对这些因素通过生活方式和行为的改变，就可以达到降低风险甚至预防失智症的目的。简单总结为六条。第一：保持心脏健康，积极治疗糖尿病；第二：保持乐观和心情愉快，早期发现和治疗忧郁症；第三：坚持规律运动，比如健步走；第四：坚持规律的脑力活动，比如读书；第五：积极活跃的社交活动，比如合唱；第六：多摄入绿色蔬菜（富含叶酸可以降低同型半胱氨酸）和其他蔬菜；如果喜欢的话可以规律饮茶，平均每天一杯即可。

需要指出的是，以上措施是根据本地研究的初步结论，我们还需要做更多的研究工作，在深入了解了新加坡乐龄人群认知功能相关因素的基础上，来设计有效的干预手段，在临床试验里验证，之后才可以推广到社区以达到增进整体健康，让更多的乐龄人士能够享有健康，活跃，积极的晚年生活的目的。

笔者正在进行的一项研究（饮食和健康老龄研究）的其中一个重点，是亚洲饮食习惯和认知功能，已经招募了1000多名社区老人。我们正在对这群老人进行跟踪调查，希望找出所有认知功能下降和罹患失智症的老人，并研究哪些饮食因素和疾病风险有关系。在进一步的研究中，也计划设计适合亚洲文化的饮食干预（比如让没有饮茶习惯的老人每天喝中国茶）来促进认知健康，这也与中医食疗的理论和传统相吻合。

我所领导的另一项研究（合唱预防失智症）旨在评价合唱对脑功能的影响。这项研究从2015年开始招募参与者，第一期合唱干预将于2017年底完成。这项研究加入了大脑核磁共振和生物标记物，是世界上唯一的一项严格评价合唱干预，对失智预防的疗效和机制研究的随机对照临床试验。

既定的文化传统对于行为干预的内容和形式有很大的影响。在合唱干预项目里，合唱老师精心选取使用了大量适合参与者文化背景的歌曲，比如《甜蜜蜜》和《月亮代表我的心》。在不久的将来，我也希望能够验证文化活动干预（比如学习书法和中
国画）对于认知健康的影响。这些干预活动是很好的认知训练，富有文化底蕴，蕴含了华人文化传统儒家、道家及禅宗的思想，也有正念的成分，应该对脑健康大有裨益。这些干预性研究非常有意义，因为只有严苛的科学研究才能得出正确可信的结论。一个著名的例子是银杏叶提取物，早年很多人认为银杏叶可以预防失智症，可是美国花费了大笔基金和人力，通过干预试验研究的结论是，在老年人群中服用银杏叶提取物，对认知下降没有任何效果。

如何才能预防失智症，让更多的乐龄人士享受健康又有质量的晚年生活，需要更多的研究来给出明确答案。在更多的研究结果出炉之前，以上建议的六条措施可参考。孔夫子说：“智者乐，仁者寿”。文化和人格修养对心理健康和长寿的影响毋庸置疑，但是迄今为止，所有的研究局限于生物医学而忽视了社会人文。作为亚洲的多文化中心，新加坡的人文科学学者和相关领域的工作者和爱好者，在这方面能大有作为。

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（本系列为国大家庭与人口研究中心提供的研究简要，由不同专家学者执笔，每月第一个星期天刊登）
How to Prevent Dementia?

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There is no doubt that culture and personality cultivation have a great influence on mental health and longevity. However, in contrast to an extensive body of literature in biomedicine, few existing studies analyze the impact of sociocultural factors and humanities.

With the rapid aging of the population, the number of local elderly people suffering from dementia (the most common type is Alzheimer’s disease) is expected to grow rapidly in the next 10 to 20 years. How to prevent dementia, how to maintain good cognitive function as well as mental health, and how to live long while keeping healthy are questions that deeply concern us. The current research progress in the treatment of dementia is unsatisfactory. Although pharmaceutical companies have invested huge money and conducted hundreds of clinical trials, the drug that can cure dementia has not been found so far. Therefore, people start to pay more attention to the early prevention of dementia by changing lifestyle and behaviors.

The idea of prevention disease has a long history in traditional Chinese medicine, which emphasizes “treat before getting illness”. It is said by China’s earliest medical book “Huang Di Nei Jing” (The Yellow Emperor’s Internal Canon of Medicine), just like digging wells after being thirsty and governing the country after it is in trouble, it is always late to take medicine after the body is ill. Also, one famous legend record in the Records of the Grand Historian wrote by Sima Qian tells that once Bian Que, a famous doctor in Warring States Period, told the lord of Qi that he had a slight disease, but the lord brushed this aside at that time he felt no symptoms. Bian Que visited the lord many times thereafter, telling him each time how this sickness was becoming progressively worse. The lord didn’t believe Bian Que. Soon after the last time Bian Que visited the lord, he was incurable and died.

The modern medical research coincides with the spirit of traditional Chinese medicine. The most classic example is the legendary research experience of Yoyo Tu, who discovered artemisinin. Based on my research on cognitive health of older people over the past decade, I argue that for dementia, prevention is of paramount importance. Once in the stage of severe cognitive impairment, the effect of many interventions will be greatly reduced. Hence, we must start to intervene as early as possible so that we are able to reduce the risk of dementia and maintain good cognitive health.

Local studies provide some good clues for the prevention of dementia. Through community-based local studies, we discovered a series of risk and protective factors. Important risk factors include heart disease, diabetes, high homocysteine, and depressive symptoms. The protective factors include regular physical exercise, regular mental activities, and active participation in social activities, having partners, and regular drinking of tea.

If individuals can change their lifestyle and behavior accordingly, then they are able to reduce the risk and even prevent dementia. To sum up, there are six simple rules that people are suggested to follow. First, maintain heart health and actively treat diabetes. Second, keep optimistic, stay in good mood, and treat depression early. Third, do exercise regularly, such as brisk walking. Fourth, do mental exercise regularly,
such as reading. Fifth, actively participate in social activities, such as singing in a choir; sixth, consume more vegetables (folate helps to reduce homocysteine); drink a cup of tea daily if you like.

It is noted that the above suggestions are based on the preliminary findings of local studies. We also need to do more research work and design effective interventions based on an in-depth understanding of the relevant factors of cognitive function in older people in Singapore. With good evidence from clinic trails, effective interventions can then be implemented in the community to improve cognitive health and allow more senior citizens to enjoy healthy, active and active life in their later years.

One of my ongoing research is to examine the relationship between Asian eating habits and cognitive function. We recruited more than 1,000 seniors from various communities in Singapore. We are conducting follow-up assessments on this group of elderly people and aim to study what kind of dietary factors contribute to the risk of incident dementia. We further plan to design dietary interventions tailed to the Asian culture and context (such as encourage elderly people without tea drinking habits to drink Chinese tea every day) to promote cognitive health. This is also consistent with the theory and tradition of traditional Chinese medicine diet.

Another study that I am leading is to evaluate the impacts of choral singing on brain function. The study began recruiting participants in 2015 and the intervention for the first group will be completed by the end of 2017. This study included brain MRI and biomarkers as outcome measures. It is the only randomized controlled clinical trial in the world that rigorously evaluates the efficacy and mechanisms of choral singing intervention in dementia prevention.

The established cultural tradition has a great influence on the content and form of the behavioral intervention. For example, in the choral singing project, the choir teacher carefully selected many songs suitable for the participants' cultural backgrounds, such as "Sweet as Honey" and "The Moon Represents My Heart." In future, I also hope to evaluate the impact of cultural interventions, such as learning calligraphy and Chinese painting, on cognitive health. These interventions are good cognitive training, rich in cultural heritage, containing Chinese cultural traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, and Zen, as well as mindfulness, and should be of great benefit to brain health. These intervention studies are very meaningful because only rigorous scientific research can lead to true and credible conclusions. A famous example is the Ginkgo biloba extract. Many people thought that Ginkgo biloba could prevent dementia in the early years. But the United States spent a lot of funds and manpower to conduct a large intervention trial and found that intake of Ginkgo biloba extract has no effect in reducing the development of dementia.

More studies are needed to provide insight into how to prevent dementia and help more seniors to enjoy a healthy life with good quality. Before more evidence become available, the above six suggestions can be referred to. Confucius said: "The wise are happy and the benevolent live long." There is no doubt that culture and personality cultivation have a great influence on mental health and longevity. However, in contrast to an extensive body of literature in biomedicine, few existing studies examined the impact of sociocultural factors and humanities. Scholars in social sciences and humanities and related fields in Singapore, the multicultural center in Asia, can accomplish much in this regard.

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中国留守儿童面面观

政策制定者应该设法减少和取消基于户籍的种种歧视和差别对待，帮助和鼓励更多的打工父母带孩子一起进城，让流动儿童享有与城市儿童同等的教育和发展机会。

中国过去几十年快速的工业化和城镇化，使大量农村及小城镇青壮年背井离乡，外出务工机会更多更好的地方打工。他们中很多人已经为人父母，与孩子的两地分居便形成了广受关注的“留守儿童”现象。

可能有些读者会问，为什么这些外出打工的父母不把孩子带在身边？要回答这个问题，我们首先需要了解中国的户籍制度。早在20世纪50年代，中国政府便设立了户籍制度，将所有的人口划分为农业及非农业，本地及非本地。孩子的户籍取决于父母的户籍，与孩子在哪里出生无关。户籍制度又和公共服务、社会福利体系紧紧结合在一起。在过去很长一段时间，如果没有本地户籍，打工者及其家人很难享受本地居民所享有的公共教育、医疗保健、住房补贴等各类社会服务和福利。

近年来，地方政府陆续对户籍制度进行了改革。在务工人员随迁子女就读公立学校的过程中，很多城市要求父母提供房产证明（或租房合同登记）、合法稳定就业证明、计划生育证明和其他证明，并对居住年限、社会保障缴纳时间等期限做出要求。在不法商家手中，买卖户口、居留权等违法行为也时有发生，这些行为严重损害了社会公平和正义。

为了保障外来务工人员和农民工的合法权益，政府部门应当加强监管，严厉打击违法违规行为，为外来务工人员和农民工提供更好的服务和支持。

除了户籍制度的限制，打工父母的工作条件和环境也让他们很难把孩子带在身边。这些工作（比如在厂里做工、建筑工人、服务员等）往往工作时间长、劳动强度大，因此很多父母无暇顾及孩子，也无力承担在城市养育孩子的高成本。

