Unobserved Preference Heterogeneity in Demand
Using Generalized Random Coefficients

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Abstract

We model unobserved preference heterogeneity in demand systems via random Barten scales in utility functions. These Barten scales appear as random coefficients multiplying prices in demand functions. Consumer demands are nonlinear in prices and may have unknown functional structure. We therefore prove identification of Generalized Random Coefficients models, defined as nonlinear or additive nonparametric regressions where each regressor is multiplied by an unobserved random coefficient having an unknown distribution. Using Canadian data, we estimate energy demand functions with and without random coefficient Barten scales. We find that not accounting for this unobserved preference heterogeneity substantially biases estimated consumer-surplus costs of an energy tax.

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1 Introduction

For discretely demanded goods, unobserved preference heterogeneity is typically modeled using random coefficients, as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP 1995). Allowing for substantial unobserved random preference heterogeneity, as BLP does, has proven to be necessary for realistic evaluations of the impacts of price changes on demand. In this paper we propose an analogous way to introduce unobserved preference heterogeneity in continuous demand systems.
The application we consider is energy demand by consumers. Energy is consumed in continuous quantities and displays substantial nonlinearities in income and price effects. Therefore, energy cannot be appropriately modeled using discrete demand methods like BLP, and instead requires the methodology of continuous demand systems.

We demonstrate the importance of accounting for random coefficient type unobserved preference heterogeneity in energy demand. In particular, we show that failure to do so results in a dramatic underestimate of the variance of impacts of energy price changes across consumers. Accounting for this variation is crucial for correctly assessing the true costs to society of energy policies such as a carbon tax. We show that measures of social welfare that ignore this unobserved preference heterogeneity yield substantially biased estimates of the full costs to society of an energy tax on consumers, by failing to fully account for the tax’s distributional impacts.

One of the most commonly used methods for incorporating observable sources of preference heterogeneity (such as the impacts of age or family size) in continuous demand systems is via Barten (1964) scales. Barten scales deflate the prices faced by consumers, and so have a structure that is analogous to random coefficients on prices, in that they multiply each price in the demand system. This suggests that a natural way to introduce unobserved preference heterogeneity into continuous demand systems is to allow random variation in the Barten scales via random coefficients on prices.

However, randomly varying Barten scales introduces a substantial econometric difficulty because, unlike discrete demand models such as multinomial logit, realistic continuous demand models are highly nonlinear in prices, due to constraints such as homogeneity and Slutsky symmetry. We therefore require a general type of random coefficients that can be identified and estimated in nonlinear, or even nonparametrically specified, demand functions. We define "generalized random coefficients" to be random coefficients applied to variables in a general nonlinear or nonparametric model, in contrast to ordinary random coefficients that are applied in linear index models.

In this paper we first provide some identification theorems, showing that the joint distribution of random coefficients can be nonparametrically identified in nonlinear, and in additive nonparametric, regression models.

We then apply these results to identification of random Barten scales in demand systems. This application includes proving a new theorem that nonparametrically characterizes the preferences associated with demand functions having a certain additive structure. This result is relevant because it allows us to exploit the regularity conditions required for nonparametric identification of generalized random Barten coefficients in additive models.

Based on these identification theorems, we estimate energy demand functions for a set of Canadian consumers. To illustrate the importance of allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in Barten scales, we evaluate the (partial equilibrium) impacts of a hypothetical tax on energy goods, like a carbon tax. Among other results, we find that allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity has a large impact on the estimated distribution of the relative costs (consumer surplus impacts) of the tax. For example, we find that this distribution across consumers has a standard deviation that is six times larger in our model than it is in a model that does not allow for such unobserved preference heterogeneity.

Consider first our proposed generalization of random coefficients models. Suppose an observed variable $Y$ depends on a vector of observed regressors $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_K)$, and on a set
of unobserved errors $U_0, U_1, \ldots, U_K$ that are (possibly after conditioning on other covariates $Z$) independent of $X$. We propose a generalized random coefficients model given by

$$Y = G(U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K) \quad \text{or} \quad Y = G(U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K) + U_0$$

(1)

for some function $G$. We focus mainly on results for the special case of equation (1) where $G$ takes the additive model form

$$Y = \sum_{k=1}^K G_k(X_k U_k) + U_0$$

(2)

and the functions $G_1, \ldots, G_K$ are unknown.

In these models the vector $U = (U_1, \ldots, U_K)$ represents unobserved heterogeneity in the dependence of $Y$ on $X$, while $U_0$, if present, represents measurement error or other independent variation $Y$. We provide conditions under which the distribution of the vector $U$ is nonparametrically identified (if present, $U_0$ is assumed independent of these other errors and has a marginal distribution that will also be nonparametrically identified.

In our empirical application, $Y$ will be a measure of energy demanded by a consumer, $G$ will be a Marshallian demand function, each $X_k$ will be the price of a good $k$ divided by a consumer’s total expenditures, and each $U_k$ (other than $U_0$) will be a Barten scale. All previous empirical implementations of Barten scales have exactly these forms, but with every $U_k$ other than $U_0$ specified as deterministic functions of observable characteristics that affect preferences, such as age or family size. In contrast, we allow the Barten scales to be random, and show their joint distribution can be nonparametrically identified, under low level regularity conditions.

One of our identification theorems shows that if $G$ is known, then under mild conditions the joint distribution of the elements of $U$ is nonparametrically identified. We also provide a theorem giving conditions under which, in equation (2), each functions $G_k$ can be nonparametrically identified (unlike our other identification result, this theorem employs an argument analogous to identification at infinity). Combining both theorems then allows us to simultaneously nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of $U$ and nonparametrically identify each $G_k$ function. Combining both theorems also provides some overidentification that we show can be exploited to generalize the model a bit (relaxing the additivity assumption by adding some interaction terms), and to some extent also relaxes our dependence on identification at infinity type arguments.

Imposing the additivity of equation (2) directly on Marshallian demand functions yields some implausible restrictions on preferences. However, we show that, when $K = 2$, these restrictions can be relaxed by suitably transforming $Y$. In particular, we prove a theorem showing that when $K = 2$, if $Y$ is defined as a logit transformed budget share, then demands will take the additive form implied by equation (2) if and only if indirect utility has a correspondingly additive form. This theorem also provides closed form expressions for the indirect utility function corresponding to nonparametrically specified demand functions that are additive in this way. These closed form expressions greatly simplify our later consumer surplus and welfare calculations.

We first provide a literature review bearing on the econometric identification of models containing random coefficients and on the modeling of preference heterogeneity in continuous
demand systems. We then present our main identification theorems, followed by our theorem characterizing the nonparametric connection between preferences and logit transformed demands. We next provide our empirical implementation of the random Barten scales model, including consumer surplus calculations on the hypothetical impacts of large increase in the price of, or taxes on, energy goods. We then conclude, and in an appendix we provide proofs, and some extensions of our identification theorems.

2 Literature Review

We use generalized random coefficients to represent equivalence scales in consumer demand models. There is a long history of using equivalence scales to empirically model observed sources of preference heterogeneity. See, e.g., Engel (1895), Sydenstricker and King (1921), Rothbarth (1943), Prais and Houthakker (1955), Barten (1964), Pollak and Wales (1981), Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982), and Ray (1992), and see Lewbel (1997) for a survey. Engel (1895) and Barten (1964) type equivalence scales take the form of multiplying total expenditures or each price in a demand function by a preference heterogeneity parameter, as in equation (1). It is therefore a natural extension of this literature to include unobserved preference heterogeneity in these equivalence scales.

We apply estimated demand functions and estimated Barten scale distributions to do welfare analyses. In particular, we use a Barten scaled energy demand function to perform consumer surplus calculations for an energy price change (as in Hausman 1981). Our consumer surplus calculations can be interpreted as a variant of Hoderlein and Vanhems (2010, 2011), who introduce unobserved preference heterogeneity into the Hausman model. The first of these two papers introduced scalar preference heterogeneity into the model nonparametrically, while the latter incorporated heterogeneity in the form of ordinary linear random coefficients. In contrast, our model follows the prior consumer demand literature by including preference heterogeneity in the form of Barten equivalence scales, differing from the prior demand literature in that our Barten scales include unobserved heterogeneity (a smaller additional difference is the way we also include an additive measurement error). We also apply our empirical results to estimate Atkinson (1970) type social welfare functions, and thereby analyze the extent to which allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity affects estimated tradeoffs between mean impacts and inequality impacts of a tax or price change in energy.

Other papers that introduce nonseparable unobserved preference heterogeneity in continuous demand systems include Brown and Walker (1989), Lewbel (2001), Beckert (2006) Matzkin (2007b), and Beckert and Blundell (2008). Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) propose a continuous demand system model in which the standard separable errors equal utility parameters summarizing preference heterogeneity, and do welfare calculations showing that accounting for this unobserved heterogeneity has a substantial impact on the results. Lewbel and De Nadai (2011) show how preference heterogeneity can be separately identified from measurement errors. A related empirical model to ours is Comon and Calvet (2003), who use repeated cross sections and deconvolution to identify a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in income effects.

Nonparametric identification and estimation of ordinary random coefficients models is considered by Beran and Hall (1992), Beran, Feuerverger, and Hall (1996) and Hoderlein, Kleme-

Ordinary random coefficients are the special case of the additive model in equation (2) in which each $G_k$ is the identity function. Additive models are a common generalization of linear models; see, Hastie and Tibshirani (1990), Linton (2000), and Wood (2006), and in the particular applications of additivity to consumer demand systems include Gorman (1976) and Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978).

This paper also contributes to the literature on estimation of models with nonseparable errors, in particular where those errors arise from structural heterogeneity parameters such as random utility parameters. Older examples of such models include Heckman and Singer (1984) and Lewbel (2001). More recent work focusing on general identification and estimation results include Chesher (2003), Altonji and Matzkin (2005), Hoderlein, and Mammen (2007), Matzkin (2007a, 2008), and Imbens and Newey (2009).

Fox and Gandhi (2013) provide general conditions for identification of random utility parameters in multinomial choice problems, including linear index models with random coefficients, and models analogous to Berry and Haile (2009) that exploit Lewbel (2000) type special regressors. They note that the only general sufficient condition known for one of their identifying assumptions is utility functions that are real analytic functions.

A related result to ours is Hoderlein, Nesheim, and Simoni (2011), who provide a high level condition they call $T$-completeness that suffices for nonparametric identification of a vector of random parameters within a known function. They provide some examples where $T$-completeness can be shown to hold, such as when error distributions are in the exponential family, or are parameterizable by a single scalar. Our model when $G$ is known is a special case of their general setup, and so our theorem proving identification for this model provides a new framework where $T$-completeness could be satisfied. More generally, one goal of our analysis is to provide relatively low level conditions that serve to identify our model, instead of high level, difficult to verify conditions as in Fox and Gandhi (2013), or like $T$-completeness.

Perhaps the result that comes closest to our identification theorem is Matzkin (2003), which in an appendix describes sufficient conditions for identification of a general class of additive models with unobserved heterogeneity. The biggest difference between our results and Matzkin (2003) is that we identify the joint distribution of $U$, while Matzkin assumes the elements of $U$ are mutually independent. However, even our model when $K = 1$ (the case where there is no joint distribution to be identified) while employing a structure very similar to Matzkin’s, does not satisfy her identification assumptions and so even in that case our Theorem is not a direct corollary of her results.

3 Generalized Random Coefficient Model Identification

In this section we first consider additive models given by equation (2). Specifically, Theorem 1 below shows nonparametric identification of each functions $G_k$ and the marginal distribution of each random coefficient $U_k$. We then provide, in Theorem 2, separate assumptions under which
the joint distribution of the random coefficients can be identified in the more general model of equation (1) when \( G \) is known. We then combine both theorems to nonparametrically identify both the joint distribution of random coefficients and the functions \( G_k \) equation (2). We also discuss conditions for identification of more general models that equal the sum of an additive model and a parameterized model of cross effects.

Theorem 1 employs an argument similar to identification at infinity (it is actually identification at zero), or what Khan and Tamer (2010) call "thin set identification." However, when we combine Theorems 1 and 2 we obtain overidentifying restrictions, and therefore our results do not depend solely on thin set identification.

Later sections will then provide the connection between these theorems and our Barten scales model of demand. However, we note upfront that in our empirical application each \( X_k \) and \( U_k \) is positive (though not bounded away from zero), so it is relevant that our identification theorems allow for zero being on the boundary of the supports of these variables.

For any random vectors \( A \) and \( B \) let \( F_{A|B}(a | b) \) and \( f_{A|B}(a | b) \) denote the conditional cumulative distribution function and conditional probability density function, respectively, of \( A \) given \( B \). Let \( e_k \) be the \( K \) vector containing a one in position \( k \) and zeros everywhere else. Let \( X_{(k)} \) denote the \( K-1 \) vector that contains all the elements of \( X \) except for \( X_k \).

### 3.1 Additive Model and Marginal Distribution Identification

**ASSUMPTION A1:** The conditional distribution \( F_{Y|X,Z}(y \mid x, z) \) and the marginal distribution \( F_Z(z) \) are identified. \((U_0, U_1, ..., U_K) \perp X \mid Z \) and \((U_1, ..., U_K) \perp U_0 \mid Z \). Either \( U_0 \) has a nonvanishing characteristic function (conditional on \( Z \)) or \( U_0 \) is identically zero. \( \text{supp}(U_0) \subseteq \text{supp}(Y) \) and \( \{0, e_1, ..., e_K\} \) is a subset of the closure of \( \text{supp}(X) \).