到底有多少留守儿童呢？如果将留守儿童定义为父母一方或双方外出工作且不满18周岁的未成年人，根据2010年人口普查数据的推算，全国一共有6102万农村留守儿童。然而，民政部2016年9月12日发布的数据显示，全国的留守儿童数量只有902万。这项统计数据“留守儿童”重新定义为父母双方或一方外出务工而另一方无监护能力、不满16周岁的未成年人。即便考虑到两个统计数据之间六年的差距以及统计口径的不同，从6102万到902万的巨大落差仍让研究人员和公众大跌眼镜。

虽然目前我们难以得知留守儿童的确切数量，但不可否认的是，中国有大量儿童在成长过程中处于父母一方或双方长期分离的状态。这种成长经历会对他们造成什么样的影响呢？

在报纸杂志和社交媒体上，人们不难看到留守儿童发生意外事故、遭受暴力侵害、自杀甚至走向犯罪道路的惨剧。但这些并不是留守儿童的全部，基于真实调查的社会科学研究，揭示了一幅更为全面和复杂的画面。

一方面，父母外出打工会增加家庭收入，让父母有更多的经济资源来为孩子提供营养、医疗和教育机会。有的研究提供了一些证据来支持这一观点。根据2010年人口普查的数据，父母外出打工的儿童比非留守儿童更健康。

另一方面，父母一方或双方长期不在家，可能会对孩子的情感健康造成负面影响。一些小规模的研究发现，和非留守儿童相比，留守儿童更难感受到亲密、安全和言语，甚至产生被遗弃的感觉。但是，另一些使用全国性的调查数据和更为严谨的统计方法的研究则发现，留守儿童和非留守儿童在抑郁自评量表和自我认知上并没有显著的不同。

现代通讯手段的发达和普及，让在外务工的父母和留守儿童也要保持联系和沟通的便利。根据我在湖北农村的访谈和调研，很多外出务工父母打电话、微信或写信给他们的孩子和家人，让孩子们感受家人的关爱。

此外，政府部门和学校也应加强留守儿童的关爱与教育，让孩子们在充满爱的环境中健康成长。
An Overview of China’s Left-behind Children

Dr Shu Hu, Joint Research Fellow, Asia Research Institute, Centre for Family and Population, NUS

As featured in Lianhe Zaobao, 3 Sep 2017

Due to China’s rapid industrialisation and urbanization over the past few decades, millions of able-bodied men and women from rural villages and small towns left their families behind, in search of better work opportunities elsewhere. Many of them are parents and their separation from children gives rise to the “left-behind children” phenomenon that has attracted much attention.

Some readers may ask, why don’t these migrant parents bring their children along? The answer to this question lies with the household registration system of China. As early as in the 1950s, the Chinese government established the household registration system, which divided the entire population into agricultural and non-agricultural; local and non-local. A child’s household registration (or hukou) status depends on his or her parents’ and has nothing to do with where the child was born. The hukou system is closely interlinked with provisions of public services and social welfare. Without a local hukou, it is very difficult for migrants and their family members to access public education, health care, housing subsidies and other social services and welfare available to local hukou holders.

In recent years, local governments have begun reforming the hukou system. Yet, their policies regarding migrant children’s access to public schools often require a number of documents such as property ownership certificate (or tenancy agreement), proof of legal and stable employment, proof of non-violation of birth planning policies, and other certificates. Many cities also require a minimum number of years of contributions to the social security system. It is not clear what percentages of migrant parents can actually meet all the requirements. Across cities and even within the same city but across time, policies specific to the privately-run schools serving migrant children often vary, which has impacted the survival and stability of these schools.

In addition to the barriers set up by the hukou system, the working conditions and environment of migrant parents made it challenging to migrate together with their children. They work long hours for meagre wages often as factory workers, construction workers, waiters and waitresses, cleaners, or couriers. Neither do many migrant parents have time to take care of their children, nor can they afford the expenses of raising a child in a city.

How many left-behind children are there in China? According to an estimation based on the 2010 census, which defines left-behind children as those below age 18 and with one or both parents away, there were 61.02 million left-behind rural children. However, a new figure published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs on November 9 in 2016 puts the number of left-behind children at 9.02 million. The new estimation
defines left-behind children as those under age 16 and those whose both parents are doing migrant work or one parent is doing migrant work and the other does not have the capability to care for children.

Though it is difficult to know the exact number of left-behind children, it is certain that a large number of children are growing up in separation from one or both parents for extended periods of time. How will this influence their lives?

Newspapers and social media often depict stories of accidents involving left-behind children, violence against left-behind children, left-behind children committing suicide, or tragedies of crimes committed by left-behind children. The picture presented by these stories is however incomplete. Social science studies based on empirical evidence tell a more comprehensive and complicated story.

On one hand, doing migrant work increases household income, which enables parents to provide their children with better food, health care, and education. The 2010 census data show that the enrolment rates are higher among rural left-behind children than among rural non-left-behind children.

On the other hand, the absence of one or both parents may cause harm to children’s psychological wellbeing. Studies based on small-scale survey found that, compared with non-left-behind children, left-behind children more often feel lonely, afraid, disappointed, anxious, and even abandoned. However, other studies using nationally representative samples and more rigorous statistical methods found that, left-behind children do not differ from non-left-behind children in terms of depressive symptoms or self-perception.

Modern technology has facilitated the contact and communication between migrant parents and left-behind children. Based on my interviews and surveys in rural Hubei, many migrant parents maintain frequent contact with their children via phone calls, messages, and internet-based instant messengers to monitor their health and school performance. Most left-behind children understand clearly why their parents left for migrant work. Many of them particularly girls think that their parents are leading a hard life as migrant workers, and they feel they must study hard to not let their parents down. Frequent parent-child communication, better financial status, and the coping strategies of migrant parents and left-behind children may all help to mitigate the negative impacts of parent-child separation.

Overall, left-behind children do not necessarily fare worse than non-left-behind children. However, researchers found that children living together with migrant parents in urban areas report levels of cognitive ability and educational expectation that are closer to those of urban children, leaving left-behind children far behind. It is the urban population that has benefited most from China’s economic growth, leaving the rural population behind. Children growing up in rural China, whether they are left behind or
not, are not able to enjoy the quality education and other public resources offered by cities. To a certain extent, migrant children can benefit from the richer and better resources and environment of the cities.

Policy makers should try to reduce and eliminate various discrimination and differential treatment based on hukou status, help and encourage more migrant parents bring along their children to the city, and ensure that migrant children enjoy equal opportunities of education and development as urban children. Shanghai did better than other cities in providing migrant children access to compulsory education. In recent years, the Shanghai government had simplified the procedure of enrolling migrant children in school, and provided special funds to require public schools and encourage private schools to accept migrant children.

In addition to institutional discrimination, migrant workers and migrant children also suffer social discrimination from the public. Some urban residents look down upon migrant workers and migrant children and attribute more crowded public transportation and higher crime rates to migrants. Reducing social discrimination is one of the requisites to ensure that migrant workers and migrant children integrate into cities. Schools, communities, media, and the government should promote interactions and understanding between local residents and migrants and between urban children and migrant children. This includes advocating the tolerance and appreciation of different dialects, accents, food habits, and other cultural practices.
1st October 2017

根据联合国的资料，在2015年的中国，每100名劳动年龄（15至64岁）人口中就有14名老年人（65岁或以上），2050年或将增加到44名老年人，而且老年人口数量将达到3亿。因应人口老龄化所带来的经济影响，对健康资源和护理的需求，中国政府已经积极发展各项长期照护政策，包括改善社区硬体设施、增加养老照护机构、培训护理专业人员等等。

医学发展的进步，不但延长人的寿命，也在增加老年人的健康期望寿命（healthy life expectancy）中的“活跃年龄”（Active Aging）。医学研究指出，老年人的健康期望寿命应加强在生活品质，其中，年长老人在日常和社区的参与，像就业、提供照顾、社区工作或是休闲活动是重要一环。许多研究已经指出，参与活动是老年人生活满意度和心理健康的重要相关性。欧盟早期的长期照护政策规划，就是在让欧洲许多国家的健康期望寿命在增加，需要更重视老年人可能面对的年龄歧视。

世界卫生组织2015年的资料显示，中国老年人的健康期望寿命是56.5岁，这在中国发展中国家来说是很好的分数。一些中国社会福利专家强调，社会福利政策上应该多重视如何鼓励老年人的社会参与，尤其是就业和志愿服务。这些研究研究其实跟积极老龄化的关系相近，在中国家庭规模缩小、家庭价值转变、农村老人留守等情况下，重新思考如何在制度上给予老年人足够的社会支持是很重要的。

有越来越多的西方研究着重社区环境对老年人生活的影响，以生育视角研究社区环境。这一视角认为，老年人对生活质量的期待时间更长，因此，公共空间的设施将决定他们参与活动的意愿与长期身心健康。举例来说，行动较为不便的老年人常在缺乏无障碍空间的社区里，长期下来将会影响他的意愿。有研究指出，社区的收入和老年人的意愿参与是负面的关系。经济的长期照护成本相对高，且社区要比较老旧、吸引人的是乐龄居民对社区的不信任，也就比较没有愿意参与活动。

自2010年代起，中国政府已经进行社区营造计划，给予更多社会福利资源，因应城乡差距和社区变迁所造成的人口变化与公共卫生议题。一篇在老年人研究发表的文章指出，居住在经济较差的农村，使用会造成空气污染的能源，可能造成健康状况较差的心理健康。另一篇在社会科学与医疗期刊发表的文章指出，社区有较多的设施与资源，当地老年人的健康状况会更好。这两篇研究有着深远的政策意义，老年人的健康状况在生活中的习惯和家庭因素影响，还跟他们的社区环境密切相关。此外，作者认为这两篇研究意义，若能进行社区环境与社会参与的研究，会对老龄化在中国的情况有所助益。

中国的退休年龄为55岁，男性为60岁。研究着重分析积极老龄化定义的三类社会活动，包含从事有薪工作、帮忙照顾孙子女以及参加社区或是休闲活动。社区环境则包含三个面向，社区环境、政府相关住房与社区与人口组成（居民教育程度、乐龄人口比例及外地人口比例）。

当把个人与家庭因素都考虑在内，研究指出社区环境的重要性，社区的经济环境，让住在城市的中老年人有更多机会参与工作或是照顾家庭子女，但是对于从事志愿活动或休闲活动，经济环境不再是重要的因素。反之，社区相关硬体环境与社区的人口组成影响更大。也就是说，当社区基本设施（比如柏油路、排水设施）改善，社区居民有较高教育水准，或是社区有较多流动人口（可能间接地带来活动机会），中老年人会有较多的机会从事志愿服务或是休闲活动。

这份研究显示，在中国推行积极老龄化，需要了解社区环境的硬体设施与人口组成情况。改进社区硬体建设是一个关键因素。城市的政府可以介入改善的方面。了解社区人口组成，可以是政策或是社会工作者可以施力的部分，因为这将关乎如何在社区实施积极老龄化的政策。政府认为，若能将积极老龄化作为长期照护体系下的一部分策略，将能重新理解人口老龄化对中国所带来的影响与契机，而社区环境将是一个不可或缺的因素。

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（本系列为国大家庭与人口研究中心提供的研究简报，由不同专家学者执笔，每月第一个星期天刊登）
Active Aging: The Importance of Community Environment
Dr Pei-Chun Ko, Joint Research Fellow, Asia Research Institute, Centre for Family and Population, NUS
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“Older adults are more likely to engage in volunteering and leisure activities in a community with basic infrastructure, such as paved roads and sewage, and with residents with higher education.”