**ASSUMPTION A2:** \( U_k, X_k \mid Z \) are continuously distributed, and for every \( r \in \text{supp}(X_kU_k) \) there exists an \( x_k \in \text{supp}(X_k) \) such that \( f_{U_k}(x_k^{-1}r) \neq 0 \).

**ASSUMPTION A3:** \( G_k \) is a strictly monotonically increasing function. The free location and scale normalizations \( G_k(0) = 0 \) and \( G_k(1) = y_0 \) for some known \( y_0 \in \text{supp}(Y) \) are imposed.

Assumption A1 first assumes identification of \( F_{Y|X,Z}(y \mid x, z) \) and \( F_Z(z) \), which would in general follow from a sample of observations of \( Y, X, Z \) with sample size going to infinity. Identification of \( F_{Y|X,Z}(y \mid x, z) \) is actually stronger than necessary for Theorem 1, since only certain features of this distribution are used in the proof. For example, it would suffice to only identify \( F_{Y|X,Z}(y \mid x_ke_k, z) \) for \( k = 1, ..., K \). However, more information regarding \( F_{Y|X,Z} \) is used in Theorem 2 and other extensions.

Assumption A1 imposes conditional independence and support requirements on \( U, X, \) and \( Z \). The role of \( Z \) is to permit the error \( U_0 \) and random coefficients \( U_k \) to be correlated with \( X \), thereby allowing elements of \( X \) to be endogenous. See, e.g., the correlated random coefficients model of Heckman and Vytlacil (1998). This allows for Heckman and Robb (1986) control

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1Formally, the condition on \( U_0 \) regarding a nonvanishing characteristic function required for the deconvolution step of the proof is only that the set of \( t \in \mathbb{R} \) for which \( E(e^{itU_0}) \neq 0 \) is dense in \( \mathbb{R} \). See, e.g., Meister (2005).
function type endogeneity, with \( Z \) being control function residuals as in Blundell and Powell (2003, 2004). In particular, if \( X_k = h_k (X_{(k)}, Q) + Z_k \) for some observed instrument vector \( Q \) and some identified function \( h_k \) (typically \( h_k \) would be \( E (X_k \mid X_{(k)}, Q) \)), then the conditional independence assumptions in A1 correspond to standard control function assumptions. Note that \( Z \) can be empty, so all the results given below will hold if there is no \( Z \), in which case \( U \) is independent of \( X \) and so the regressors \( X \) are exogenous. The assumptions also permit \( Z \) to be discrete, and place no restriction on the dimension of \( Z \), although control function residuals would generally be continuous and have dimension equal to the number of endogenous elements of \( X \).

Assumption A2 assumes that the regressors and random coefficients are continuously distributed. Assumption A2 also calls for a mild relative support assumption on \( X_k \) and \( U_k \). Later Theorem 2 will require a stronger support restriction.

The normalizations in Assumption A3 are free normalizations, because first if \( G_k (0) \neq 0 \) then we can redefine \( G_k (r) \) as \( G_k (r) - G_k (0) \) and redefine \( U_0 \) as \( U_0 + G_k (0) \), thereby making \( G_k (0) = 0 \). Next, given a nonzero \( y_0 \in \text{supp} (Y) \), there must exist a nonzero \( r_0 \) such that \( G_k (r_0) = y_0 \). We can then redefine \( U_k \) as \( r_0 U_k \) and redefine \( G_k (r) \) as \( G_k (r/r_0) \), thereby making \( G_k (1) = y_0 \). These particular normalizations are most convenient for proving Theorem 1 below, but in empirical applications alternative normalizations may be more natural, e.g., choosing location to make \( E (U_0) = 0 \).

What follows is our first identification theorem, which as noted in the literature review is closely related to, but is not a direct corollary of, results in Matzkin (2003).

**THEOREM 1:** Let \( Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0 \) and let Assumption A1 hold. Then the distribution function \( F_{U_0 \mid Z} \) is nonparametrically identified, and for every \( k \in \{1, ..., K\} \) such that Assumptions A2 and A3 hold, the function \( G_k \) and the distribution function \( F_{U_k \mid Z} \) are nonparametrically identified.

Identification of \( F_Z \) was assumed, and Theorem 1 gives identification of \( F_{U_0 \mid Z} \) and \( F_{U_k \mid Z} \), and so by combining these the marginal distributions \( F_{U_0} \) and \( F_{U_k} \) are also identified. In applications we would generally assume that Assumptions A2 and A3 hold for all \( k \in \{1, ..., K\} \).

In our notation, Matzkin (2003) considers models of the form \( Y = \sum_{k=0}^{K} M_k (S, X_k, U_k) \) where \( M_k \) are unknown functions and \( S \) are additional observed covariates. Our Theorem 1 fits this general framework with \( M_k (S, X_k, U_k) = G_k (X_k U_k) \) and \( G_0 (X_0 U_0) = U_0 \) with \( X_0 = 1 \). As we do, Matzkin assumes that \( M_k \) is monotonic in \( U_k \) and that \( U \) and \( X \) are continuous and conditionally independent. She proposes alternative restrictions or normalizations that suffice to identify each function \( M_k \) and distribution \( F_{U_k} \), but none of her proposed restrictions fit our generalized random coefficients framework, and as a result Theorem 1 is not a corollary of her results. Her closest result to our framework is the assumption that \( M_k (S, X_k, U_k) = N_k (S, X_k - U_k) \) for some function \( N_k \). By redefining \( X_k \) and \( U_k \) as \( \ln X_k \) and \( \ln U_k \), we can

\(^2\)The proof of Theorem 2 involves evaluating the distribution of \( Y \) given \( X \) where either \( X = 0 \) or all but one element of \( X \) equals zero. This means conditioning on a set of measure zero. The same applies to Theorem 1 regarding conditioning on \( Z \) at a point if \( Z \) is continuous. Note, however, that issues of nonuniqueness of the limiting argument (the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox) do not arise here, since the identification proof depends only on transformations of smooth conditional density and expectation functions. It would be possible to recast the proofs in terms of conditioning on sets \( \| X \| \leq c \) and taking limits as \( c \to 0 \).
replace our $G_k (X_k U_k)$ with $g_k (X_k - U_k)$ for a suitably redefined function $g_k$. However, we still cannot apply Matzkin’s result by equating $N_k (S, X_k - U_k) = g_k (X_k - U_k)$, because for this specification Matzkin (2003) requires the presence of at least one additional regressor $S$ that has certain properties, and our model has no such additional regressors inside the $G_k$ functions.\footnote{An alternative identifying restriction Matzkin (2003) proposes has $S$ empty, but assumes $M_k (\bar{x}_k, U_k) = U_k$ for some known value $\bar{x}_k$. However, in our model this would require $G_k (\bar{x}_k U_k) = U_k$, which only holds when $G_k$ is proportional to the identity function. One other restriction she considers is that $M_k$ be linearly homogeneous in $X_k$ and $U_k$, which cannot hold for our $G_k$.}

Another point of difference between our Theorem 1 and Mazkin (2003) is that she assumes the $U_k$ functions are mutually (conditionally) independent, while our Theorem 1 does not impose either conditional or unconditional independence.

A small extension to Theorem 1 is the following.

**COROLLARY 1:** Let $\tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K)$ be any function that equals zero when all but one of its elements equal zero. Then Theorem 1 holds replacing $Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0$ with
\[
Y = \tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0
\]

In Corollary 1, the function $\tilde{G}$ is not identified, so the main point of this corollary is that presence of a $\tilde{G}$ function does not interfere with identification of the $G_k$ and $F_{U_k | Z}$ functions. We later apply Corollary 1 in contexts where $\tilde{G}$ can be identified by other means.

It is worth noting that if $Y = G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) + U_0$ for any function $G$, then there exist functions $\tilde{G}$ and $G_k$ that satisfy equation (3), with $\tilde{G}$ having the required property of equaling zero when all but one of its elements is zero. This is easily shown by construction. Given any function $G$, for $k = 1, ..., K$, define $G_k (X_k U_k) = G (0, ..., 0, X_k U_k, 0, ..., 0)$, that is, as $G$ with all elements except the $k'th$ element evaluated at zero. Then define $\tilde{G}$ by $\tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) \equiv G (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K) - \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k)$. Then, by construction, equation (3) holds and $\tilde{G}$ has the desired property.

### 3.2 Joint Distribution Identification

Theorem 1 only identifies the distribution function of each $U_k$. We now make additional assumptions sufficient to identify the joint distribution $F_{U_1 | Z} (U_1, ..., U_K | Z)$. Theorem 2 below shows identification when $G$ is known in equation (1). We will then combine both Theorems to obtain overidentification of equation (2), which should mitigate some concern about making use of identification at zero arguments in Theorem 1.

**ASSUMPTION A4:** The conditional distribution $F_{Y | X, Z} (y | x, z)$ and the marginal distribution $F_Z (z)$ are identified. $U \perp X | Z$. $U, X | Z$ are continuously distributed. $X$ and $U$ have rectangular support with the closure of $supp (X | Z)$ equal to the closure of $supp (U_1 X_1, ..., U_K X_K | Z)$.

Given $U \perp X | Z$, the support conditions in Assumption A4 could be satisfied in a few different ways. For example, it holds for a given element $k$ if $supp (X_k | Z) = \mathbb{R}$, or if
\textit{supp} (X_k \mid Z) = \mathbb{R}^+ \text{ and } \textit{supp} (U_k \mid Z) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^+, \text{ or if } \textit{supp} \ (X_k \mid Z) = (0, c_k \text{ for some constant } c_k \text{ and } \textit{supp} \ (U_k \mid Z) = (0, 1, \text{ or if } \textit{supp} \ (X_k \mid Z) = -c, c \text{ and } \textit{supp} \ (U_k \mid Z) = -1, 1.

\textbf{ASSUMPTION A5:} \bar{Y} = G (X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K) \text{ for some identified function } G.

Let \( t \) denote the square root of minus one. For a given function \( h \) and real numbers \( t_1, \ldots, t_K \) define \( \kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} \) by

\[ \kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} = \int_{\text{supp}(X \mid Z)} h \ [G(s_1, \ldots s_K), t_1, \ldots, t_K] S_1^{t_1 - 1} S_2^{t_2 - 1} \ldots S_K^{t_K - 1} dS_1 dS_2 \ldots dS_K \quad (4) \]

\textbf{ASSUMPTION A6:} Assume for any reals \( t_1, \ldots, t_K \), given \( G \) we can find a non negative, bounded function \( h \) such that \( \kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} \) is finite and nonzero.

Assumption A6 is a rather mild restriction on \( G \), because the function \( h \) is freely chosen, based on knowing \( G \). Note that the term \( S_1^{t_1 - 1} S_2^{t_2 - 1} \ldots S_K^{t_K - 1} \) in equation (4) is unbounded only on a set of measure zero, so e.g., when \( \textit{supp} \ (X \mid Z) \) is bounded we only need to choose \( h \) to ensure that \( h \ (G) \) is sufficiently large on that set (for unbounded support we also need to control tail thickness to keep the integral bounded). We can also let the function \( h \) depend on \( t \) if desired. Assumption A6 also imposes very little smoothness on \( G \).

To illustrate, suppose \( \textit{supp} \ (X \mid Z) \) is bounded, and suppose \( G \) equals a sum of any finite number of terms, each of which is a product consisting of any polynomial multiplied by any integrable function bounded between two positive numbers. Then \( h \ (G, t_1, \ldots, t_K) = e^{-G} \) will satisfy Assumption A6.

\textbf{THEOREM 2:} Let Assumptions A4, A5, and A6 hold, and assume \( \textit{supp} \ (U \mid Z) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{K+}. \) Then the joint distribution function \( F_{U \mid Z} (U_1, \ldots, U_K \mid Z) \) is identified.

We can also obtain identification for cases where elements of \( U \) can be negative as well as positive, using the following Corollary.

\textbf{COROLLARY 2:} Let Assumptions A4, A5, and A6 hold, replacing the term \( S_1^{t_1 - 1} S_2^{t_2 - 1} \ldots S_K^{t_K - 1} \) in equation (4) with \( S_1^{t_1 - 1} S_2^{-t_2 - 1} \ldots S_K^{-t_K - 1} \). Assume \( \textit{supp} \ (U \mid Z) \) is bounded. Then the joint distribution function \( F_{U \mid Z} (U_1, \ldots, U_K \mid Z) \) is identified.

Having the support of \( U \) be bounded is sufficient but not necessary for identification using Corollary 2. See the proof of this Corollary for details.

### 3.3 Full Model Identification and Over Identification

Here we combine Theorems 1 and 2 to completely identify equation (2), and then show how the model might be identified even without the use of Theorem 1.

\textbf{COROLLARY 3:} Let \( Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0 \). Define \( G (X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) \). Let Assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, and A6 hold, and assume \( \textit{supp} \ (U \mid Z) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{K+}. \) Then functions \( G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K \) and the joint distribution function \( F_{U \mid Z} (U_1, \ldots, U_K \mid Z) \) are identified.
Corollary 3 shows not just identification but substantial over identification of the model. In particular, it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that, for any $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and any real scalar $t_k$,\footnote{The conditional distribution of $Y - U_0$ is identified by the deconvolution argument in the proof of Theorem 1, so the numerator of equation (5) is identified. The remainder of this equation depends only on functions $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K$ and $F_{U_1|Z}, \ldots, F_{U_K|Z}$ that are also identified by Theorem 1, and on $h$ which is chosen by the econometrician as described in Assumption A6.}

$$
\int_{\text{supp}(X|Z)} E \left[ h \left( Y - U_0, 0, \ldots, 0, t_k, 0, \ldots, 0 \right) \mid X_1, X_2 \ldots X_K, Z \right] \frac{X_{t_k}^{-1}}{X_1 X_2 \ldots X_K} dX_1 dX_2 \ldots dX_K = \int_{\text{supp}(U_k|Z)} U_{t_k}^{1/2} dF_{U_k} = \int_{\text{supp}(X|Z)} h \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(S_k), 0, \ldots, 0, t_k, 0, \ldots, 0 \right) \frac{S_{t_k}^{-1}}{S_1 S_2 \ldots S_K} dS_1 dS_2 \ldots dS_K
$$

Therefore, the functions $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K$ and $F_{U_1|Z}, \ldots, F_{U_K|Z}$, that are identified by Theorem 1, must also satisfy the infinite collection of additional restrictions given by equation (5) for any $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and all reals $t_k$. This shows that our identification of these functions is not solely based on thin sets as in Theorem 1 alone.

In fact, it may be the case in some applications that Theorem 1 is not needed at all. Suppose we have $Y = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(X_k U_k)$, so there is no $U_0$. Generally, there will exist many functions $h$ that satisfy Assumption A6. For example, in the case discussed just before Theorem 2, the $h$ function given by $h(G, t_1, \ldots, t_K) = e^{-\rho G}$ will satisfy Assumption A6 for any positive real number $\rho$. Let $\kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho, G_1, \ldots G_K)$ be defined by

$$
\kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho, G_1, \ldots G_K) = \int_{\text{supp}(X|Z)} e^{-\rho \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k(S_k)} S_{t_1}^{-1} S_{t_2}^{-1} \ldots S_{t_K}^{-1} dS_1 dS_2 \ldots dS_K.
$$

Similarly, let $\lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho)$ be defined by

$$
\lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho) = \int_{\text{supp}(X|Z)} E \left[ e^{-\rho Y} \mid X_1, X_2 \ldots X_K, Z \right] X_{t_1}^{-1} X_{t_2}^{-1} \ldots X_{t_K}^{-1} dX_1 dX_2 \ldots dX_K.
$$

It then follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that for any real positive scalars $\rho$ and $\rho$ and for any set of $k$ real numbers $t_1, \ldots, t_K$,

$$
\frac{\lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho)}{\kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho, G_1, \ldots G_K)} = \frac{\lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho)}{\kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}(\rho, G_1, \ldots G_K)}
$$

This then provides a continuum of equations in the unknown functions $G_1, \ldots G_K$. If these equations only have one solution (which is essentially a completeness assumption), then they suffice to completely $G_1, \ldots G_K$. In this case Theorem 1 is not needed, since this result combined with Theorem 2 would then identify the entire model.

We do not know of low level sufficient conditions to ensure that equation (7) has a unique solution, so we do not present this result as a formal identification theorem for the functions $G_1, \ldots G_K$. However, this infinite set of restrictions, along with additional infinite set of restrictions given by equation (5), shows that we have far more identifying information regarding $G_1, \ldots G_K$ and $F_{U_1|Z}, \ldots, F_{U_K|Z}$ than just the thin set based information from Theorem 1.
3.4 Additional Models and Notes

The overidentifying information discussed in the previous subsection suggests that Theorems 1 and 2 may be combined to potentially identify richer models than equation (2). Suppose that

$$Y = \tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, ..., X_K U_K, \theta) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) + U_0$$

(8)

where the function $\tilde{G}$ is known, but the vector of parameters $\theta$ is unknown, and $\tilde{G}$ equals zero whenever all but one of its first $K$ elements equals zero. Then the functions $G_1, G_2, ..., G_K$ are still identified by Corollary 1. As above, assume we can construct a set of $h$ functions that satisfy Assumption A6, and let the parameter $\rho \in P$ for some set $P$ index the choice of $h$ function, which will denote $h_\rho$. In the earlier example the $h$ function given by $h_\rho (G, t_1, ..., t_K) = e^{-\rho G}$ satisfies Assumption A6 for any $\rho \in P$ where $P$ equals the set of positive real numbers. Let $\tilde{\kappa}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\theta, \rho)$ be defined by

$$\tilde{\kappa}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\theta, \rho) = \int_{supp(X|Z)} h_\rho \left[ \tilde{G} (s_1, ..., s_K, \theta) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (s_k), t_1, ..., t_K \right] S_1^{-\eta_1} S_2^{-\eta_2} ... S_K^{-\eta_K} dS_1 dS_2 ... dS_K$$

(9)

Similarly, let $\tilde{\lambda}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\rho)$ be defined by equation (31) in the appendix, with $\tilde{Y} = Y - U_0$ and $h_\rho$ in place of $h$. Like equation (7), it then follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that for any two elements $\rho$ and $\bar{\rho}$ of the set $P$, and for any set of $k$ real numbers $t_1, ..., t_K$,

$$\frac{\tilde{\lambda}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\rho)}{\tilde{\kappa}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\theta, \rho)} = \frac{\tilde{\lambda}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\bar{\rho})}{\tilde{\kappa}_{t_1, ..., t_K} (\theta, \bar{\rho})}$$

(10)

This then provides an infinite number of equations in which the only unknown is the finite vector of parameters $\theta$, and so $\theta$ will be identified if no value of this vector other than the true value satisfies all of these equations. Once $\theta$ is identified, then $G (s_1, ..., s_K) = \tilde{G} (s_1, ..., s_K, \theta) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (s_k)$ is identified and we can then apply Theorem 2 to once more identify $F_{U|Z} (U_1, ..., U_K | Z)$.

To illustrate, consider the model

$$Y = G_1 (X_1 U_1) + G_2 (X_2 U_2) + \theta X_1 U_1 X_2 U_2 + U_0$$

(11)

for some unknown scalar constant $\theta$, so in this example $\tilde{G} (s_1, s_2, \theta) = \theta s_1 s_2$. Apply Theorem 1 along with equation (5) to overidentify $G_1$ and $G_2$: $F_{U_0|Z} (U_0 | Z)$ is also identified by Theorem 1. Assume there exists at a value of $\rho, \bar{\rho}, t_1$ and $t_2$ such that $\kappa_{t_1, t_2} (\theta, \rho)$ is strictly monotonic in the scalar $\theta$. Then that suffices to ensure that equation (10) has a unique solution and hence that $\theta$ is identified. Finally, apply Theorem 2 with $G (s_1 s_2) = \theta s_1 s_2 + G_1 (s_1) + G_2 (s_2)$ to identify $F_{U|Z} (U_1, U_2 | Z)$, and so the entire model given by equation (11) is then identified.

For either equation (2) or more general models like those above, constructing an estimator based on mimicking the steps of our identification arguments would likely be both inefficient and difficult to implement. Inefficiency is likely because Theorem 1 uses thin set identification and Theorem 2 provides equations based on specific choices of the function $h$, and it is hard to see how one might choose the function $h$ to maximize efficiency, and indeed different $h$ functions
might be optimal for each moment and each function to be estimated. Also, Theorem 2 identifies the characteristic function of $U$, so an inversion would be needed to directly obtain the distribution function of $U$. Finally, sequentially applying Theorem 1 to estimate $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K$ and Theorem 2 to estimate $F_U$ would ignore the overidentifying information discussed in the previous subsection. We will therefore later use parametric or sieve maximum likelihood to estimate our models.

4  Random Barten Scales

Let a "consumer" refer to an individual or household that maximizes a single well behaved utility function. Let $Q_j$ denote the quantity purchased of a good $j$, and let $S(Q, U)$ denote the direct utility function over the bundle of goods $Q = (Q_1, \ldots, Q_J)$ of a consumer having a vector of heterogeneity parameters $U$. Assume $S$ is continuous, non-decreasing, and quasi-concave in $Q$. Define the reference consumer to be a consumer that has heterogeneity parameters $U$ normalized to equal one, and let $\bar{S}(Q_1, \ldots, Q_J)$ denote the direct utility function of a reference consumer. Each consumer chooses quantities to maximize utility subject to the standard linear budget constraint $\sum_{j=1}^{J} P_j Q_j = M$ where $P_j$ is the price of good $j$ and $M$ is the total amount of money the consumer spends on this bundle of goods. Write the Marshallian budget share functions that result from maximizing the reference utility function $\bar{S}$ as $W^*_j = \omega_j (P_1/M, \ldots, P_J/M)$, where $W^*_j = Q_j P_j / M$ is the share of money $M$ that is spent on good $j$ (called the budget share of good $j$). Let $V (P_1/M, \ldots, P_J/M)$ denote the indirect utility function corresponding to $\bar{S}$, obtained by substituting $Q_j = \omega_j (P_1/M, \ldots, P_J/M) M / P_j$ into $\bar{S}(Q_1, \ldots, Q_J)$ for $j = 1, \ldots, J$.

Our empirical application is based on Barten (1964) scales. Barten scales are a longstanding method used to bring preference heterogeneity on the basis of observed variables into continuous demand models. Barten scales are consequently a natural starting point for the incorporation of random utility parameters representing unobserved preference heterogeneity. See, e.g., Lewbel (1997) for a survey of various types of equivalence scales in the consumer demand literature, including Barten scales, and see Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982) for a prominent empirical application of traditional Barten scales. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) includes an extensive discussion of parametric identification of Barten Scales.

Barten (1964) proposed the model in which consumers have utility functions of the form $S(Q_1, \ldots, Q_J; a_{h1}, \ldots, a_{hJ}) = \bar{S}(Q_1/a_{h1}, \ldots, Q_J/a_{hJ})$, where the Barten scales $a_{h1}, \ldots, a_{hJ}$ are positive functions of observable household attributes $h$, such as age or family size, that embody variation in preferences across consumers. For households with multiple members, Barten scales can be interpreted as representing the degree to which each good is shared or jointly consumed. The smaller the Barten scale $a_{hj}$ is, the greater the economies of scale to consumption of good $j$ within the household. This is then reflected in the demand functions, where smaller Barten scales have the same effect on demands as lower prices. For example, if a couple with one car rides together some of the time, then in terms of total distance each travels by car, sharing has the same effect as making gasoline cheaper. The more they drive together instead of alone, the lower is the effective cost of gasoline, and the smaller is the couple’s Barten scale for gasoline.
More generally, Barten scales provide a measure of the degree to which different households get utility from different goods. This is how we will employ them. Although Barten scales have long been a popular method of modeling preference heterogeneity in empirical work, up until now Barten scales have always been modeled as deterministic functions of observable characteristics of consumers. Here we consider using Barten scales to embody unobserved heterogeneity of preferences across consumers.

We propose random Barten scales, assuming that consumers have utility functions of the form $S(Q_1, \ldots, Q_J; U_1, \ldots, U_h) = S(Q_j/U_1, \ldots, Q_j/U_J)$, where $U_1, \ldots, U_J$ are positive random utility parameters embodying unobserved preference heterogeneity across consumers. More formally, we could write each random Barten scale as $U_j$, since for each good $j$, the distribution function that $U_j$ is drawn from could depend on observable household attributes $h$. Barten’s original model is then the special case where the distribution of each $U_j(h)$ is degenerate with a mass point at $\alpha_{hj}$.

Define normalized prices $X_j = P_j/M$ for each good $j$ and rewrite the budget constraint as $\sum_{j=1}^J X_j Q_j = 1$. Now $S(Q_1, \ldots, Q_J)$ and $V(X_1, \ldots, X_J)$ are the direct and indirect utility functions of the reference consumer, and $\omega_j(X_1, \ldots, X_J)$ is the Marshallian budget share demand function of the reference consumer. It can be immediately verified from the first order conditions for utility maximization that a consumer will have Marshallian demand functions of the form $W_j^* = \omega_j(U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_J X_J)$ for each good $j$ if and only if the consumer’s direct and indirect utility function equal, up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation, $\bar{S}(Q_1/U_1, \ldots, Q_j/U_j)$ and $V(U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_j X_j)$, respectively. Also, given a specification of reference indirect utility $V(X_1, \ldots, X_J)$, the corresponding Barten scaled demand functions can be obtained by the logarithmic form of Roy’s identity:

$$\omega_j(U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_J X_J) = \frac{\partial V(U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_J X_J)}{\partial \ln X_j} \left/ \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^J \frac{\partial V(U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_J X_J)}{\partial \ln X_\ell} \right) \right.$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Notice that the functional form of each $\omega_j$ only depends on the functional form of $\bar{S}$ or equivalently of $V$, so $U_1, \ldots, U_J$ can vary independently of $X_1, \ldots, X_J$ across consumers. These derivations are exactly those given by Barten (1964) and by later authors who applied Barten scales, e.g., Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982), except that we put unobserved random variables $U_j$ in place of deterministic functions $\alpha_{hj}$ of observed household characteristics. Random Barten scaled Marshallian demand functions then have precisely the form of our generalized random coefficients given in equation (1).