China is actively preparing for its ever-growing aging population. According to the United Nations, in 2015 100 working people supported 14 senior citizens. By 2050, that will change to 100 working people supporting 44 seniors. As the aging population grows, it will affect economic development and demand on medical resources. In anticipation of these changes, China has blueprinted long-term care policies, including building nursing homes, expanding training of care professionals, and improving the physical environment of residential communities.

People are not only living longer, but they are staying healthier well after what has traditionally been the retirement age. Older adults are often eager to engage in work, caregiving or volunteering later in their lives. The World Health Organization (WHO) initiated the campaign Active Aging in 2002. This program encourages society to enhance quality of life for older adults by providing opportunities to maintain their health, to encourage social participation and to protect them from danger. Essential to this is enabling older adults to actively participate in family and community through working, caregiving, volunteering and leisure activities. Studies have shown that participating in social activities results in improved life satisfaction and mental health. The European Union (EU) has already integrated Active Aging into long-term care policies, providing support for older citizens to participate in social activities, which prolongs good health and delays long-term care.

WHO statistics showed that the healthy life expectancy in China was 68.5 years old in 2015. Social policy experts in China have been advocating policies to encourage seniors to actively participate in volunteering or work. With China's shrinking family size, changing family values and rural older adults being left behind as younger generations migrate to the larger cities, redesigning the policies to support older adults is crucial.

Studies of Western societies use an "ecological approach" to examine how residential communities affect social participation by older adults. An ecological approach looks at how infrastructure and public facilities influence older residents' motivation to participate in activities. This in turn affects their long-term health because they spend more time in their home communities than do other age groups. For example, a physically disabled senior finds it almost impossible to get out into his or her local community if there are no ramps. Living in a place like this, he or she would have little motivation to even try to get out of the house. Even worse, healthy seniors who live in a poor community are probably not going to volunteer even if they want to because of fear of crime. A high crime rate, combined with unmaintained infrastructure, contributes to distrust of neighbors.

Clearly, if China is to take seriously the ideas of Active Aging, the environmental conditions of various communities need to be examined. Since the 1980s, China has been implementing community-improvement projects by distributing more social welfare funds to local governments. The goal is to aid
in dealing with social issues attributed to the infrastructure gap between urban and rural communities and to transformations taking place throughout society. Seniors living in poor communities or areas with high air pollution show signs of poor mental health. At the same time, those who live in communities with more facilities and grass-root NGOs have better mental health.

Recognizing the importance for the Chinese government to promote the most beneficial policies, I conducted a study to examine how the community that senior citizens live in affects their engagement in social activities. In an extensive analysis of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, I found that older adults in urban areas have more opportunities for work and caregiving than do those in rural areas. Also, senior citizens living in communities with better infrastructure, more educated residents and larger percent of migrants coming from the countryside in search of work will participate more in volunteering and leisure activities than will older people from other types of communities.

To conclude, this study demonstrates not only the importance of community economic conditions, but also that built-in infrastructure and community composition matter to Active Aging in China. The government can use results like these in designing policies. Building on what has been done in Western societies, China can promote Active Aging by continuing to build a long-term care system and to design aged-friendly community environments, both of which will be key factors in improving quality of life for older adults in China.
冯秋石：长寿和健康可否兼得？

即使老年人身体功能会不断减退，可是不断改进其生活条件和环境，也可以有效地缓解甚至逆转整体老年人口的生活自理能力下降的趋势。

随着生育水平的降低和预期寿命的延长，世界上大多数国家的人口正在发生前所未有的老龄化现象。这对社会有着多方面的影响，其中庞大而迅速增长的高龄老年群体，即 80 岁以上的老年人口，对社会是一个主要挑战。这些老年人患有疾病和出现残障的风险相对较高，是家庭和社会养老体系的主要服务对象。认识高龄老年群体的生理和认知健康的变化趋势，是测量养老需求和规划养老体系的重要政策课题。

除了政策层面的意义，研究高龄老年人的健康变化趋势，也是对人口长寿和健康的关系的理论探讨。老年人越来越长寿，是普遍事实，可是寿命延长是否伴随着健康的身体状况呢？这是值得探讨的问题。一些学者提出，随着社会经济发展和生活方式改变，老年人长寿的同时也会健康，这就是“成功的成功”；然而另一些学者认为，随着医疗体系的进步，濒临死亡的老年人被抢救活命，长寿却不健康，造成了“成功的失败”。理论上这两种情况都有可能出现，因此实证层面上对老年人健康趋势的监控和解释就成为了研究的重点。

我近年来加入了杜克大学曾毅教授所领导的科研小组，开始关注中国高龄老人的健康变动趋势，相关论文最近发表在国际著名的《柳叶刀》杂志。中国老年人口目前占世界的五分之一。因为出生在上世纪五六十年代的中国婴儿潮一代，将在 2030 年前后成为高龄老人，中国的高龄老人人数将从 2010 年的 1900 万人增至 2050 年的大约 1.5 亿人。这个数目庞大而增长迅猛的高龄老年人群，是中国老龄化社会面对的主要挑战之一。

我们使用中国老年健康影响因素跟踪调查从 1998 年到 2008 年的十年跟踪数据，比较了同一年龄组的高龄老年人，在相隔 10 年期间的存活和健康状况。我们做了三次比较，即比较


为什么残疾情况有所好转，但实测的身体功能却反而下降了呢？我们认为，近年来中国老年人生活环境的改善，可能已经显著降低了老年人因日常生活不便而产生的残障状况，而且这种改善的作用，抵消了他们在身体功能方面的下降。比如家庭坐便器的广泛使用，减少了老年人如厕起身的困难程度；淋浴器的安装和使用，改善了老年人洗澡冲凉的条件。还比如洗衣机的大量普及，方便了老年人的生活自理，即使他们的身体条件已经不允许从事传统的洗衣劳动。这个发现指出了一个基本事实：即使老年人身体功能会不断减退，可是不断改进其生活条件和环境，也可以有效地缓解甚至逆转整体老年人口的生活自理能力下降的趋势。

我们还发现，中国 2008 年高龄老年人口的认知能力，比 1998 年相同年龄组的高龄老人明显下降，这与来自一些西方国家的实证报告不一致。我们认为，这一现象除了前面讨论过的“成功的失败”的影响外，还可能与 2008 年的中国高龄老人的较低的受教育水平有关。2008 年的中国高龄老人在其孩童和年轻阶段，经历了比早于他们十年出生的高龄老人更为严重的战乱和饥荒，严重影响了他们的受教育机会。当然，教育程度低并不必然导致老年时期的认知能力差，而且认知能力的测量方法也可能有误差。可是，认识到中国高龄群体的认知功能下降这一事实有着重要的现实意义。目前在中国，老年认知功能问题的诊断、治疗以及康复都相对不足，相关政府部门亟需加强这方面的社会服务，并做好准备应对持续增长的老年认知障碍的护理和医疗需求。

长寿和健康能否兼得？从人口层面看，这个问题似乎没有简单的答案。可是对于个体来说，这却是一个值得追求而且有可能实现的目标。面对老龄化社会，对长寿和健康的关系的不断追问，反映了人们对老年生活质量的关注。单纯的寿命延长已经无法满足老年人的需求，他们渴望的是在延长的寿命中充分享受更健康更快乐的人生。长寿而且健康，这是每一个老年人应得的未来。

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Can We Get Both Longevity and Healthy Life at the Same Time?

Dr. Feng Qiushi, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, NUS

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Even though the physical functions of the elderly are declining, if we continuously improve their living conditions and environment, the trend of decline of the self-care capability of the aged population as a whole, may be effectively alleviated or even reversed.

With falling of the fertility rate and the prolonging of people’s life expectancy, the population demographic of most countries in the world is entering an unprecedented era. This will impact many aspects of society; especially the impact of the huge and rapidly growing group of advanced aged persons, namely, those over 80, which poses a major challenge to society. These elderly people suffer a relatively high risk of sickness and physical disabilities, and are the main subjects to be served by the family and social aged care system. Understanding the change trend of physiologic and cognitive health of the advanced age group is an important subject in measuring the demand for aged care services and planning of the aged care system.

Besides the significance in the policy aspect, to study the health change trend of the advanced aged also involves a theoretical discussion about the relationship between the overall population's longevity and health. That elderly people are living longer and longer is a generally accepted fact, but the question of whether a longer life is accompanied with a healthier physical condition needs to be discussed. Some scholars are of the opinion that, with social and economic development and change of life style, elderly people can attain longevity and good health at the same time, which would be a “success of success”. Other scholars are of the opinion that, with improvement of the medical system, some elderly people who had been on the verge of death are revived, but then go on to live a longer but unhealthy life, which would be a “failure of success”. Theoretically, both of these situations may occur. In such a context, at the empirical level, the monitoring and interpretation of the health trend of the elderly has become a focus of study.