### 4.1 Additive Model Random Barten Scales: Theory

In our empirical application, we let $\omega_1$ be the budget share of a single good of interest, energy, and we let $\omega_2$ denote the budget share of all other goods, corresponding to the general Barten scaled model with $J = 2$. This case only requires estimating a single equation for $\omega_1$, since the equation for $\omega_2$ is automatically determined by construction as $\omega_2 = 1 - \omega_1$. If we had $J > 2$, then we would have $J - 1$ separate equations to estimate, and we would have further overidentification because the same Barten scales, with the same joint distribution $F_{U_1 | Z}(U_1, \ldots, U_K | Z)$, would appear in each equation.
Matzkin, (2007a), (2007b), (2008) discusses identification of systems of equations where the number of equations equals the number of random parameters, assuming it is possible to invert the reduced form of the system to express the random parameters as functions of observables. Although our model has $J$ Barten scales $U_j$ and $J$ demand equations, Matzkin’s identification method for systems of equations cannot be applied here because there are actually only $J - 1$ distinct demand functions $\omega_1,...,\omega_{J-1}$, with the remaining demand function $\omega_J$ determined by the adding up constraint that $\sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_j = 1$.

The decomposition of total consumption into $J = 2$ goods is often done in empirical work when one wishes to focus on the welfare effects of a price change on a particular good, as we will do empirically. See, e.g., Hausman (1981), Hausman and Newey (1995), Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey (2010), and Hoderlein and Vanhems (2010, 2011). This construction is formally rationalizable by assuming utility is separable into good 1 and a subutility function of all other goods. See, e.g., Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). Alternatively Lewbel (1996) provides conditions on the distribution of prices (stochastic hicksian aggregation) under which Marshallian demand functions have the same properties with nonseparable utility as with separable utility.

With $J = 2$ goods, our model is $W_1^* = \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)$ and $W_2^* = 1 - W_1^*$, and with $J = 2$ we can rewrite equation (12) as

$$\lambda (W_1^*) = \ln \left( \frac{\partial V(U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial V(U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right)$$

where $\lambda (W_1^*)$ is the logit transformation function $\lambda (W_1^*) = \ln \left[ W_1^* / (1 - W_1^*) \right]$.

Due to the constraints of Slutsky symmetry, imposing additivity directly on the Marshallian demand function $\omega_1 (X_1, X_2)$ would result in extreme restrictions on behavior. See, e.g., Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). So we instead impose additivity on the logit transformation of $\omega_1 (X_1, X_2)$ (later this will be relaxed to allow for interaction terms), thereby assuming demands have the additive form

$$\lambda (W_1) = \lambda [\omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)] + U_0 = g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2) + U_0$$

Here the functions $g_1$ and $g_2$ are nonparametric and $U_0$ is interpreted as measurement error in the observed budget share $W_1$ relative to the true budget share $W_1^*$. This implies that the underlying demand function for good 1 is given by

$$W_1^* = \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) = \left( 1 + e^{-g_1 (U_1 X_1) - g_2 (U_2 X_2)} \right)^{-1}$$

Use of the logit transformation here, and assumed additivity in logit transformed budget shares, has as far as we know not been considered before in the estimation of continuous demand functions. However, this logit transformed model has a number of advantages. First, $\lambda (W_1)$ has support on the whole real line, so the measurement error $U_0$ has unrestricted support, instead of a support that necessarily depends on covariates. Second, with this transform no constraints need to be placed on the range of values the nonparametric functions $g_1$ and $g_2$ take on. Third, unlike all other semiparametric or nonparametric applications of the Hausman (1981) consumer surplus type methodology (such as those cited above), a closed form expression for the indirect
utility function that gives rise Marshallian demands (15) and hence (14) exists, and is given by Theorem 3.

THEOREM 3: The demand function $\omega_1$ satisfies $\lambda [\omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)] = g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2)$ for some functions $g_1$ and $g_2$ if and only if $\omega_1$ is derived from an indirect utility function of the form

$$V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) = H [h_1 (U_1 X_1) + h_2 (U_2 X_2), U_1, U_2].$$

for some monotonic in its first element function $H$ and some differentiable functions $h_1$ and $h_2$. The functions $g_1, g_2, h_1,$ and $h_2$ are related by

$$h_1 (U_1 X_1) + h_2 (U_2 X_2) = \int_{-\infty}^{\ln X_1} e^{g_1 (U_1 x_1)} d \ln x_1 + \int_{-\infty}^{\ln X_2} e^{-g_2 (U_2 x_2)} d \ln x_2$$

(16)

and

$$g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2) = \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_1 (U_1 X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_2 (U_2 X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right)$$

(17)

Also, the functions $h_1 (U_1 P_1 / M)$ and $h_2 (U_2 P_2 / M)$ are each nonincreasing, and their sum is strictly increasing in $M$ and quasiconvex in $P_1, P_2$, and $M$.

The function $H$ has no observable implications for individual consumer’s demand functions, and is present only because utility functions are ordinal and therefore unchanged by monotonic transformations.\(^\text{5}\) We can therefore just write the indirect utility function in Theorem 3 as

$$V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) = h_1 (U_1 X_1) + h_2 (U_2 X_2).$$

(18)

Preferences $V (X_1, X_2)$ are defined to be indirectly additively separable (see, e.g., Blackorby, Primont, and Russell 1978) if, up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation, $V (X_1, X_2) = h_1 (X_1) + h_2 (X_2)$ for some functions $h_1, h_2$. So an equivalent way to state the first part of Theorem 3 is that $\omega_1$ satisfies equation (15) if and only if preferences are given by a Barten scaled indirectly additively separable utility function. The second part of Theorem 3 then provides closed form expressions for the indirect utility function given the nonparametric (additive in the logit transformation) demand function and vice versa.

4.2 Additive Model Random Barten Scales: Identification and Estimation

From equation (14) we have the demand model

$$\lambda (W_1) = g_1 (U_1 X_1) + g_2 (U_2 X_2) + U_0$$

(19)

Identification of this model can be obtained by Corollary 3, letting $Y = \lambda (W_1)$ and $G_k = g_k$. A condition that suffices to make the monotonicity of Assumption A3 hold is that the goods not

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\(^5\)Later we will reintroduce the function $H$ to construct a money metric representation of utility for use in social welfare calculations.
be Giffen goods.\(^6\) Having good 1 not be Giffen guarantees monotonicity of \(g_1\), and similarly the restriction that good 2 is not Giffen means that \(\omega_2\) is monotonic in \(X_2\), which by the adding up constraint \(\omega_1 + \omega_2 = 1\) implies monotonicity of \(g_2\).

Next consider Assumptions A1, A2, and A4. Continuity of each \(X_k\) and \(U_k\) is straightforward. \(U_0\) is assumed to be measurement error in \(Y\) and hence independent of the other variables. \(U_1\) and \(U_2\) are preference parameters, and it is common to assume that tastes are determined independently of regressors in partial equilibrium analyses (though we will consider potential endogeneity later). As discussed earlier, Barten scales are traditionally modeled as deterministic functions of demographic characteristics, so in our extension to random Barten scales we assume \(Z\) are demographic characteristics.

Each \(X_k\) is by construction nonnegative and Assumption A1 requires zero to be in the closure of the support of \(X\), so we are assuming that prices can be arbitrarily close to zero and/or total expenditures can be arbitrarily large. However, Assumption A1 is only needed for Theorem 1, and as discussed earlier it may be possible to completely identify the model without Theorem 1 and therefore without Assumption A1, and even if not, Theorem 2 provides very many overidentifying conditions that do not depend on this identification at zero. Barten scales are nonnegative, so remaining support conditions can be satisfied by assuming the support of each \(X_k\) is \(\mathbb{R}^+\), or by assuming the support of each \(X_k\) is the interval \((0, c_k\) for some constant \(c_k\) and (after rescaling units of measurement if necessary) \(\text{supp} (U_k) = (0, 1)\). Finally, the earlier discussions regarding Assumption A6 carry over directly to these demand applications.

Given identification, we will estimate the model using Sieve Maximum Likelihood. We do not list here the formal assumptions for consistency and asymptotic inference of sieve maximum likelihood estimation in this application, because the generic conditions for validity of these estimators in an independently, identically distributed data setting like ours are well established. See, e.g., Chen (2007) and references therein.\(^7\)

Based on Theorem 3, and in particular equation (17), we can nonparametrically specify \(g_1\) and \(g_2\) by nonparametrically specifying \(h_1\) and \(h_2\) in terms of sieve basis functions (imposing the shape restrictions possessed by indirect utility functions if desired). For efficiency, it is desirable to choose a basis for sieve expansions having the property that low order terms are equivalent to good parametric models. We therefore consider a polynomial in logs sieve basis

\[
\ln h_k (U_k X_k) = \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta_{ks} (\ln (U_k X_k))^s
\]  

\(^6\)A Giffen good is a good that has a positive own price elasticity in its Marshallian quantity demand function, and hence an upward sloping demand curve. While possible in theory, very little empirical evidence has been found for the existence of Giffen goods, and particularly not for the types of goods we consider in our application. The only example we know of is Jensen and Miller (2008), who show that some grains may have been Giffen goods for extremely poor households in rural China.

\(^7\)Depending on the supports and tail thickness of the model errors and regressors, it is possible in problems like ours for identification to be weak, in the sense that recovering the structural functions of the model could entail ill-posed inverse problems. See, e.g., Hoderlein, Nesheim, and Simoni (2011), who document these issues in a framework similar to ours, though in their model only the error distributions are nonparametric. The assumptions required for standard sieve maximum likelihood inference may rule out at least some forms of weak identification, though our use of sieves could even then be interpreted as a choice of regularization for structural function estimation.
with constants $\beta_{ks}$, for $k = 1, 2$, letting $S \to \infty$ as $n \to \infty$. Logarithmic specifications like these are common in demand models, e.g., with $S = 1$ equations (18) and (20) correspond to Barten scaled Cobb Douglas preferences, and with $S = 2$ this gives a separable version of the Translog indirect utility function of Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982), though in their model the Barten scales have the traditional form of being functions only of observable characteristics. Having $S = 3$ without Barten scales corresponds to an additively separable version of the third-order Translog budget share function as in Nicol (1984).

In this model we impose the free normalization $\beta_{20} = 0$. This is imposed without loss of generality, because if $\beta_{20} \neq 0$ then we can multiply the indirect utility function $V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)$ by $e^{-\beta_{20}}$ (which is a monotonic transformation of $V$) and redefine $\beta_{10}$ as $\beta_{10} - \beta_{20}$ to get an observationally equivalent representation of indirect utility that has $\beta_{20} = 0$. Applying Theorem 3 and equation (14) to this model gives the demand function

$$
\lambda (W_1) = \lambda [\omega_{S1} (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \beta)] + U_0
$$

$$
= \beta_{10} + \left( \sum_{s=1}^{S} \left[ \ln (U_1 X_1)^s \beta_{1s} - \ln (U_2 X_2)^s \beta_{2s} \right] + \ln \left( \sum_{s=1}^{S} (\ln (U_1 X_1)^s)^{s-1} s \beta_{1s} \right) \right) + U_0.
$$

(21)

where $\omega_{S1} (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \beta)$ denotes the sieve representation of $\omega_{1} (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2)$ with $S$ terms in the parameters $\beta$. Here, $\lambda (W_1)$ is additive as in (14) since the logged ratio may be written as a difference of logs.

To simplify the model, instead of letting the dependence of $U$ on a vector of demographic characteristics $Z$ be entirely unrestricted, we assume each Barten scale takes the form

$$
U_k = \alpha_k (Z) \tilde{U}_k
$$

where $\alpha_k (Z)$ is a traditional deterministic Barten scale that depends on demographic household characteristics $Z$, and the remaining random variation $\tilde{U}_k$ in each Barten scale is assumed to be independent of covariates. Our sieve for modeling $\alpha_k (Z)$ is to replace $\ln [\alpha_k (Z)]$ with an ordinary polynomial in $Z$, with a vector of coefficients denoted $\theta_k$. This polynomial does not include a constant term, because the scaling of $\alpha_k (Z)$ is freely absorbed into the $\beta_{ks}$ parameters.

We nonparametrically model the density functions of $U_0$ and the vector $\tilde{U} = \tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2$ by using Hermite polynomial sieve densities as in Gallant and Nychka (1987). For the joint density $f_{\tilde{U}}$, this corresponds to a $J$'th order expansion of the form

$$
f_{\tilde{U},J} (\tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2, \gamma, \sigma, \rho) = \left( \sum_{j_1=0}^{J} \sum_{j_2=0}^{J} \gamma_{j_1 j_2} (\ln \tilde{U}_1)^{j_1} (\ln \tilde{U}_2)^{j_2} \right)^{2} \exp \left( \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_1}{\sigma_1} - 2 \rho \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_1}{\sigma_2} \right) \left( \frac{\ln \tilde{U}_2}{\sigma_2} - 2 (1 - \rho^2) \right)
$$

(22)

where $\gamma$ is the vector of coefficients $\gamma_{j_1 j_2}, \sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2),$ and $C (\gamma, \sigma, \rho)$ is the constant necessary to make $f_{\tilde{U},J}$ integrate to one. Because we scale by $C$, we can without loss of generality let $\gamma_{00} = 1$. When $J = 0$ (which in our empirical work we find to be a reasonable restriction) this reduces to $\tilde{U}_1$ and $\tilde{U}_2$ being bivariate log normal with $C (\gamma, \sigma, \rho) = 2\pi \sigma_1 \sigma_2 (1 - \rho^2)$, each $\ln \tilde{U}_k$ having mean zero and variance $\sigma_k^2$ and correlation coefficient $\rho$. Note that we don’t need to explicitly model the mean of $\ln \tilde{U}$ and hence the scaling of each $\tilde{U}_k$, because the scaling of
\( \tilde{U}_k \), like that of \( \alpha_k (Z) \), is freely absorbed into the \( \beta_{ks} \) parameters. The analogous sieve for the density of \( U_0 \) is

\[
f_{0j} (U_0, \delta, \sigma_0) = \frac{\left( \sum_{j=0}^{J} \delta_j U_0^j \right)^2}{C_0 \left( \delta, \mu_0, \sigma_0 \right)} \exp \left( - \left( \frac{U_0 - \mu_0}{\sigma_0} \right)^2 / 2 \right)
\]

(23)

where \( \delta \) is the vector of coefficients \( \delta_j, \delta_0 = 1 \), \( C_0 \left( \delta, \mu_0, \sigma_0 \right) \) is the constant necessary to make \( f_{0j} \) integrate to one, and we constrain these coefficients to impose the usual assumption that the additive model error \( U_0 \) is mean zero.