In recent years, I joined a research team led by Professor Zeng Yi of Duke University, and began to study the change trend of the health of the advanced aged in China. Relevant papers were recently published in the internationally recognized journal The Lancet. Now, China’s elderly population accounts for about one fifth of the world's total. Since China’s baby boom generation, who were born in the 1950s and ’60s, will join the ranks of the advanced aged by around 2030, the number of advanced elderly people in China is expected to grow from 19 million in 2010 to about 150 million by 2050. This huge and rapidly growing advanced aged group poses one of the major challenges facing China’s aging society.

Using the follow-up data for the 10 years between 1998 and 2008 obtained from the Health Influencing Factors Follow-up Survey for China’s Elderly People, we compared the survival and health situation of advanced elderly people of the same age group at an interval of 10 years. We made three comparisons, namely, a comparison between the elderly of the 80 years age group in 1998 and 2008, a comparison between the elderly of the 90 years age group in 1998 and 2008, and a comparison between the elderly of the 100 years age group in 1998 and 2008.
We made comparisons from 4 aspects regarding each of the above pairs of elderly person groups, including annual mortality rate, disability (ADL scale), actually measured physical functions (three movements: standing up, picking up things and turning around) and cognitive capability (MMSE scale). Analysis of the data shows that the health change trend of advanced aged people in China displays both the characteristics of "success of success" and "failure of success". Regarding "success of success", the annual mortality rate of advanced elderly people in each age group in 2008 shows a significant drop compared with that in 1998, and the disability rate is significantly less than that in 1998. At the same time, compared with the data of 1998, the actually measured physical function and cognitive ability of advanced aged persons of different age groups in 2008 display a significant fall, which is an important evidence for the "failure of success".

Why does the disability situation show improvement, but the measurement of physical functions show some fall? We believe that, improvement of the living conditions of China’s aged people over recent years has significantly reduced the disability factors of elderly people that result from the inconvenience of daily life, and this improvement offsets the decline in their physical function. For example, the wide use of household pedestal pans reduces the difficulty for elderly people to stand up after using a toilet; and installation and use of shower facilities helps improve the conditions of elderly people's bathing and showering; and popularization of washing machines greatly facilitates the self-care of elderly people, even if their physical conditions don't allow them to conduct traditional laundry work anymore. This finding shows a basic fact: Even though the physical functions of the elderly are declining, the continuously improving living conditions and environment may effectively alleviate or even reverse the declining trend of the self-care ability of the elderly population as a whole.

We noticed that, the cognitive ability of China’s advanced aged people in 2008 displayed a significant drop compared with the advanced aged people of the same age group in 1998. This is inconsistent with the results of some empirical studies conducted in Western countries. We believe, besides the impact of the "failure of success" situation that has been discussed above, this phenomenon may be related to the relatively low education level of advanced aged people in 2008. Those advanced aged people surveyed in 2008 experienced more severe wars and famines in their childhood and youth stage than those advanced aged people that were born about 10 years before them, which may have seriously affected their education opportunities. Certainly, low education level doesn't necessarily result in a poor cognitive capability in the elderly stage, and possibly there are errors in the method of measuring cognitive ability. However, it is of important practical significance to realize the fact that the cognitive function of the advanced aged group in China is declining. Currently in China, the diagnosis, treatment and recovery of elderly people's cognitive-function related problems is relatively inadequate. It is urgently needed that relevant government departments strengthen social services in this aspect, and be well prepared to meet the continuously increasing demand for nursing and medical services regarding cognitive dysfunction of elderly citizens.

Can we achieve both longevity and healthy life at the same time? Viewed from the population aspect, there seem to be no simple answer to this question. But for individuals, this is an objective that is worthy of pursuing, and possibly can be achieved. Faced with an aging society, the continued study about the relationship between longevity and health reflects people's concern about elderly people's quality of life. Simply prolonging of life is not what the elderly want; they desire to fully enjoy healthier and happier living over a prolonged life. Healthy longevity--this is a future that every elderly person deserves.
韩国人肥瘦男女有别

虽然韩国肥胖的普遍程度，与中高收入国家相比相对缓和，但在中年男性中，肥胖趋势发展迅速，但中年女性则尚未发现这一现象。

肥胖问题在亚洲国家变得越来越普遍。经济的飞速发展，致使肥胖的出现导致肥胖问题。在肥胖环境下，人们的生活模式与饮食都快速变化，因此主观能动性与在教育中所积累起来的知识，对预防肥胖显得越发重要。

为了繁衍，女性能够储存更多的脂肪，因此肥胖现象更加普遍。同时，生育的经历也显著提高其肥胖的可能性。近期的研究显示，超重与肥胖的性别差异因社会和文化语境而异，这表明性别是除生物因素外的一个重要因素。

研究发现，教育水平越高，肥胖风险越低，但这是否是因为教育水平本身无关紧要。在性别差异明显的非西方社会，肥胖率正快速上升，但对性别、教育与体重的关系知晓仍甚少。在这些社会中，男性和女性以不同的方式接受高等教育，并获得不平等的社会和经济回报。此外，文化意识形态在男性和女性身上存有潜在的性别差异，也导致不同性别在应对肥胖环境时形成了不同的动机。

与男性相比，女性的肥胖与教育的关系更加明显。教育与文化资本紧密相连，因此在体重的教育程度上显示出的性别差异，可能反映了不同社会规范和性别对理想身材的差异。特别是在反平等主义国家，社会传统使人们更倾向于根据外貌来评判女性，因此女性对自己的身材也更加强调。

人们可能并不常把韩国人同肥胖联系起来，特别是在韩国电视剧与电影中出现的都显得比较苗条。虽然韩国肥胖的普遍程度，与中高收入国家相比相对缓和，但在中年男性中，肥胖趋势发展迅速，但中年女性则尚未发现这一现象。但近年来，却仅在女性中观察到其体重上存在教育差异。根据经济合作与发展组织（OECD）对11个成员国所展开的跨国调查，肥胖的教育差异在韩国与西班牙女性中最明显，而这一差异在韩国男性中最小。尽管体重的教育程度存在明显的性别差异，但对于社会中这一差异形成的原因却了解甚少。

在韩国，尽管高等教育的扩招减小了教育中性别差异，但性别差异在劳动参与度上依然明显。《经济学人》（2016年）基于最新的跨国数据所计算出的“玻璃天花板指数”显示，在30个OECD成员国中，韩国的性别工资差异最大，女性担任高级管理职位的可能性最小，是最不适合女性工作的一种职业。因此，对女性而言，教育可能并不能影响她们的经济资源，也不对她们的健康行为起直接的决定作用。

在性别分工明显的社会中，女性在家庭中常以女性的外表为导向，使得女性更倾向于在投资以外表来提升外在吸引力。反之，由于韩国男性基本没有外表方面的社会压力，所以并不大在意自己的身材。在这样的社会中，美颜价值可以在婚姻与劳动力市场上转化为有形的社会资源，因此女性的美貌更可能被视为是一种象征性的资产。

那些能够影响人们健康的生活方式，有时与个人所属的群体或组织的意识形态并不一致。人们通过迎合来避免因违反群体规范所带来的负面影响。韩国普遍存在着长时间工作的社会共识，2014年OECD的统计数据表明，在高收入国家中，韩国的人工作时间最长。长时间的工作减少了雇员户外运动与睡眠的时间，成为导致肥胖的重要因素。啤酒聚餐作为一种正常工作的一种延伸，有助于提升职场人际关系，也为韩国男性雇员带来了增加啤酒聚餐的压力。啤酒被认为是一种“社会润滑剂”，无论是专业人员还是普通雇员都变被动享受它，认为是一种展示餐桌礼仪的展现，缓解工作压力的方式。诸如整日伏案工作，惯性睡眠超时工作，纵情饮酒等不健康的行为，已被精英群体奉为美德，成为评判男性雇员成功与否的标准。这可能会导致高学历女性处于更高的致胖风险之中。

此外，我们应更注重了解为何一些社会如韩国，体重状态与体重认知的教育程度差异存在明显男女之别。鉴于此，我近期发表在《国际健康平等》杂志上的一项研究，就基于韩国的性别关系分化，对比了在控制其他社会经济特征与健康行为后，教育与体重之间的联系。

基于2008年至2012年韩国国健调查数据（样本量1万7947），我的研究探讨了教育与体重分布之间的关系，观察并计算了不同教育背景下与性别的人，认为自己的身材属于中等的平均概率的差异。受过高等教育的韩国女性更倾向于利用自己的知识来达到苗条的身材，并且这一关系并不是通过经济资源产生作用。

与之相反，男性的教育水平同体重、肥胖呈正向相关。对他们而言，有利益保持健康体重的行为，往往与长时间工作与重度饮酒的集体意识形态相抵。韩国男性传统上倾向于高社会地位，同时把喝酒看成是构建社会网络的途径。此外，与女性相比，韩国男性更倾向于低估自己的身材，即无论教育程度如何，超重男性往往认为自己的体重属于“中等”状态。目前的研究发现，韩国男性显著的社会地位差异，以独特的方式来影响着两性的教育和体重之间的关系。这显示体重分布可以反映社会结构下的教育、经济与行为资源之间的相互作用，呈现出一定的社会规律。

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（本系列为国大家庭与人口研究中心提供的研究摘要，由不同专家学者执笔，每月第一个星期天刊登）
Slender Women and Overweight Men: Gender Differences in the Educational Gradient in Body Weight in South Korea

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Obesity has become increasingly prevalent in Asian countries where it was rarely a problem in the past. Several factors account for this, including the experiencing of remarkable economic growth in these countries, and the emergence of an obesogenic environment. The emergence of obesogenic environments makes the human agency and knowledge that accrue from schooling more important for obesity prevention as people are exposed to fast changes in physical activity patterns and dietary intake.

Obesity is typically more prevalent among women because women's bodies are adapted to store more fat due to biological factors related to reproduction. The experience of childbirth also significantly increases the probability of obesity. Recent studies have documented that the gender differences in being overweight and obesity prevalence vary by social and cultural contexts, which indicates that gender is an important social factor of obesity as well as a biological marker.

Research links higher education with a lower risk of obesity but whether the shape and strength of the relationship varies by gender is inconclusive. Relatively less is known about the gender-specific mechanisms through which education is associated with weight status in non-Western societies with a gender hierarchy that have experienced a rapid rise in their obesity rates. Men and women are exposed to higher education in different ways and gain unequal socioeconomic returns to their levels of education in these societies. Furthermore, there are potential gender differences in the cultural ideologies regarding body shape, which contribute to generating different motivation for men and women to manage the emerged obesogenic environments.

The educational gradients in being overweight and obesity may be steeper for women than for men. Education is closely associated with cultural capital and predisposes people to be knowledgeable about normative codes of desirable physical appearance. Therefore, the variation in the educational gradients in weight status among men and women may be reflective of gender-linked differences in normative codes regarding ideal body size. Social pressure to conform to ideal body shape may vary between men and women. In developed societies, obese individuals are often stigmatized and social penalties for being obese are greater for women than for men. Women are more sensitive to their body shape particularly in anti-egalitarian countries where they are more likely to be evaluated by societal conventions based on physical appearance than men.

It may not be common for people to relate Koreans in South Korea with obesity, especially when they generally appear slender in Korean dramas and films. Although the prevalence of obesity in South Korea is relatively moderate compared to other high- and middle-income countries, it has been growing quickly, especially among middle-aged men although the same trend has not been observed among women. However, educational disparities in weight status have been observed only for women in recent years. According to the cross-national statistics among the 11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the largest educational differences in
being overweight and obesity have been observed for Korean women along with Spanish women, while the smallest educational inequalities have been found for Korean men. Despite the stark gender differences in educational gradients in weight, little is known about what creates the variations between men and women in this society.

Despite the expansion of higher education, which has reduced the gender gap in educational attainment, gender inequalities in labor force participation, wages, and type of employment remain substantial in Korea. According to the “glass-ceiling index” of the Economist (2016) based on the latest cross-national data, Korea is the worst place to be a working woman among 30 OECD countries. Korea has the largest gender wage gap and Korean women are least likely to be in senior managerial positions, which is far behind women in Scandinavian countries. Thus, it is possible that for women the effect of schooling may not be attributable to economic resources and play a direct role in determining health behaviors. In the context of a strong gender division of labor, women's bodies are often sexually objectified by men in the process of mate selection, which may drive women toward investing in human capital to achieve physical attractiveness. On the other hand, Korean men are less likely to be under appearance-related social pressures and less likely to be sensitive to body size. In this society, women's beauty is more likely to be valued as a symbolic asset, e.g., a beauty premium, which translates into tangible social resources in the labor and marriage market.

Health-related lifestyles are sometimes at odds with the ideology of the groups or organizations that people belong to. Individuals are expected to conform to the group's dominant ideology in order to avoid any possible disadvantages from not fulfilling the normative rules. Collective practices in Korea support the norm favoring longer working hours. The 2014 OECD statistics show that Korea has the longest working hours compared to other high income countries. Long working hour decreases workers' time for outdoor activities and sleep which play a significant role in the etiology of obesity. Korean male workers are also under pressure to participate in drinking gatherings as an extension of formal working hours to improve work place relations. Embedded in a cultural system of social interactions, alcohol consumption, a 'social lubricant', is positively perceived by professional and sales workers as a way to show solidarity with one’s business network and to ease the stress associated with work. Unhealthy behaviors such as sitting behind a desk all day, overworking while reducing sleep hours, and binge drinking have been supported as a virtue shared by elite groups that measure social success among Korean men of working age. This may lead Korean men with college educations, who are generally more likely to have sedentary jobs and higher incomes than men with low levels of education, to be exposed to higher behavioral risks for gaining weight.

More attention should be paid to investigating why gender differences in the educational gradients in weight status and weight perception strongly exist in specific social contexts. My recent study which is appearing in International Journal for Equity in Health extends previous literature by examining how the link between education and weight status operates before and after controlling for other socioeconomic characteristics and health behaviors within the structure of gender relations in South Korea where huge gender differences have been observed in the educational inequalities in weight status.

Using the Korean National Health Survey (N= 17,947) conducted in 2008–2012, quantile regression models were estimated to assess the associations between education and body weight distribution. The mean difference in the predicted probabilities of perceiving body image as average was also
compared by educational attainment for women and men. Highly educated Korean women were more likely to utilize their knowledge to obtain slender body shape and the relationship was not mediated by economic resources. In contrast, education was positively associated with being overweight and obesity among Korean men, for whom behaviors promoting healthy weight often conflict with a collective ideology at work that strongly supports long work hours and heavy alcohol consumption. Korean men traditionally tend to place a high value on socializing, while viewing drinking positively as a crucial component to building masculine social networks. Furthermore, Korean men were more likely to under-perceive their body size than Korean women, that is, overweight men tend to consider themselves to be of 'average' weight, regardless of their educational attainment. Current study found that strict gender inequalities in social status in South Korea operate to affect the relationship between education and weight status among men and women in unique ways. Weight status can be socially patterned by the interplay between education, economic, and behavioral resources within the structure of gender relations.
7 January 2018

人文亚洲
刘晓明 宋长城

迷信、炫耀与房价

在住房市场，人们是要为他们的迷信或炫耀的偏好付出代价的。

买房是大多数人人生中的最大一笔投资。住房也是很多老年人的最大一份财富。所以，房价是人人关心的问题。就迷信房价有影响吗？要回答这个问题，我们先看一下迷信怎样影响人们的生活。

生活中迷信随处可见。比如在选择课程小组时，我的学生没人选第四组。在华人文化里，喜欢八和讨厌四可能是最广为流传的迷信之一。它来源于中文“发”和“死”的谐音。显然，因为课程小组的序号可以取任何数字，没人选四不会对任何其它事情产生影响。如果号码的供给有限的话，情况就不一样了。

看一部手机编号的拍卖，就能了解幸运号码对经济生活的影响。在电信公司里和的网站上，87278888的起价是888元。星和公司把尾号8888的号码的起价订在888元，在一定程度上源于号码朗朗上口容易记。

除了好号之外，人们买这个号可能是由于偏好好的好兆头或炫耀。所以迷信和炫耀对价格都会有影响。

由于顾问可以选一个号码，幸运手机号码的价格对经济的影响很小。可是在房地产市场，情况就截然不同了。在任何给定的地点，有和没有幸运地址房子的数量都是有限的。比如说为了工作方便，你很想在工作地点附近买一套新房子，而邻近的公寓项目只剩下有幸运地址的房子了。尽管你不迷信，也不想炫耀，如果迷信的买家对你看中的房子也感兴趣的话，房地产商不会因为对你幸运地址没有偏好而便宜卖给你。所以，即使你不迷信，也不想炫耀，你也得为这类房子付更高的价格。

有和没有幸运地址的房子的差价，要看有多少人愿意为它花钱。如果有200个买家对200套房子感兴趣，这200套房子中有20套有幸运地址。如果有20个买主愿意为幸运地址多付1个百分点或2个百分点，这些房子会以多于其他房子1个百分点或2个百分点的价格成交。

作为消费者，消费者为他们的喜爱的房子付更高价格是正常的。但是作为投资，为一个没有任何实际用途的因素而付高价格就可能产生影响。比如说一个人在年轻时为有幸运地址的房子多付了2个百分点，年老买房时却找不到愿意付这个差价的买主，那他的投资回报就会小于其他人。

我们最近使用2000年到2009年新加坡新建私人住宅销售数据，研究人们对有幸运地址住房的需求。我们把幸运地址和房子，按欢迎程度从高到低分别五类。第一类是楼屋和房子的范围是0，第二类是尾数是8而没有4，第三类是尾数即没有8也没有4或有8又有4，第四类是尾数是4但没有8，第五类是尾数是4。

和我们预料的一样，华人比其他族群更愿意买尾数是8的住宅，更不愿意买尾数是4的房子。为了了解买幸运地址的原因，我们比较鬼月和非鬼月的交易。因为迷信的人会避免在鬼月买房，如果对8的偏好是由迷信造成的，对幸运地址的需求在鬼月会少。结果证明了这一点。我们还发现年纪大和更不愿在鬼月买房，说明他们比年轻人更迷信。

由于多数新加坡买房子的人对幸运地址有偏爱，第一类和第二类的房价高2个百分点；第二类和第三类的房价高3.5个百分点；第三类和第四类的房价高2.5个百分点。对于一个100万新元的住宅，拥有第一类地址的住宅价格，比第二类地址的住宅高出3万3000新元。如果年利率是4%，拥有第一类地址住宅需要每年多付1320新元。这个差价可能是由于迷信造成的。

为了研究炫耀对房价的影响，我们比较第一和第二类地址大房子的价格。这些大房子的面积大于全国90%的房子。在这里我们假设大房子不仅可以满足买者的空间需求，还可以给拥有者提供炫耀的资本。我们发现这两类大房子的价格差高达16个百分点。这说明炫耀的目的对房价有更明显的影响。

买有幸运地址的房子会是好的投资吗？为了避免这个问题，我们比较投资有幸运地址的房子和投资其他房子的回报。对大多数人来说，投资的回报率和幸运地址的幸运程度没有关系。对非华人买家，买有第一类地址的房子的回报率，比买第五类地址的房子的回报率要高出15个百分点。这主要是由于非华人对8或4没有什么偏好。和华人相比，他们在买房时可能会对有幸运地址的房子付更多的钱，对有不受欢迎地址的房子付更低的价格。在他们卖房子时，这些房子有很大可能被华人买去。而这些华人买家会为前所未有更高的价格，对后者付更高的价格。

我们的研究表明，在住房市场，人们是要为他们的迷信或炫耀的偏好付出代价的。如果人们的偏好是稳定的，也就是说长期的买家也愿意为有幸运地址住房付更高的价格，或只愿意用折扣价买不受欢迎地址的房子，迷信或炫耀就不会影响到投资回报率。可是如果将来的买家不再迷信，拥有幸运地址的房子的人就可能收回买房时所付的差价了。拥有不受欢迎地址的房子的人也不用折价出售。也就是说，人们对幸运地址的偏好会变化，这将导致未来房价的再分配。

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低收入看护者的烦恼

虽然承受各种压力，他们照料挚爱的亲人时所展现的抗逆能力
和无私奉献，应该得到社会的尊重。

年长者的长期护理课题随着人口老化而愈受重视，除了关乎年长者的社区护理服务和方案，也包括了对家中看护者的关注。诚然，支援看护者是老年长期护理的重要一环，然而我们也发现，在本地的研究中，对于理解低收入家庭的看护者在各方面的承受压力，却是相对有限的。