In our application we did not require \( J \) greater than two, and for \( J = 2 \) we get

\[
C_0 \left( \delta, \mu_0, \sigma_0 \right) = \left[ \left( \mu_0^4 + 6 \mu_0^2 \sigma_0^2 + 3 \sigma_0^4 \right) \delta_1^2 + 2 \left( \mu_0^3 + 3 \mu_0 \sigma_0^2 \right) \delta_1 \delta_2 + \left( \mu_0^2 + \sigma_0^2 \right) \left( 2 \delta_2 + \delta_1^2 \right) + 2 \mu_0 \delta_1 + 1 \right] \sigma_0
\]

and the restriction that \( E \left( U_0 \right) = 0 \) imposes the constraint that

\[
\left( \mu_0^5 + 10 \mu_0^3 \sigma_0^2 + 15 \mu_0 \sigma_0^4 \right) \delta_1^2 + 2 \left( \mu_0^4 + 6 \mu_0^2 \sigma_0^2 + 3 \sigma_0^4 \right) \delta_1 \delta_2 + \left( \mu_0^3 + 3 \mu_0 \sigma_0^2 \right) \left( 2 \delta_2 + \delta_1^2 \right) + 2 \left( \mu_0^2 + \sigma_0^2 \right) \delta_1 + \mu_0 = 0.
\]

When \( J = 1 \) these simplify to

\[
C_0 \left( \delta, \mu_0, \sigma_0 \right) = \left[ \left( \mu_0^3 + \sigma_0^2 \right) \delta_1^2 + 2 \mu_0 \delta_1 + 1 \right] \sigma_0 \left( 2 \pi \right)^{1/2}
\]

and

\[
\left( \mu_0^3 + 3 \mu_0 \sigma_0^2 \right) \delta_1^2 + 2 \left( \mu_0^2 + \sigma_0^2 \right) \delta_1 + \mu_0 = 0.
\]

For \( J = 0 \), we get \( C_0 \left( \delta, \mu_0, \sigma_0 \right) = \sigma_0 \left( 2 \pi \right)^{1/2} \) and \( \mu_0 = 0 \), corresponding to a mean zero normal.

For a given consumer with observed values \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \), the conditional density function of \( W_1 \) is then

\[
f_{W_1 | x_1, x_2, Z} \left( w_1 \mid x_1, x_2, z; \beta, \sigma, \theta, \delta, \gamma, \rho \right) = \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{0j} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{w_1}{1 - w_1} \right) - \omega_{S1} \left( \alpha_1 (z) \tilde{u}_1 x_1 + \alpha_2 (z) \tilde{u}_2 x_2, \beta, \sigma, \theta, \delta, \gamma, \rho \right) \right] f_{\tilde{U}_1, \tilde{U}_2} \left( \tilde{u}_1, \tilde{u}_2, \gamma, \sigma, \rho \right) d\tilde{u}_1 d\tilde{u}_2
\]

Assuming independently, identically distributed observations \( w_{1i}, x_{1i}, x_{2i} \) of consuming households \( i \), estimation then proceeds by searching over parameter vectors \( \beta, \sigma, \delta, \) and \( \gamma \) to maximize the sieve log likelihood function

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \ln f_{W_1 | x_1, x_2, Z} \left( w_{1i} \mid x_{1i}, x_{2i}, z_i; \beta, \sigma, \theta, \delta, \gamma, \rho \right).
\]

4.3 Empirical Additive Model Random Barten Scales

We estimate the model of the previous subsection using Canadian household expenditure microdata from the 1997 to 2008 Surveys of Household Spending. We consider households comprised of one adult (as of 31 Dec) aged 25-45 residing in provinces other than Prince Edward Island.
(due to data masking). We consider the share of total nondurable expenditures commanded by energy goods, and drop observations whose expenditures on energy goods are zero, and those whose total nondurable expenditures are in the top or bottom percentile of the total nondurable expenditure distribution. This leaves 9413 observations for estimation.

Total nondurable expenditures are comprised of the sum of household spending on food, clothing, health care, alcohol and tobacco, public transportation, private transportation operation, and personal care, plus the energy goods fuel oil, electricity, natural gas and gasoline. Total nondurable expenditures are scaled to equal one at its mean value, which is a free normalization of units.

| Table 1: Summary Statistics: Canadian Energy Shares |
|----------------------------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| 9413 observations                      | mean  | std dev | min | max  |
| energy share, $W$                      | 0.14  | 0.09   | 0.00 | 0.73 |
| total nondurable expenditure, $M$      | 1.00  | 0.50   | 0.1  | 2.90 |
| price of energy goods, $P_1$           | 1.00  | 0.23   | 0.43 | 2.28 |
| price of nonenergy goods, $P_2$        | 0.96  | 0.08   | 0.76 | 1.35 |
| energy normalised price, $X_1$         | 1.31  | 0.92   | 0.19 | 10.27|
| nonenergy normalised price, $X_2$      | 1.30  | 0.94   | 0.29 | 9.41 |

Prices vary by province (9 included) and year (12 years) yielding 108 distinct price vectors for the underlying commodities comprising nondurable consumption. These underlying commodity prices are normalised to equal one in Ontario in 2002. To maximize price variation, following Lewbel (1989) and Hoderlein and Mihaileva (2008), we construct $P_1$ as the Stone price index using within group household specific budget shares of energy goods, and $P_2$ is constructed similarly for non-energy goods. These price indices both have a value of one in Ontario in 2002. Finally, the regressors $X_1$ and $X_2$ are defined as the prices for energy and non-energy divided by total nondurable expenditure for the households. Table 1 gives summary statistics for budget shares, expenditures, prices, and normalised prices.

We estimate equation (24) in Stata, plugging in equations (21) and (22) with $S = 3$ and $J = 2$. Estimated coefficients are given in Table 2 below. Standard errors are provided with the caveat that they treat the sieve basis functions as finite model parameterizations.\(^8\)

\(^8\)Given that our our data ended up implying low order sieve polynomials, it is reasonable to interpret our estimates parametrically.
Table 2: Estimated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( h_1 ) and ( h_2 )</th>
<th>( \text{est} )</th>
<th>( \text{se} )</th>
<th>( U_0, U_1, ) and ( U_2 )</th>
<th>( \text{est} )</th>
<th>( \text{se} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_0 )</td>
<td>-2.144</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>( \sigma_0 )</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{11} )</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>( \sigma_1 )</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{12} )</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>( \sigma_2 )</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{13} )</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>( \delta_1 )</td>
<td>-0.452</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{21} )</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>( \gamma_{11} )</td>
<td>-0.663</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{22} )</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>( \gamma_{21} )</td>
<td>-0.322</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta_{23} )</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>( \gamma_{12} )</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma_{22} )</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures 1 and 2 show the estimated distributions of \( \ln U_1 \) and \( \ln U_2 \). We do not show the distribution of \( U_0 \), because it is insignificantly different from a normal (\( \delta_1 \) and \( \delta_2 \) are jointly insignificant). These two distributions of unobserved heterogeneity parameters are not far from log normal and hence rather strongly right-skewed, with modes well below zero.

The estimated standard deviations of \( \ln U_1 \) and \( \ln U_2 \) in Figures 1 and 2 are 0.52 and 0.84, (these differ from \( \sigma_1 \) and \( \sigma_2 \) because the \( \gamma \) parameters affect the second moments). The standard deviations of \( \ln X_1 \) and \( \ln X_2 \) are 0.54, indicating that unobserved preference heterogeneity in the Barten scales contributes variation to energy demand of the roughly the same order of magnitude as that contributed by observed variation in prices and total expenditures across consumers. The standard deviation of the additive error \( U_0 \) is 0.26, showing that both additive errors and unobserved preference heterogeneity contribute substantively to observed variation in demand.

We postpone more thorough empirical analyses to later, when we report estimated results from a richer model.

### 4.4 Interaction Terms in Utility

The additive utility model in Theorem 3, estimated in the previous subsection, restricts price interaction effects. Using identification based on Theorem 2 instead of Theorem 1, we could instead nonparametrically estimate any sufficiently smooth demand function \( \omega_1 \left( U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2 \right) \), and identify the function \( \omega_1 \) and distribution of the associated Barten scales \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \). However, in doing so we would lose the benefits we gained from Theorem 3 of having closed form expressions for the corresponding indirect utility function \( V \left( U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2 \right) \), which is useful for welfare analyses and convenient for imposing constraints associated with utility maximization. We will therefore instead generalize the class of indirect utility functions given by Theorem 3.

Theorem 3 yielded the indirectly additive utility function \( V \left( X_1, X_2 \right) = h_1 \left( X_1 \right) + h_2 \left( X_2 \right) \). To relax the restrictiveness (in terms of cross effects) of additive demand functions, we now consider adding second and third order interaction terms to the model of Theorem 3, giving an indirect utility function of the form

\[
V \left( X_1, X_2 \right) = h_1 \left( X_1 \right) + h_2 \left( X_2 \right) + X_1 X_2 \alpha_0 + X_1^2 X_2 \alpha_1 + X_1 X_2^2 \alpha_2 \quad (25)
\]
For unknown functions \( h_1 (X_1) \) and \( h_2 (X_2) \) along with unknown constants \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1, \) and \( \alpha_2 \). Higher order interactions could be similarly identified if necessary, indeed, we could interpret these interactions as the first terms in a sieve expansion for an arbitrary indirect utility function. Barten scaling this indirect utility function, substituting the result into equation (13), and adding the error term \( U_0 \) as before gives the demand model

\[
\lambda (W_1) = \ln \left[ g_1 (U_1 X_1) + M_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \alpha) \right] - \ln \left[ g_2 (U_2 X_2) + M_2 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \alpha) \right] + U_0
\]

(26)

where \( g_k (U_k X_k) = U_k X_k \hat{c} h_k (U_k X_k) / \partial (U_k X_k) \) for \( k = 1, 2 \) and

\[
M_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \alpha) = U_1 X_1 U_2 X_2 \alpha_0 + 2 U_1^2 X_1^2 U_2 X_2 \alpha_1 + U_1 X_1 U_2^2 X_2^2 \alpha_2,
\]

(27)

\[
M_2 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \alpha) = U_1 X_1 U_2 X_2 \alpha_0 + U_1^2 X_1^2 U_2 X_2 \alpha_1 + 2 U_1 X_1 U_2^2 X_2^2 \alpha_2.
\]

(28)

Identification of this demand model follows directly from Theorem 3.\(^9\)

For estimation of the model, we let the functions \( h_k \) in equation (25) be represented by the same polynomial in logs sieve basis functions as before. Barten scaling this indirect utility function gives, by equation (26), the demand function

\[
\lambda (W_1) = \omega s (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \beta) + U_0
\]

\[
= \ln \left[ \left( e^{\beta_{10} + \sum_{s=1}^{S} (\ln (U_1 X_1))^s \beta_{1s}} \right) \left( \sum_{s=1}^{S} (\ln (U_1 X_1))^s \beta_{1s} \right) + M_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \alpha) \right]
\]

\[
- \ln \left[ \left( e^{\sum_{s=1}^{S} (\ln (U_2 X_2))^s \beta_{2s}} \right) \left( \sum_{s=1}^{S} (\ln (U_2 X_2))^s \beta_{2s} \right) + M_2 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2, \alpha) \right] + U_0
\]

The demand function given by equation (29) is the same as (21), except for the addition of the functions \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) given by equations (27) and (28), which embody the additional desired price interaction terms. We estimate equation (29) using the same sieve maximum likelihood method as before.

### 4.5 Empirical Barten Scales with Interaction Terms

Table 3 presents estimated parameters for the demand equation (29), that is, the Barten scale model with interaction terms. Again, we use a 2nd order Hermite expansion around the normal for \( U_0, \ln U_1 \) and \( \ln U_2 \), and a 3rd order polynomial in \( \ln X_j \) for \( G_j \). In this model, if any of the interaction coefficients \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1, \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are negative, then for large values of either \( U_1 \) or \( U_2 \), the utility function will violate monotonicity. In the demand and likelihood functions, this would make the argument of the log function in \( \lambda (W_1) \) negative. We therefore restrict \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1, \) and \( \alpha_2 \) to be non-negative.

As Table 3 shows, two of the interaction terms are statistically significant (and all three are jointly significant). For comparison, we also estimated the model, denoted "without heterogeneity," imposing the constraint that \( U_1 = U_2 = 1 \) and thereby removing unobserved preference.