根据2009年全国非正式看护者的调查（National Survey of Informal Caregivers in Singapore），在1190名受访的看护者中，有将近40%的人每月家庭收入少于2000元。

这份研究结果显示，看护者除了在财务上承受较高压力，有些甚至必须同时照顾家中多位需要看护的家人而深感不胜负荷。虽然依靠外藉女佣的做法在本地相当普遍，但是这对低收入家庭而言，却是沉重的经济负担。

究竟他们在日常生活中面对哪些挑战？我们获大－曹氏老龄化研究基金的资助，做了量化研究。虽然只搜集少于20个居家看护者的访谈，但却涵盖了不同年龄、性别、身份（伴侣、手足、子女）、种族和工作背景。从这些访谈中，我们理解到看护者做决定的过程、所处的社会经济处境和家庭关系对他们的影响。虽然承受各种压力，他们照料挚爱的亲人时所展现的抗逆能力和无私奉献，应该得到社会的尊重。

一个看护者的典型日程包括：早间采购、做饭和做家务。其他主要的例行任务，还有确保家中的年长者按时服药、带他们看诊和做健康检查。虽然政府的各项补贴降低了医疗支出，对看护者而言，最大的难题却来自安排家中年长者出门，主要原因时他们没有足够的体力去支撑年长者的行动。

再者，虽然有无障碍巴士和地铁服务，看护者却对他们会造成其他乘客的不便而感到不安，但是搭德士或是招救护车又太昂贵。

出门的困扰让有些看护者觉得，带年长者下楼去日间托老机构都很困难。照顾长期卧床的年长者更是艰难，行动自如者则有容易跌倒的风险。多数的年长者在我们访谈期间，都已跌倒至少一次而必须住院。

年长者的看护者面临更多挑战。年长者因拨打骚扰电话或是非法饲养鸟类，使得看护者不但得处理邻居的抱怨，甚至得面对警方、市政理事会和农药局的罚款、警告等法律后果。

破裂和关系的失和是另一个主要压力来源。

我们的研究显示，因为复杂的家庭关系，看护者宁可选择朋友、邻居或是宗教组织等处在远处的外人协助，而不是在咫尺的家人。

当一位成年孩子在众多子女之间成为主要看护者时，他们会体现出一种结合在和谐的家庭中的心境，理解其他足可可能因为有自己的家庭，或是和年长者的关系和而不敢或不愿意成为主要看护者。主要看护者的个人经历，过去所积累的不顺、沟通方式或是性格，都会深深影响他们和被看护者的互动模式。一些看护者必须承受年长者的暴躁脾气、易怒和易怒的情绪。但是，相对来说，看护者本身却极少有自我解压的出口或沟通管道去传递他们的遭遇。

我们使用“破裂”这个字眼去描述家庭关系，因为它意味着就算与家人、子女等的互动不完美，甚至是备受折磨的，这样的关系却依然会造成看护者的负面影响。有一名被访者，子女都旅居海外，她早年被自己被遗忘。一位被访者的看护者觉得无法帮忙带孩子而影响了与儿子的关系。这种种情况是消费者的利益和需求，也会造成破裂的家庭关系。

虽然那些兄弟姐妹和成年子女是主要看护者的重要支持，不和睦的家庭关系却造成对看护者的更多限制而无法解脱。这是为什么我们受访的看护者通常只选择维持较为微弱的狭小支持网络，这也有意味着他们或许更需要能到协助的较为正式管道。

但是，关于正式协助的信息不足太多，让看护者难以决定。实际上，几乎所有受访的看护者都是因为年长者入院后无法负担住院费，才首次接触到医疗社工。他们表示来自政府和非政府组织的辅导和协助，的确大大减轻与医疗相关的财务负担。

再者，医疗社工不但确保他们能应付医疗支出，也提供指引与帮忙协调社会服务。尤其是当看护者不堪服侍信息和没有能力花时间与精力去理解服务信息的内容时，医疗社工的协助更加及时。

这份研究研究也进一步突显单身看护者的脆弱性，因为他们常被理解为是理所当然的看护者人选，但本身的需求却容易被忽视。看护者的忧虑也显示，在年长者逝后，在心理咨询或恢复就业服务帮助他们，对看护者支持和关怀的生活策划，一样须要加以重视。

新加坡的年长者长期护理服务，正朝向以社区为主发展。强化家庭关系、提供年长者护理和相关服务的信息，和看护者后续支持服务等，不仅对低收入家庭，对一般为家中长者提供看护的也是必要的。

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The Troubles Facing Low Income Caregivers in Eldercare

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With the advent of aging population in Singapore, the caring of older persons requiring long term care are increasingly receiving attention in the recent years. If we pay some attention, we will realize how frequent we can find reports of new community services and programs available to support this group of older persons in the news; there are also more efforts to support caregivers today.

Despite such encouraging signs, research effort to understand the experiences of members of lower-income households in their efforts to manage the strain imposed on their financial, material, and emotional resources from providing care for their elderly family members in Singapore are still limited. According to the 2009 national survey of informal caregivers in Singapore (NSICS), caregivers with household income of less than S$2000 comprise close to 40% of the 1190 caregivers surveyed. We also know from research on informal caregivers and care-recipients in Singapore thus far that a variety of factors greatly compounds the problems of caregiving within financially impoverished households. Financial inadequacy resulting from caregiving constitutes one of the main causes of higher stress among caregivers. The demands on already stretched financial resources are further exacerbated by the fact that a significant number of caregivers are either not working, or are immensely burdened with being a "dual-role" caregiver that tends to encounter care-related disruptions while at work. It is also likely for some caregivers to have to take care of multiple dependents in the households at one time. While both elderly care-recipients generally tend to prefer informal over formal caregiving, the common option of employing live-in fulltime foreign domestic helpers to support the caregivers especially among middle-class families in Singapore are not viable for low-income households due to financial limitations.

How do such primary caregivers of dependent elderly from low income households experience and cope with their everyday challenges? The desire to further understand the lived situation of the caregivers has motivated us to conduct an explorative study to understand qualitatively the mosaic of support and contextual challenges faced by primary caregivers of dependent elderly in low-income households. This study was supported by NUS-Tsao Aging Initiative fund. Despite being a small-scale study with less than 20 family caregivers ranging from age 40s to 80s, these caregivers who are either spouses, siblings or children from different gender and different races, and many either retired or unemployed not in active workforce - shed light on the decision-making processes, socio-economic circumstances, and the socio-familial dynamics that shape the coping strategies employed by caregivers of dependent elderly. Although faced with stresses of caregiving, this group of caregivers deserves respect for their resilience and dedication to care for their loved ones.

Caregivers of dependent elderly who suffered from dementia reported more challenges. Sometimes they have to cope with complaints from neighbors and even legal ramifications arising from the inconsiderate actions of the elderly, including fines and notices issued by the police, town council and the Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority of Singapore (AVA) for offences such as nuisance calling and illegal bird feeding.
Fractured and antagonistic relations with members of their family is another main source of stress. Compared to research who found that proximity was an important factor in determining which form of support was preferred, our data showed that in cases where caregivers preferred turning to non-familial support such as friends, neighbors and religious associations, it was not due only to proximity, but specific problems arising from complex family dynamics. Adult children caregivers expressed sentiments that embodied elements of both altruism and fatalism in becoming primary caregivers even when there were considerable number of them, because their other siblings either had their own families or had antagonistic relationships with the care recipient. Among the caregivers too, factors such as their shared personal histories, past grievances, communication styles, and personalities greatly impacted upon their dynamics with the care recipient. Some have to endure the undesirable behaviors of the elderly, such as their hot-temple, or suspicious and temperamental nature, while they rarely have their own outlet to de-stress and communication about the problems they encounter.

We used the term 'fractured' to describe most of these familial ties because while family members were not completely estranged from each other, the relationships constituted a source of emotional anguish for the caregivers due to feelings of animosity and guilt arising from perceptions that there had been a failure to meet familial expectations. Among the respondents, there is one whose children are overseas and she felt forgotten by them. Another caregiver is staying with his mother to care for her because his wife and children did not want his mother to move in with them. Caregivers with adult children face financial difficulties 'sandwiched' between the demands of their elderly parents and their own children as they are seen as source of support for the latter. A caregiver who needs to devote care to her own husband felt her son’s unhappiness with her for not being able to provide childcare for his son. Competing interests and demands of in-laws who wanted to keep scarce resources within their number family or for their own elderly parents also contribute to fractured relationships.

While siblings and adult children constitute a crucial line of support for informal caregivers, troubled family relationships can cause more strain than relief for the caregivers. This serves to explain the tendency of our respondents to adopt a more narrow approach when it comes to maintaining the size of their support networks. Consequently, assistance from more formal sources became important to support their meagre source of informal support. However, caregivers frequently mentioned that seeking formal support was problematic for them because they viewed such information to be either lacking or excessive. In fact, almost all the caregivers began receiving assistance as a result of having their dependent elderly admitted to a hospital. The inability to cover the hospitalization bills lead to their first contact with a medical social worker. They maintain that the subsidies and support provided from both governmental and non-governmental organizations had significantly alleviated their financial burdens, especially in terms of medical-related expenditure. Medical social workers thus play crucial role not only ensuring they are able to cope with the medical bills, but also provide guidance and negotiate with various social service agencies on their behalf. They greatly help the caregivers especially when they have problems with literacy and the inability to afford the time and effort required to process information about support services.

With more services rolled out in the recent years to cope with the increase needs of eldercare, there is thus urgent need for relevant guidance and sustained help in the form of mediator to navigate and bridge the gaps and barriers in the institutional environment. The study also further highlight
on the vulnerability of single caregivers who had often become ‘default’ caregivers. Support in eldercare should not stop with the decease of the elderly but should extend to post-caregiving support such as counselling on psychological needs and back to employment plans.

As Singapore moves towards more community-based models of care for the elderly, informal caregivers will play an increasingly crucial and demanding role to ensure care for their elderly family members. The need for support from strengthening family relationships, navigating the eldercare support services to post caregiver support will be needs necessary not only for the low-income group but for all residents.
在多数工业化社会，结婚率下降是一个有据可查的趋势。在东亚，35岁至39岁的单身女性比例大幅增加。2000年后期，低龄女性的比例已高达约五分之一。这种情况也在新加坡出现，从1980年的8.5%稳步上升至2015年的17%。在高等教育人群中，这一趋势尤为明显。2015年，新加坡30岁至39岁的女性中，受过大专教育的女性保持单身的比例，是只念中学或以下的同龄女性的两倍。东亚和南欧的许多地区亦如此，结婚率的下降、初婚年龄的稳步上升和生育率的下降息息相关。

从经济的角度来衡量，教育和结婚的关系显然很直接。拥有高技能的女性更可能推迟结婚去从事利润率丰厚的职业。相反地，低技能女性更可能结婚，因为不工作的机会成本亦低。全世界高教育女性的婚嫁状况，其实呈现出更加复杂的图景。近年来，北美、北欧及大部分南欧和西欧部分地区高教育女性的结婚率实际上更高，与东亚和南欧形成鲜明对比。

为什么？答案可能在于社会的保守程度及人们对职业女性的态度。

为了了解世界各地女性的婚姻前景，我们使用了23个国家数据的模型，记录了各国高等教育非技术性女性的结婚率差距，并追踪这一差距的长期变化。我们发现，虽然技术性女性整体结婚率低于低技术性女性，但在北美、北欧及大部分南欧和西欧部分地区，这种差距似乎正在下降，甚至偶尔出现逆转。然而，这种差距在东亚和南欧部分地区保持稳定或呈扩大态势。

我们建议，以男性是否支持女性追求职业发展为关键因素，来探讨发达国家非技术性女性的婚姻前景。我们认为，做家务和抚养子女等照顾家庭的行为，为家庭的福祉提供了贡献。与低技术性女性相比，高技术性女性因工作，较少有时间做家务（育儿和家务）做贡献，这降低了她们在劳动力市场上的吸引力。然而，她们在劳动力市场上的增加却使她们更具吸引力，因为丈夫开始重视她们的高收入。

发现，若工资低，高技能女性更多参与就业，会降低她们的婚姻前景。因为丈夫从妻子的工资增长中获得的效用收益，远远低于他们在家庭福祉方面的损失。但是，当工资水平够高时，高技能女性作为配偶会更有吸引力，因为她们的收入可以补偿家庭福祉的损失。

这个框架可以帮助我们理解高技能女性的就业机会，如何分别影响她们在保守社会和性别相对平等的社会里的婚姻前景。在保守社会，丈夫对妻子的职业和收入的重视程度较低。他们更喜欢妻子留在家里照顾家人，不管她们的教育程度或收入能力。女性需要极高的工作报酬，来补偿丈夫因妻子工作所带来的损失。

我们的模型预测两点。首先，在相对保守的社会中，高技能女性的结婚率应该低于低技能女性，而且人数相对少。其次，高技能女性的工资增长对其婚姻前景的影响，取决于社会的保守程度。与保守型社会相比，在性别相对平等的社会中，高技能女性的工资增长往往会增加她们在婚姻市场的吸引力。

我们用23个国家的结婚率数据（包括四个时间段：1995年、2000年、2005年和2010年）来检验这一模型，重点关注35岁至44岁之间女性的结婚状况。为了衡量各国性别规范的强弱，我们使用了综合社会规范调查数据（IVS），该数据收集了很多国家中人们的各种社会态度。我们把对以下问题的肯定答案（“当就业机会少时，男性比女性有更多的就业权利”）视为表达了保守的观点，即男性的劳动就业更重要。

首先，我们发现，在保守的社会，受过高等教育的女性结婚率特别低。另外，我们的模型还预测，在这些国家，较少女性会决定接受高技能训练，因为这样会让她更不易结婚。我们的数据表明，在相对保守的国家中，接受高等教育的女性比例比男性比例更低。

最后，与模型预测一致，高技能与低技能女性的结婚率，与劳动力市场机会之间的关系，在不同国家存在显著差异。与不那么保守的国家中的高教育女性，不太可能因为劳动力市场机会的增加而改善婚姻前景。

我们分析对于预测东亚和南欧等高等教育女性的长期婚姻前景有何意义？首先，高教育女性结婚率低可能会转化为生育率低下，这将加剧已经偏低的生育率。此外，最新研究显示，高教育职业女性的子女，倾向于持开放的社会态度。这些群体生育率低，会进一步阻碍社会向更加开放的方向转型。

尽管社会规范变化缓慢，保守社会的高技能女性的更优就业机会，会最终改善其婚姻前景。我们可能预测这个过程需要多长时间。事实上，在相对平等的国家中，高教育女性的结婚率已经赶上甚至超过了低教育女性。因此，我们希望，东亚和南欧国家中高技能女性的婚姻差距会短命的。

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To Marry or Not to Marry: How Social Norms Determine a Woman’s Marriage Prospects

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The decline in marriage is a well-documented trend in most of the industrialized world. In East Asia, the proportion of single women aged 35 to 39 has increased considerably, reaching about one in five in Hong Kong and Japan by the mid to late 2000s compared to one in twenty, at most, in 1970. Similar patterns have been observed in Singapore, where the proportion of women between the ages of 35 and 39 who are single has risen steadily from 8.5% in 1980 to 17% in 2015. The retreat from marriage appears to be especially pronounced among the highly educated. In Singapore, in 2015, among women aged 30 to 39, university educated women were twice as likely to remain single as compared to their peers with secondary school qualifications or less. The same can also be said for many parts of East Asia and Southern Europe. In these countries, the declines in marriage rates have been accompanied by a steady rise in the age at first marriage and declines in fertility.

These figures make sense intuitively. Highly skilled women are more likely to put off marriage to pursue lucrative careers. By contrast, their lesser-educated peers are more likely to marry since the opportunity cost of not working is relatively lower. It seems then that education and career prospects are responsible for the lower marriage prospects of highly skilled women. However, examining the marriage patterns of women across countries throws up a more complex picture of the marriageability of educated women. Data show that, in recent times, highly educated women in North American, most Nordic countries, and parts of Western Europe are, in fact, more likely to get married than their less-educated peers. These patterns are in stark contrast to the patterns observed in East Asia and Southern Europe.

Why then is it that highly educated women from some countries are more likely to get married compared to others? The answer may lie in how conservative societies are and the attitudes that people have towards working women.

To understand the marriage prospects of women around the world, we used data from 23 developed countries from 1995 to 2010 to systematically document differences in the gap in marriage rates between skilled and unskilled women across countries, and how the gap evolves over time. We found that while skilled women overall marry at a lower rate than unskilled women, it appears that this gap has been decreasing – in some cases even reversing – in North America, most Nordic countries, and some parts of Western Europe. In contrast, the gap has remained constant or widened in East Asian countries as well as parts of Southern Europe.

To explain the difference in marriage prospects for skilled women relative to unskilled women across developed countries, we propose the idea that the disapproval that men in some societies have towards working women is the key ingredient which lowers marriage prospects faced by skilled women.

We can view caring for the household by doing tasks such as household chores and child rearing as contributing to the overall well-being of the household. Since educated women are more likely to work as compared to their less-educated peers, they are less able to contribute to the household public good (childcare and household chores) as compared to unskilled women. This is because working women have less time to take care of the household. This makes skilled women less attractive as a potential partner in
the marriage market. Nevertheless, as the labour market opportunities of skilled women rise, they become increasingly more attractive as husbands start to value their higher income.

Intuitively, at low wage levels, increases in work due to an increase in the market wage lowers the marriage prospects of skilled women, since the loss in public good consumption is too large relative to the husband’s utility gain from the increase in the wife’s wages. When the market wage is high enough, further increases in market wages make skilled working women more attractive as spouses compared to unskilled non-working women who earn less. This is because their higher income more than compensates for the loss in utility from providing less of the public good.

This framework can help us to understand how skilled women’s labour market opportunities may impact their marriage prospects in a society with more traditional gender norms and another with more gender-equal norms. In the more traditional society, husbands place a lower importance on their wives’ careers and earnings. They prefer that their wives stay at home and take care of their families regardless of their education levels and the fact that they could be working and earning good incomes. In other words, in societies with more conservative norms, women need to make a lot more in their jobs to compensate a husband for the disutility of a working wife.

This model has two main predictions. First, more conservative societies should have lower marriage rates for skilled women relative to unskilled women, and a lower proportion of skilled women. Second, the impact of the increase in a skilled women’s wages on her marriage prospects will depend on how conservative a society is. An increase in wages of skilled women in gender-equal societies tends to make them more attractive as potential spouses compared with skilled women in conservative societies.

We test the predictions of the model using data on marriage rates by education for 23 countries in four time periods – 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. We focus on marriage outcomes of women between the ages of 35 to 44 as this allows us to observe completed first marriage decisions that are likely to involve children. To measure the strength of gender norms across countries, we use data from the Integrated Values Survey (IVS) which gathers data on various social attitudes from a large number of countries. We interpret agreement to the question: “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women” as expressing the conservative view that it is more important for men to be employed in the labor market relative to women.

We find support for the predictions of the model in the data. First, we show that countries with more conservative gender norms are also countries where educated women marry at an especially low rate compared to less educated women. Our model also predicts that in more gender conservative countries, a lower fraction of women are likely to decide to become skilled as educated women in those countries expect that they will face greater barriers in the marriage market. This is exactly what we find – countries that have more conservative gender norms appear to have lower share of females with a tertiary education relative to males.

Finally, we show that the relationship between the skilled-unskilled gap in marriage rates and skilled women’s labor market opportunities appears to differ markedly across groups of countries in a way that is consistent with the predictions of the model. Increases in labor market opportunities of skilled women is significantly less likely to improve the marriage prospects of skilled women in more conservative countries relative to less conservative countries.
What does this analysis imply about the expected long-run trends of the marriage prospects of highly educated women in gender-conservative countries such as those in East Asia and Southern Europe? The lower marriage rates among highly educated women are likely to translate into a decline in fertility among them. This will exacerbate already low fertility rates in these parts of the world. Moreover, as recent studies suggest that children of working and educated mothers tend to develop more liberal attitudes, lower fertility among these groups could further dampen the shift toward more progressive gender norms.