\(^9\)It’s possible to directly prove identification of the demand model of equations (26), (27), and (28) under weaker conditions than those of Theorem 3. Specifically, identification follows if Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 hold with \( G_k (X_k) = \ln g_k (X_k) \) for \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), the functions \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are differentiable, and either \( g_k' (0) E (U_k) \) for \( k = 1 \) or \( k = 2 \) is nonzero and finite. A proof appears in earlier working paper version of this paper.
heterogeneity. This corresponds to a more traditional demand model in which the only error term is additive, albeit additive in the logit transform of the budget share.

Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated densities of $\ln U_1$ and $\ln U_2$. Here the standard deviations of $\ln U_1$ and $\ln U_2$ are 0.44 and 0.81, respectively, which is similar to what we observed in the model without interaction terms. Finding that $U_2$ has a larger variance than $U_1$ means that consumers have more heterogeneity in their preferences for non-energy goods than for energy goods, which is not surprising, given the extent to which energy goods are necessities.

Recall $X_j = P_j/M$ where $M$ is total expenditures. Figure 5 displays estimated energy budget share functions (Engel curves) evaluated at prices $P_1 = P_2 = 1$, for each quartile of the $U_1$ and $U_2$ distribution. Nine Engel curves are displayed, corresponding to the combinations of each quartile of $U_1$ with each quartile of $U_2$. Each Engel curve was obtained by simulation, drawing 10,000 observations of total expenditures $M$ from a nonparametric estimate of the distribution of real expenditure (nominal expenditure deflated by the Stone index) and evaluating the estimated budget share equations for each given $U_1$ and $U_2$ quartile at each total expenditure $M$ draw. Here, we see that variation in the random Barten scales $U_1$ and $U_2$ causes substantial shifts in the Engel curves. For comparison, Figure 5 also displays, with a thick grey line, the Engel curve from a model without heterogeneity which imposes $U_1 = U_2 = 1$.

| Table 3: Interaction Terms in Utility: Estimated Parameters |
|-----------------|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|
| $h_1$ and $h_2$ | est | se  | $U_0$, $U_1$, and $U_2$ | est | se  |
| $\beta_0$      | -2.546 | 0.174 | $\sigma_0$      | 0.166 | 0.039 |
| $\beta_{11}$   | 1.084 | 0.056 | $\sigma_1$      | 0.540 | 0.046 |
| $\beta_{12}$   | -0.143 | 0.030 | $\sigma_2$      | 0.854 | 0.041 |
| $\beta_{13}$   | 0.056 | 0.013 | $\delta_1$      | -0.822 | 1.732 |
| $\beta_{21}$   | 0.947 | 0.064 | $\gamma_{11}$   | -0.646 | 0.072 |
| $\beta_{22}$   | 0.276 | 0.032 | $\gamma_{21}$   | -0.482 | 0.039 |
| $\beta_{23}$   | 0.066 | 0.008 | $\gamma_{12}$   | 0.002 | 2.517 |
| $\alpha_0$     | 0.000 | 0.001 | $\gamma_{12}$   | 0.141 | 0.063 |
| $\alpha_1$     | 0.006 | 0.002 | $\gamma_{22}$   | 0.134 | 0.016 |
| $\alpha_2$     | 0.017 | 0.004 |                     |      |      |

The shape of the Engel curve without unobserved preference heterogeneity in Figure 5 is rather different from those that allow for unobserved preference heterogeneity. For example, at low expenditure levels, allowing for unobserved preference heterogeneity reduces the slope of the energy Engel curve, suggesting that it is not as much of a necessity as would appear in the absence of such heterogeneity.

Because $U_1$ and $U_2$ affect budget shares in different ways, it is difficult to see the joint effect of these two unobserved heterogeneity parameters on the distribution of implied behaviour. We address this in our remaining figures. Figure 6 displays a contour plot of the density of estimated energy budget shares evaluated at $P_1 = P_2 = 1$. This is again obtained by simulation, based on 10,000 draws of $M$ as before. This time, for each real expenditure draw we also draw a value of $U_1$ and $U_2$ from their estimated distributions, and evaluate the estimated energy budget share at these drawn values of $M$, $U_1$ and $U_2$. For comparison, we also display, as a thick grey line, the simulated shares from the model without heterogeneity.
The standard deviation of the marginal distribution of energy budget shares is 0.09 in the model which accounts for both unobserved preference heterogeneity and observed expenditure variation. In contrast, it is only 0.02 in the model which accounts only for observed expenditure variation. Thus, the variation in budget shares due to heterogeneity in preferences is large relative to that due to variation in total expenditures.

4.6 Consumer Surplus Effects of a Carbon Tax

We now apply our model to evaluate the partial equilibrium effects of a large change in the price of energy, as might result from a carbon tax. Using equation (25), even with non-parametric demand components we have a closed form expression for indirect utility. We can therefore compute consumer surplus effects without approximations of the type proposed by Vartia (1984). Instead, we numerically invert the indirect utility function (25) to obtain the cost of living impact of a price change. We would otherwise need to numerically solve a differential equation as in Hausman and Newey (1995), but such a solution would need to be calculated for every value on the continuum of points that $U_1$ and $U_2$ can take on.

For an individual facing initial prices $P_1, P_2$, having total expenditures $M$ and preferences indexed by Barten scales $U_1, U_2$, the cost-of-living impact of moving to new prices $P_1', P_2'$ is

$$\pi \left( U_1, U_2, M, P_1', P_2', \bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2 \right),$$

defined as the solution to

$$V \left( \frac{U_1 P_1}{M}, \frac{U_2 P_2}{M} \right) = V \left( \frac{U_1 P_1}{\pi M}, \frac{U_2 P_2}{\pi M} \right).$$

Here $\pi$ is the proportionate change in costs $M$ needed to compensate for the price change, that is, the amount by which $M$ would need to be scaled up to bring an individual facing prices $P_1, P_2$ (and having preferences given by $U_1, U_2$) back to the same indifference curve they were on when facing prices $P_1', P_2'$. To show price effects clearly, we consider a large price change: doubling the price of energy. So we solve for the $\pi$ function given the initial price vector $\bar{P}_1 = \bar{P}_2 = 1$ and the new price vector $P_1 = 2, P_2 = 1$. Figure 7 shows the resulting estimated joint distribution (contour plot) of $\ln \pi$ and $\ln M$. This plot is constructed by calculating the surplus for each of 10,000 draws of $U_1, U_2, M$, and, as in Figure 6, the thick gray line gives estimates of $\pi$ based on the model no preference heterogeneity.

Table 4 gives summary statistics of distributions presented in Figure 7. The "without heterogeneity" estimates in Table 4 are statistics for the marginal distribution of $\pi$, obtained from sieve maximum likelihood (SML) estimates of a model without unobserved preference heterogeneity (the same estimates that generate the thick gray line in Figure 7). The variation in these without-heterogeneity statistics comes only from variation in $M$.

The second set of estimates in Table 4 are based on the SML estimates given in Table 3, that is, our main model that includes the random Barten scales. The "ignore heterogeneity"
estimates in Table 4 describe the marginal distribution of $\pi$, conditioning on $U_1$ and $U_2$ equaling their estimated medians. These estimates differ from "without heterogeneity" in the estimated parameter values of the demand functions, but still have variation that only comes from variation in $M$. If our main model is correctly specified, then "without heterogeneity" demand function estimates will be inconsistent, while the "ignore heterogeneity" statistics will show the impacts of ignoring heterogeneity, evaluated at consistently estimated demand parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Summary Statistics for Cost of Living Change and Social Welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>log-cost of living impacts for individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall–without heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std err</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall-ignore heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std err</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall–with heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std err</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At lower Qtl of $M$ ($\ln M = -0.38$) | 0.140 | 0.079 | 0.070 | 0.137 | 0.204 |
At median of $M$ ($\ln M = -0.03$) | 0.130 | 0.071 | 0.070 | 0.123 | 0.181 |
At upper Qtl of $M$ ($\ln M = 0.26$) | 0.113 | 0.057 | 0.068 | 0.110 | 0.151 |

The remaining set of estimates in Table 4, labeled "with-heterogeneity," are based on our main model (SML estimates from Table 3), showing features of the marginal distribution of $\pi$ accounting for the estimated variation in $U_1$ and $U_2$, as well as variation in $M$. The last three rows of Table 4 give the conditional distribution of $\pi$ in the with-heterogeneity model, conditioning on the quartiles of $M$. The variation in these last three rows comes only from variation in $U_1$ and $U_2$.

It has long been known that first order approximations to the cost of living effects of marginal price changes can be evaluated without estimating demand functions and associated demand elasticities (see, e.g., Stern 1987). These theoretical results have been used to argue that demand function estimation is not required for marginal policy analyses. In our data, the average value of the budget share for energy is 0.14, so if there were no substitution effects in response to a price change, doubling the price of energy would increase the cost of living by $\pi = 0.14$. This would be the first order approximation based estimate of $\pi$. However, the estimated average cost-of-living impacts given in Table 4 are much less 0.14, showing substantial relative price substitution effects. This supports findings in, e.g., Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) that, contrary to the first order approximation theory, it is empirically necessary to estimate demand functions and associated price elasticities to properly evaluate consumer surplus and welfare effects when price changes are large rather than marginal. Moreover, one goal of an energy tax would be to reduce energy consumption, so it’s important to account for the impact on welfare of this reduction.

In place of the first order approximation of .14, Table 4 shows that our main model gives an estimated average cost of living impact of 0.128, which is over nine percent smaller. This is true whether we ignore heterogeneity in our main model or not, but if we misspecify the demand
functions by estimating them without heterogeneity, we get a value of 0.111, thereby underestimating the average impact by over ten percent, a substantial amount. This is because, in a nonlinear model like ours, estimation without-heterogeneity leads to bias in the estimated parameters. Thus, even if we were not interested in the distribution of effects of a price change, just getting the average impact correct requires accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity when estimating demand function parameters.

Far larger than these differences in the mean of $\pi$ is the effect of preference heterogeneity on the variation of impacts in cost of living $\pi$ across consumers. This can be seen in Figure 7, where consumers near the top of the contour plot have their costs of living go up by over 25%, while those near the bottom have impacts near zero. This variation can be seen in the standard deviations and interquartile ranges of estimates of $\pi$ in Table 4. Particularly notable is that, when allowing for heterogeneity, the standard deviation increases 450%, from .016 when ignoring heterogeneity to .072 when allowing for preference heterogeneity. The increase relative to the without-heterogeneity model is even larger, an increase of almost sixfold.

The effects of preference heterogeneity on cost of living are even larger than the impacts of varying $M$. The cost of living impact of the tax is, in percentage terms, bigger for poor households than for rich ones, as can be seen in the first column and last three rows of Table 4. The cost of living impact drops from 0.14 for consumers at the bottom quartile level of total expenditures $M$ to 0.113 for those at the top quartile, giving an interquartile range of 0.027. In contrast, looking across the "median of $M$" row of Table 4 shows that the interquartile range in impacts just from variation in preferences (that is, holding $M$ fixed) is 0.111 (0.181 minus 0.070). This is more than four times larger than the interquartile range of 0.027 stemming from variation in $M$. Overall, variation in preferences has a dramatically larger impact than variation in income on who is hurt the most or least by our energy tax experiment.

4.7 Social Welfare Implications of a Carbon Tax

The above analyses summarized the distribution of welfare implications of our energy tax experiments across consumers. To evaluate the implications for aggregate welfare, we consider the impacts of our experiment on a range of possible social welfare functions. To proceed, we require interpersonally comparable and cardinal measures of individual utility. To make utility functions interpersonally comparable, we follow the standard procedure in this literature of constructing money metric cardinalizations of utility. A money metric utility cardinalization $\tilde{V}$ of a given indirect utility function $V$ is the monotonic transformation $H(V)$ having the property that, at base prices $\bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2$, the function $\tilde{V} = H(V)$ equals total expenditures. Since in our application preferences also vary by Barten scales, we also need to choose a base level of Barten scales $\bar{U}_1, \bar{U}_2$ at which $H(V)$ equals total expenditures. Formally, $\tilde{V}$ is defined by

$$\tilde{V} (U_1 P_1 / M, U_2 P_2 / M) = H \left[ V \left( U_1 P_1 / M, U_2 P_2 / M, \bar{U}_1, \bar{U}_2, \bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2 \right) \right].$$

where $V$ is given by equation (25) and $H$ is defined to satisfy

$$\tilde{V} (\bar{U}_1 \bar{P}_1 / M, \bar{U}_2 \bar{P}_2 / M) = M$$

for all values of $M$. Strict monotonicity of $H$ as a function of $V$, and of $V$ as a function of $M$, ensures that such a function $H$ exists and that the resulting function $\tilde{V}$ is unique.
We let base prices be $P_1 = P_2 = 1$ and we take $\bar{U}_1$ and $\bar{U}_2$ to equal the medians of the estimated distributions of $U_1$ and $U_2$, respectively. We could have allowed $H$ to depend on $U_1$ and $U_2$ directly (as in the statement of Theorem 3), in addition to depending on $V$, $\bar{U}_1$, $\bar{U}_2$, $P_1$, and $P_2$, but this turns out to be unnecessary for constructing the money metric utility $\tilde{V}$.\(^{11}\) As a result $\tilde{V}$, like our original expression of the utility function $V$, depends on Barten scales only through their interactions with prices.\(^{12}\)

Let $\tilde{V}_i$ denote the money metric utility of a consumer $i$. The range of social welfare functions over money-metric utilities that we consider are in the Atkinson (1970) Mean-of-Order-$r$ class, defined by

$$S_r(\tilde{V}_1 \ldots \tilde{V}_N) = \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum (\tilde{V}_i)^r \right)^{1/r} \text{ for } r \neq 0, \text{ and } S_r(\tilde{V}_1 \ldots \tilde{V}_N) = \exp \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum \ln \tilde{V}_i \right) \text{ for } r = 0.$$ 

We use $r = -1, 0, 1$ corresponding to the harmonic, geometric and arithmetic mean of individual money metric utility. The social welfare function $S_1$ is inequality neutral, while $S_0$ and $S_{-1}$ are inequality averse.