However, our analysis suggests a silver lining. Regardless of slowly changing norms, better job opportunities for skilled women in conservative societies should ultimately result in improving their marriage market prospects. We can only speculate how long this process would take. However, the fact is that the marriage rate of educated women has caught up to, and in some cases surpassed, that of less educated women in more gender-equal countries. This should give East Asian and Southern European countries hope that marriage gap between skilled and unskilled women may be transitory.
丈夫做家务有助生育率

在只有一个小孩的夫妻当中，丈夫每周多花一个半小时做家务，夫妻生育第二个小孩的可能性就提高一个百分点。

如何提高生育率，一直是亚洲发达国家的政府共同面对的棘手挑战。让人为意的是，在发达国家，女性劳动力参与率越高，生育率也越高。这一看似反常的现象，能够如何帮助我们理解亚洲发达国家的低生育率及人口老龄化问题，并提供一些政策上的启示？

2015年，新加坡、香港及韩国的总生育率（即每对夫妇生育孩子的数量）只有1.2，日本稍高，但也仅有1.5，均为世界最低。正因为这些国家及地区的生育率极低，它们的人口老龄化也要比其他国家来得快。比较各经济体65岁以上人口占比例，从7%增加到14%所需时间，法国、澳大利亚和美国分别为115年、73年及80年；而新加坡、香港、台湾和韩国则分别为17年、19年、25年及32年。

为提高生育率和应对老龄化，亚洲发达国家需要创造友好和健康的工作与家庭之间的冲折。这些经济体的妇女在家庭任务的分配上，包括育儿、扶老及家务在内的家庭职责较重，几乎全部都在女性的肩膀上。在世界其他国家，女性劳动力参与率的上升一直导致生育率下降，这个现象被称为性别革命的第一阶段。然而，从上个世纪90年代开始，这两者之间却从负相关关系变成了正向关系。这一变化被Goldschieder、Bernhardt和Lappeguard在2015年称之为性别革命的第二阶段，凸显了男性积极参与家庭责任的重要性。

我对韩国所做的研究，和日本御茶水女子大学的永瀬伸子教授，以及美国哈佛大学的Mary Brinton教授共同对日本所做的研究，都支持该假说。研究发现，在只有一个小孩的夫妻当中，丈夫每周多花一个半小时做家务，夫妻生育第二个小孩的可能性就提高一个百分点。

然而，在亚洲发达国家，男性对家务劳动的贡献仍然微乎其微，不管是与他们的妻子的贡献，还是以家务劳动的小时数来计算。在所有OECD（经济合作与发展组织）国家中，日本和韩国夫妻之间的家务劳动分工是最低等的。它们也是仅有的亚洲成员国。而在其他非OECD的亚洲经济体如新加坡和香港，虽然缺乏相关的统计数据，但情况大概也不好到哪里去。而且我们需要值得注意的是，在新加坡和香港，外籍家庭佣人占据了部分原本加诸于妻子和母亲的家务重任。有学者认为，亚洲国家家务劳动性别分工的持续存在，表明它们还停留在性别革命的第一阶段，所以未能扭转低生育率现象。

如何鼓励亚洲男性更多地分担家庭职责呢？这一地区的性别角色规范之强，恐怕会降低公共宣传的吸引力。不妨把注意力集中在加班文化上。2013年，韩国人工作了2163个小时，日本人工作了1734个小时。2011年，非OECD的亚洲社会花了更多时间在工作上，新加坡2287个小时，香港2343个小时、台湾2144个小时。和其他发达国家相比，这些地区的工作时间长到令人震惊。OECD国家中最低的工作时间是德国的1363个小时，而平均工作时长为1770个小时。在20世纪下半叶经济快速发展时期，集体利益被置于个体福利之上，亚洲发达国家的人们对校长的工作时间习以为常。这样的工作习惯传给了新一代，继续影响着组织的管理文化。

减少工作时长，可以相应地降低工作与家庭之间的冲突。事实上，工作时间长的男性，花更少时间在家务劳动上，也花更少时间与家人相处。为了改善情况，韩国政府在2004年和2011年间，将法定工作时长从每周44小时减少至每周40小时。男性工作时间的减少，是否表示他们可以为家人做得更多呢？我在一项与都柏林大学Changjun Lee博士和首尔国立大学的Young Kyung Do博士的共同研究项目中，探讨了工作时间减少4小时，对家庭的影响。我们发现，男性工作时长的减少，无须男性每年拜访和看望父母的次数增加了四次，为父母提供衣物等非现金支持的频率，也提高了8.2个百分点。

总之，在女性劳务参与率更高的国家，生育率也更高，这是因为一个对家庭友好和社会环境，让女性能够平衡工作和家庭的需要。消除加班文化并鼓励男性在家多做贡献，可以提高生育率。
杨李唯君，胡姝：审视家庭的定义

应该对新加坡人认为什么是理想的家庭规范和功能展开公开讨论。当共识在这些讨论中产生时，公共政策需要做出相应的调整。

和其他发达国家相比，新加坡的家庭与人口变迁具有一些独特性。自独立以来，家庭与人口政策就是新加坡国族建构策略的一部分。家庭价值观——亲爱关怀、互敬互重、孝顺尊长、忠诚承诺、和谐沟通——在 1991 年被列为新加坡五大共同价值观之一。新加坡的家庭与人口政策推崇三代同堂、异性婚姻的双亲理想家庭模式。这些政策曾经有效地将婚外生育率、非婚同居率及离婚率控制在低水平。然而，政府定义的可接受的家庭行为，在现实生活中受到了挑战。包括未婚人士、未婚单亲家庭、离异单亲家庭、离异外籍配偶以及同性伴侣在内的社会群体的需要和诉求在日益增长。新加坡家庭与人口的历史变迁和现在所面临的挑战，即是我们今年 4 月出版的新书《新加坡的家庭与人口变迁：全球家庭变迁的一个独特案例》的主题。

公共政策和人们不断变化的价值观念，产生了一些意想不到的影响。今日的新加坡有着全世界最低之一的生育率、最高之一的无孩率、高单身率、快速老龄化的人口以及高比率的跨种族婚姻和跨国婚姻。1930 年代出生的女性无孩率仅为 5%，而 1966 年至 1970 年间出生的女性无孩率接近四分之一。这一比率高于美国，与拥有欧洲最高无孩率的德国水平相当。由于 90% 曾结过婚的女性有至少一个孩子，高无孩率很大程度上是因为高单身率。2015 年，35 岁至 39 岁的新加坡女性单身率达到了 17%。虽然许多欧洲国家名义上的单身率更高，但那里的年轻人同居比率很高，并不是真正的“单身”。它们的生育率高于新加坡，正是因为很多同居伴侣共同生育和抚养孩子。那些国家的家庭政策，允许非婚生育的孩子享受公共福利。

年轻人结婚的障碍之一是工作场所和家庭内部不平等的性别规范。人类社会 20 世纪最引人注目的变化，是女性教育水平的提高。新加坡的女性高等教育入学率，从
1970 年的 4% 急剧上升到 2015 年的 95%，超过了大部分发达西方国家。我们此前的研究发现，随着女性教育程度的提升，她们更加看重个人发展和职业成就，也更加追求性别平等。然而，大部分社会都尚未对工作场所和家庭内部的性别规范作出有效的调整。

在社会规范更倾向于性别平权的美国和部分欧洲国家，受教育程度更高的女性结婚率更高，离婚率更低，生育率更高。而在性别规范趋于保守的社会，她们的结婚率要比受教育程度较低的女性低。社会学家指出，婚姻越来越不受东亚女性欢迎，因为婚姻对她们来说，不仅意味着养育孩童、照顾老人的责任和负担，还意味着工作收入和职业发展将受到不利影响。如果想要提高结婚率和生育率，新加坡必须改善工作场所和家庭内部的性别不平等。

很多新加坡年轻人对组建家庭踌躇不前，可以归结为下列几个因素的影响：一、国家的制度变化未能跟上工作场所和家庭内部性别规范快速变化的脚步；二、“怕输”文化强调成功，竞争激烈的环境导致了超长的工作时间和巨大的社会压力；三、生活成本高昂，养育子女和照顾年迈父母的经济负担过重；四、计划结婚的伴侣等待组屋公寓的时间很长；五、公共政策对“家庭”的定义过于狭窄，对未婚单亲家庭、离异单亲家庭、同居伴侣、单身人士以及同性伴侣提供极为有限的支持，或通过限制她们获取公共服务来施以惩罚。在这些因素的共同作用之下，很多年轻人感到建立一个“成功的”婚姻和抚养“成功的”孩子，是困难的或者说是不值得的，从而害怕或者逃避组建家庭。

要提高结婚率和生育率，必须从根本上改变文化并调整制度。新加坡需要在工作场所和家庭内部减少性别不平等，通过减少工作时间和降低儿童和成人的竞争压力来改变“怕输”文化，通过长期的专项或直接支持，来降低组建家庭和养育孩童的成本，为新加坡人提供更加多样的生活安排和家庭类型选择。与其关注家庭的某种理想结构，不如回到“新加坡家庭价值”的原本定义——亲爱关怀、互敬互重、孝顺尊长、忠诚承诺、和谐沟通。正如我们新书的很多章节所显示的那样，其他家庭形式同样能够很好的服务于新加坡社会，同样能够将新加坡家庭价值付诸实践。

和父母辈相比，今天的年轻人面临着截然不同的社会经济状况和生活挑战，也可能赋予婚姻和为人父母不同的意义。有些年轻人也许想先同居一段时间来试验婚姻。放宽离婚限制有可能会出人意料地增加结婚率，因为年轻人知道万一婚姻不成功，总是有终
结它的选择。上个世纪 90 年代以来，新加坡持续的低结婚率和生育率意味着，有必要进一步让家庭适应新的社会规范和社会环境。应该对新加坡人认为什么是理想的家庭规范和功能展开公开讨论。当共识在这些讨论中产生时，公共政策需要做出相应的调整。

家庭历史学者已经指出，家庭的功能和定义，在不同的历史阶段和不同的文化都有所不同。家庭的定义是政治的，因为它决定了谁能得到公共产品以及谁会被社会所接受。世界各地的家庭体系都在转型。只有当制度不断对现行的社会和经济变迁做出调整时，新加坡的家庭系统才能有效运作，一方面满足个体家庭成员的感情需要，另一方面保持整个社会的延续与和谐。


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