Table 5 provides estimates of the value of these social welfare functions defined over utilities when facing initial prices $P_1 = 1, P_2 = 1$ and new prices $P_1 = 2, P_2 = 1$, holding the population distribution of $M_i U_{1i}$ and $U_{2i}$ fixed. Simulated parametric standard errors are provided in italics.\(^{13}\) Table 5 includes estimates of the social welfare functions $S_r$ at both initial and new prices, and also reports the social welfare loss associated with the energy price increase, defined as the difference in the estimated social welfare function $S_r$ between the two price regimes. In addition, we report the loss difference, defined as the difference in estimated losses based on $S_r$ versus the estimated losses based on $S_1$. The estimated loss is a social welfare measure of the cost of the hypothetical energy tax, while the loss difference measures the impact of accounting for inequality aversion on these estimated costs.

As one would expect, the estimated welfare losses based on the $S_1$ social welfare function (the arithmetic mean of money metrics) confirm the patterns associated with the mean estimates of $\pi$ in Table 4. In particular, the estimated loss based on $S_1$ increases when we account for unobserved heterogeneity in the model. As reported in the first column of Table 5, the estimated welfare loss based on $S_1$ increases from 10.3% without heterogeneity to 14.9% with heterogeneity.

---

\(^{11}\)This convenient feature does not always hold, e.g., the social welfare calculations in Jorgenson, Lau, and Stoker (1982) use representations of Barten scaled utility functions that do not have this property.

\(^{12}\)We do one final adjustment to money-metric utilities, which is to scale them by a factor which makes the average money metric at initial prices the same for the models with and without unobserved preference heterogeneity. This makes the inequality-neutral social welfare function $S_1$ have the same value for both models at base prices, which makes comparisons across the specifications easier to interpret.

\(^{13}\)Note that for the model without heterogeneity, the estimated level of social welfare at base prices does not have sampling variability induced by the estimation of the parameter vector. This is because, by construction, heterogeneity is only induced by variation in $M_i$, and in particular will for $S_1$ just equal the mean of $M_i$ at base prices, which is 1.035. To facilitate comparisons across models with and without heterogeneity, our normalization of individual utilities likewise normalizes the $S_1$ estimates at base prices with heterogeneity to equal 1.035, the average of $M_i$. 

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Table 5: Social Welfare Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>arithmetic</th>
<th></th>
<th>geometric</th>
<th></th>
<th>harmonic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$S_1$</td>
<td>std err</td>
<td>$S_0$</td>
<td>std err</td>
<td>$S_{-1}$</td>
<td>std err</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without heterogeneity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initial prices</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new prices</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loss</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loss difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with heterogeneity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initial prices</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new prices</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loss</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.013</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, a different story emerges when we include inequality aversion in the social welfare calculations. Without accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity, we see that inequality in total expenditures $M_i$ does not affect estimated welfare losses very much. Welfare loss is 10.3% under $S_1$, 10.8% under $S_0$, and 11.5% under $S_{-1}$, and the differences between these measures are statistically insignificant. When we fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity, it appears greater inequality aversion is associated with no change, or possibly a small increase, in the estimated social welfare cost of the energy tax.

In contrast, once we take unobserved preference heterogeneity into account, estimated welfare losses decrease as the degree of inequality aversion increases, from 14.9% under $S_1$ to 13.2% under $S_0$ to 10.1% under $S_{-1}$. The loss differences between these numbers are strongly statistically significant.

Essentially, the impacts of inequality due to variation in preferences mitigates the impacts of inequality due to variation in income. The reason is that, without allowing for unobserved preference variation, every poor consumer appears to be hit harder by an energy tax than every rich consumer. Accounting for preference variation shows that some wealthy people who consume a lot of energy or are more energy price inelastic will be hurt more, in relative terms, than some poorer consumers who use relatively less energy or who are more energy price elastic.

These patterns can be seen in Figure 8. In the model without unobserved preference heterogeneity, the induced consumer surplus loss increases somewhat with total expenditures $M$, but does not have much variation overall. However, in the model with unobserved heterogeneity, some rich households have very large utility (money-metric) impacts, which drives down $S_1$ substantially. Since risk averse social welfare functions downweight the utilities of the rich, these individuals in the upper right of the distribution shown in Figure 8 don’t influence social welfare as much, and so the social welfare loss based on inequality averse measures like $S_0$ and $S_{-1}$ is reduced. The main point here is that failing to account for preference heterogeneity completely misses the potential mitigating effect that variation in preferences from causes other than income has on inequality averse social welfare calculations.

Overall, our energy tax experiment yields two major conclusions. First, accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity has a big impact on how much variation we find in the cost-of-living impacts of price changes. In our example, the standard deviation of cost-of-living impacts due to a 100% energy tax is 5 times as large in the model with unobserved preference heterogeneity as in the model without unobserved preference heterogeneity. Second, we
find that accounting for unobserved preference heterogeneity reverses how the estimated social welfare loss of an energy tax varies with inequality aversion.

5 Conclusions and Extensions

We have shown nonparametric identification of a generalized random coefficients model, and provided an empirical application in which the generalized random coefficient structure arises from extending existing commonly used economic models of observed heterogeneity to models of unobserved heterogeneity. In our application to Barten scales, allowing for general forms of unobserved heterogeneity is shown to be important for empirically evaluating the welfare effects of potential policy interventions such as a carbon tax. For example, we find that failure to account for preference heterogeneity would result in underestimating the total cost of an energy tax (measured as the effect on total consumer surplus) by over ten percent, and in underestimating the variation in impacts (measured as the standard deviation in cost of living impacts across consumers) by over eighty percent. We also find that unobserved preference heterogeneity strongly interacts with inequality aversion in social welfare calculations, reversing conclusions that would have been made in models that failed to account for preference heterogeneity.

Our application focused on consumers with single utility functions. A possible extension would be to consider collective household models, e.g., Barten scales have been applied to household models in, e.g., Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2010). It would also be useful to place our carbon tax analyses into a general equilibrium setting.

Useful areas for further work on the theory of generalized random coefficients would be extensions to nonparametrically identify joint rather than marginal distributions of the random coefficients, and to relax the smoothness assumptions that were imposed for identification of the nonadditive model.

6 Appendix B: Proofs

Before proving Theorem 1, we prove a couple of lemmas.

**Lemma 1:** Let \( \tilde{Y}_k = G_k (X_k U_k) \) where \( G_k \) is a strictly monotonically increasing function. Assume \( U_k \perp X \mid Z \). The marginal distributions of \( U_k \) and \( X_k \) are continuous. The support of \( X_k \) includes zero, the support of \( U_k \) is a subset of the support of \( \tilde{Y}_k \), and for every \( r \) such that \( G_k (r) \) is on the support of \( \tilde{Y}_k \) there exist an \( x_k \neq 0 \) on the support of \( X_k \) such that \( f_{U_k} \left( x_k^{-1} r \right) \neq 0 \). Assume the location and scale normalizations \( G_k (0) = 0 \) and \( G_k (1) = y_0 \) for some known \( y_0 \) in the support of \( \tilde{Y}_k \) are imposed. Let \( r = H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \) be inverse of the function \( G_k \) where \( \tilde{y}_k = G_k (r) \). Define \( X_{(k)} \) to be the vector of all the elements of \( X \) except for \( X_k \). Define the function \( S_k (\tilde{y}_k, \tilde{x}) \) by

\[
S_k (\tilde{y}_k, \tilde{x}) = E \left[ F_{\tilde{y}_k|X_k,X_{(k)},Z} (\tilde{y}_k | \tilde{x}^{-1}, 0, Z) \right] = \int_{\text{supp}(Z)} F_{\tilde{y}_k|X_k,X_{(k)},Z} (\tilde{y}_k | \tilde{x}^{-1}, 0, z) f_z (z) dz.
\]
Then
\[ H_k (\tilde{y}_k) = \text{sign} \left( \text{sign} (x_k) \frac{\partial S_k (\tilde{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial x_k^{-1}} \right) \exp \left( \int_{y_0} \frac{\partial S_k (\tilde{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial \tilde{y}_k} d \tilde{y}_k \right) \]
(30)

Note that if \( Z \) is discretely distributed, then the integral defining \( S_k \) becomes a sum. If \( Z \) is empty (so \( U_k \) and \( X \) are unconditionally independent) then \( S_k (\tilde{y}_k, \tilde{x}) = F_{\tilde{y}_k | X_k, x_k} (\tilde{y}_k | \tilde{x}^{-1}, 0) \).

The main implication of Lemma 1 is that if the distribution \( F_{\tilde{y}_k | X, Z} \) is identified, then the function \( H_k \) is identified by construction.

PROOF of Lemma 1: For any \( \tilde{y}_k = G_k (x_k U_k) \) and any \( x_k > 0 \) we have

\[
F_{\tilde{y}_k | X_k, x_k, Z} (\tilde{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) = \text{Pr} \left( G_k (x_k U_k) \leq \tilde{y} \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right)
= \text{Pr} \left( U_k \leq x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}) \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right)
= F_{U_k | X_k, x_k, Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}) \mid x_k, 0, z \right] = F_{U_k | Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}) \mid z \right]
\]
where the last equality uses \( U_k \perp X \mid Z \). Similarly for any \( x_k < 0 \) we have

\[
F_{\tilde{y}_k | X_k, x_k, Z} (\tilde{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) = \text{Pr} \left( G_k (x_k U_k) \leq \tilde{y} \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right)
= \text{Pr} \left( U_k \geq x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}) \mid X_k = x_k, X_{(k)} = 0, Z = z \right)
= 1 - F_{U_k | Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}) \mid z \right]
\]

Together these equations say

\[
F_{U_k | Z} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \mid z \right] = I (x_k < 0) + \text{sign} (x_k) F_{\tilde{y}_k | X_k, x_k, Z} (\tilde{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) .
\]

So

\[
F_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right] = \int_{\text{supp}(Z)} \left[ I (x_k < 0) + \text{sign} (x_k) F_{\tilde{y}_k | X_k, x_k, Z} (\tilde{y}_k | x_k, 0, z) \right] f (z) d z.
\]

It follows that for any \( x_k \neq 0, \)

\[
\frac{\partial S (\tilde{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial x_k^{-1}} = \text{sign} (x_k) f_U \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right] H_k (\tilde{y}_k)
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial S (\tilde{y}_k, x_k^{-1})}{\partial \tilde{y}_k} = \text{sign} (x_k) f_U \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right] x_k^{-1} \frac{\partial H_k (\tilde{y}_k)}{\partial \tilde{y}_k}
\]

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So for $f_U \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right] \neq 0$ it follows that

$$\frac{x_k \partial S \left( \tilde{y}_k, x_k^{-1} \right)}{\partial \tilde{y}_k} / \frac{\partial \tilde{y}_k}{\partial x_k^{-1}} = \frac{\partial H_k (\tilde{y}_k)}{H_k (\tilde{y}_k)} = \frac{\partial \ln |H_k (\tilde{y}_k)|}{\partial \tilde{y}_k}$$

so

$$\exp \left( \int_{y_0}^{\tilde{y}_k} x_k \partial S \left( \tilde{y}, x_k^{-1} \right) / \partial \tilde{y} d\tilde{y} \right) = \exp \left( \int_{y_0}^{\tilde{y}_k} \partial \ln |H_k (\tilde{y})| / \partial \tilde{y} d\tilde{y} \right) = \exp \left( \ln |H_k (\tilde{y}_k)| - \ln |H_k (\tilde{y}_0)| \right) = |H_k (\tilde{y}_k)|$$

where $H_k (\tilde{y}_0) = 1$ follows from $G_k (1) = \tilde{y}_0$. Finally

$$\text{sign} \left( \text{sign} (x_k) \frac{\partial S \left( \tilde{y}_k, x_k^{-1} \right)}{\partial x_k^{-1}} \right) = \text{sign} \left( \text{sign} (x_k) \text{sign} (x_k) f_U \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right] H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right) = \text{sign} \left( f_U \left[ x_k^{-1} H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right] H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \right) = \text{sign} (H_k (\tilde{y}_k))$$

So the right side of equation (30) equals $\text{sign} (H_k (\tilde{y}_k)) |H_k (\tilde{y}_k)| = H_k (\tilde{y}_k)$ as claimed.

**LEMMA 2:** If Assumption A1 holds and the normalization $G_k (0) = 0$ for all $k$ holds, then $F_{U_0 | Z}$ and the distribution function $F_{\tilde{Y} \mid X, Z} (\tilde{Y} \mid x, z)$ are identified, where $\tilde{Y} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k)$.

**PROOF of Lemma 2:**

$$F_{Y \mid X, Z} (y \mid 0, z) = \Pr (G (0) + U_0 \leq y \mid X = 0, Z = z) = F_{U_0 \mid X, Z} (y \mid 0, z) = F_{U_0 \mid Z} (y \mid z)$$

identifies the distribution function $F_{U_0 \mid Z}$ on the support of $Y$, which contains the support of $U_0$. Next define $\tilde{Y} = Y - U_0$. Then since $Y = \tilde{Y} + U_0$ and the distributions of $Y \mid X, Z$ and $U_0 \mid X, Z$ are identified, for each value of $X = x, Z = z$ apply a deconvolution (using the nonvanishing characteristic function of $U_0$) to identify the distribution of $\tilde{Y} \mid X, Z$, where $\tilde{Y} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k)$.

**PROOF of Theorem 1:** When $X_{(k)} = 0$ (equivalently, when $X = e_k x_k$ for some $x_k$) we get $\tilde{Y} = G_k (X_k U_k) + \sum_{j \neq k} G_j (0) = G_k (X_k U_k)$. Define $\tilde{Y}_k = G_k (X_k U_k)$. It follows that $F_{\tilde{Y}_{(k)} \mid X_{(k)}, Z} (\tilde{y}_{(k)} \mid x_k, 0, z) = F_{\tilde{Y} \mid X, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid x_k e_k, z)$, so the distribution function on the left of this identity is identified, given by Lemma 2 that $F_{\tilde{Y} \mid X, Z}$ is identified. Let $r = H_k (\tilde{y}_k)$ denote the inverse of the function $G_k$ where $\tilde{y}_k = G_k (r)$. It follows by construction from Lemma 1 that $H_k (\tilde{y}_k)$ is identified for every value of $\tilde{y}_k$ on the support of $Y_k$ satisfying the property that, for some $x_k$ on the support of $X_k$, $f_{U_k} \left[ x_k^{-1} H (\tilde{y}_k) \right] \neq 0$. This identification of $H_k (\tilde{y}_k)$ in turn means that the function $G_k (r)$ is identified for every $r$ such that $G_k (r)$ is on the support of
of the conditional distributions of each distribution function \( F_{X|X,Z} \) for identification of \( H_k \). Then \( E \) shows identification of the characteristic function implies identification of the distribution function \( F \), and hence identification of all the moments of \( U \). Sufficient conditions that then suffice to uniquely identify the distribution \( F \) are well known. See, e.g., Billingsley (1979), chapter 30. One such sufficient condition is that the support of continuously distributed \( U \) be bounded.

\[ \widetilde{Y}_k \text{ and there exist an } x_k \text{ on the support of } X_k \text{ such that } f_{U_k | Z}(x_k^{-1} r) \neq 0. \]  

This then implies identification of \( G_k \) on its support. Finally, given identification of \( F_{\bar{Y}|X,Z} \) and of \( H_k(\bar{y}) \), the distribution function \( F_{U_k | Z} \) is identified by \( F_{U_k | Z}[H(\bar{y}) / x_k | z] = F_{\bar{Y}|X_k,x(k),Z}(\bar{y} | x_k, 0, z) \) for \( x_k > 0 \) and \( F_{U_k | Z}[H(\bar{y}) / x_k | z] = 1 - F_{\bar{Y}|X_k,x(k),Z}(\bar{y} | x_k, 0, z) \) for \( x_k < 0 \).

**PROOF of Corollary 1:** By construction, the function \( \bar{G} \), \( X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K \) is zero when evaluated at \( X = 0 \) or at \( X = X K e_k \) for any \( k \), so evaluated at any such value of \( X \), equation (3) is equivalent to equation (2). For equation (2), the proof of Theorem 1 showed identification of the conditional distributions of each \( U_k \) given \( Z \), and identification of each function \( G_k \) only using \( X = 0 \) and \( X = X K e_k \), so these functions are also identified for equation (3).

**PROOF of Theorem 2:**

Define \( \lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} \) by

\[
\lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} = \int_{\text{supp}(X|Z)} E \left[ h \left( \bar{Y}, t_1, \ldots, t_K \right) \mid X_1, X_2 \ldots X_K, Z \right] X_1^{-u_1} X_2^{-u_2} \ldots X_K^{-u_K} d X_1 d X_2 \ldots d X_K
\]

where the second equality follows from Fubini’s theorem. Do a change of variables on the inner integrals, letting \( S_k = X_k U_k \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, K \) to get

\[
\lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} = \int_{\text{supp}(U|Z)} \int_{\text{supp}(X|Z)} h \left( G \left( X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K \right), t_1, \ldots, t_K \right) d F \left( U_1, U_2 \ldots U_K \mid Z \right) X_1^{-u_1} X_2^{-u_2} \ldots X_K^{-u_K} d X_1 d X_2 \ldots d X_K
\]

and therefore \( E \left( U_1^{t_1} U_2^{t_2} \ldots U_K^{t_K} \mid Z \right) \) is identified, by equaling the ratio of identified objects \( \lambda_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} / \kappa_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} \). With \( \text{supp} (U \mid Z) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^K \), the characteristic function of the vector \( \ln U \) is identified from \( E \left( U_1^{t_1} U_2^{t_2} \ldots U_K^{t_K} \mid Z \right) = E \left( e^{i \sum_{k=1}^K t_k \ln U_k} \mid Z \right) \), and identification of this characteristic function implies identification of the distribution function \( F_{U_k|X} \) for all \( U_k \).

**PROOF of Corollary 2:** Repeating the proof of Theorem 2, dropping \( i \) everywhere it appears, shows identification of \( E \left( U_1^{t_1} U_2^{t_2} \ldots U_K^{t_K} \mid Z \right) \) for all reals \( t_1, \ldots, t_K \), and hence identification of all the moments of \( U \). Sufficient conditions that then suffice to uniquely identify the distribution of \( U \) given its moments are well known. See, e.g., Billingsley (1979), chapter 30. One such sufficient condition is that the support of continuously distributed \( U \) be bounded.
PROOF of Corollary 3: Theorem 1 identifies the functions $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_K$, and shows that the distribution of $\tilde{Y}$ defined by $\tilde{Y} = G (X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K)$ is identified. Assumption A5 therefore holds, and by Theorem 2 the joint distribution function $F_{U|Z} (U_1, \ldots, U_K | Z)$ is identified.

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PROOF of Corollary 1: Applying the proof of Lemma 2 to the model of Corollary 1 shows that $F_{U|Z}$ and the distribution function $F_{\tilde{Y}|X,Z} \left( \tilde{Y} \mid X, z \right)$ are identified, where $\tilde{Y} = \prod_{k=1}^{K} g_k (X_k U_k)$. It therefore follows that $F_{\tilde{Y}|X,Z} \left( \tilde{Y} \mid x, z \right)$ is identified where $\tilde{Y} = \ln \left( \tilde{Y} \right) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \ln \left[ g_k (X_k U_k) \right] = \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k)$, and the remainder of the identification therefore follows applying the proof of Theorem 1.

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PROOF of Theorem 2: By construction, the function $\tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K)$ is zero when evaluated at $X = 0$ or at $X = X_k e_k$ for any $k$, so evaluated at any such value of $X$, equation (??) is equivalent to equation (2). For equation (2), the proof of Theorem 1 showed identification of the conditional distributions of each $U_k$ given $Z$, and identification of each function $G_k$ only using $X = 0$ and $X = X_k e_k$, so these functions are also identified for equation (??). What remains is to identify the function $\tilde{G}$. Define $R (X, Z) = E \left[ \tilde{G} (X_1 U_1, \ldots, X_K U_K) \mid X, Z \right]$. The function $R (X, Z)$ is identified for all $X$ because $R (X, Z) = E \left[ \tilde{Y} - \sum_{k=1}^{K} G_k (X_k U_k) - U_0 \mid X, Z \right]$, which depends only on distributions and functions that have already been identified. For non-negative integers $t_1, \ldots, t_K$ define $R_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}$ by

$$ R_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (x, z) = \frac{\partial^{t_1 + \ldots + t_K} R (x, z)}{\partial x_1^{t_1} \ldots \partial x_K^{t_K}} $$

and similarly for $\tilde{G}_{t_1, \ldots, t_K}$. Then

$$ R_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (x, z) = E \left( U_1^{t_1} \times \ldots \times U_K^{t_K} \tilde{G}_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (x_1 U_1, \ldots, x_K U_K) \mid X = x, Z = z \right) $$

and $E \left( U_1^{t_1} \times \ldots \times U_K^{t_K} \mid X = x, Z = z \right) = E \left( U_1^{t_1} \mid Z = z \right) \times \ldots \times E \left( U_K^{t_K} \mid Z = z \right)$ has already been identified from Theorem 1. Therefore $\tilde{G}_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (0) = R_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (0) / E \left( U_1^{t_1} \times \ldots \times U_K^{t_K} \mid Z = z \right)$ is identified for all sets of non-negative integers $t_1, \ldots, t_K$. Now $\tilde{G}$ is entire and analytic, so it equals its Maclaurin series expansion

$$ \tilde{G} (r) = \sum_{t_1=0}^{\infty} \ldots \sum_{t_K=0}^{\infty} \frac{r_1^{t_1} \ldots r_K^{t_K} \tilde{G}_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (0)}{(t_1 + \ldots + t_K)} $$

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for all values of \( r \), which shows that the function \( \tilde{G} (r) \) is identified, since \( \tilde{G}_{t_1, \ldots, t_K} (0) \) is identified for all sets of nonnegative integers \( t_1, \ldots, t_K \).

**PROOF of Corollary 2:** For a given \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \) let \( Y = -Q_j \) if \( j \) is not a Giffen good, otherwise let \( Y = Q_j \). Then the function \( G \) in Theorem 2 is given by \(-\omega_j (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_J X_J) / U_j X_j \) which makes the function and \( G_j \) in Theorems 1 and 2 be \(-\omega_j (0, \ldots, 0, U_j X_j, \ldots, 0) / U_j X_j \) (remove the minus signs if the good \( j \) was Giffen). Then \( G_j \) is strictly monotonically increasing, and we have taken \( U_0 = 0 \), so by Theorem 1, the distribution function \( F_{U_j | Z} \) is identified. Repeating this procedure for each \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \) identifies all of the \( F_{U_j | Z} \) distributions. Given identification of all of the \( F_{U_j | Z} \) distributions, we can now apply the remainder of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 to each demand function \( Q_j X_j = \omega_j (U_1 X_1, \ldots, U_J X_J) \) for \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \) to identify each function \( \omega_j \), observing that by Roys identity (and boundedness of budget shares) each \( \omega_j \) will be analytic, and having each \( U_j \) be positive and bounded makes the remaining assumptions of Theorem 2 hold.

**PROOF of Theorem 3:** As discussed in the text, a property of Barten scales (which can be readily verified using Roys identity) is that, if \( V (X_1, X_2) \) is the indirect utility function corresponding to the demand function \( \omega_1 (X_1, X_2) \), then up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation \( H (V, U_1, U_2) \) of \( V \), the indirect utility function corresponding to \( \omega_1 (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) \) is \( V (U_1 X_1, U_2 X_2) \), and vice versa. It therefore suffices to prove that the theorem holds with \( U_1 = U_2 = 1 \).

By equation (12), given any indirect utility function \( V \), the corresponding demand function \( \omega_1 \) is given by

\[
\omega_1 (X_1, X_2) = \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2) / \partial \ln X_1}{\partial V (X_1, X_2) / \partial \ln X_1 + \left[ \partial V (X_1, X_2) / \partial \ln X_2 \right]}
\]

Similarly, given any demand function \( \omega_1 \), if this equation holds then \( V \) equals, up to an arbitrary monotonic transformation, the indirect utility function that corresponds to \( \omega_1 \). It follows that

\[
\lambda [\omega_1 (X_1, X_2)] = \ln \left( \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial V (X_1, X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right) \tag{32}
\]

Given any functions \( g_1 (X_1) \) and \( g_2 (X_2) \), define a corresponding function \( V (X_1, X_2) \) by

\[
V (X_1, X_2) = \int_{-\infty}^{\ln X_1} e^{g_1 (x_1)} d \ln x_1 + \int_{-\infty}^{\ln X_2} e^{-g_2 (x_2)} d \ln x_2. \tag{33}
\]

Substituting equation (33) into equation (32) gives

\[
\lambda [\omega_1 (X_1, X_2)] = g_1 (X_1) + g_2 (X_2) \tag{34}
\]

which shows that, up to monotonic transformation, equation (33) is the indirect utility function that generates the demand equation (34) (note that a property of demand systems is that, if some indirect utility function \( V \) generates a given demand system, then all other indirect utility functions that generate that same demand system are monotonic transformations of \( V \)).
equation (33) is additive, this shows that the indirect utility function that generates the demand equation (34) is additive.

To go the other direction, given any differentiable functions \( h_1 (X_1) \) and \( h_2 (X_2) \), if \( V (X_1, X_2) = h_1 (X_1) + h_2 (X_2) \) equation (32) equals

\[
\lambda [\omega_1 (X_1, X_2)] = \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_1 (X_1)}{\partial \ln X_1} \right) - \ln \left( \frac{\partial h_2 (X_2)}{\partial \ln X_2} \right)
\]

which is in the form of equation (34), showing that any additive indirect utility function generates a demand equation in the form of (34).

Together these results prove the first part Theorem 3. Adding back the Barten scales \( U_1 \) and \( U_2 \) to the functions \( g_1, g_2, h_1, \) and \( h_2 \) proves equations (17) and (16). The properties of the functions \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) given at the end of Theorem 2 follow from the fact that the indirect utility function \( h_1 (U_1 P_1 / M) + h_2 (U_2 P_2 / M) \) must possess the standard properties of all indirect utility functions, i.e., homogeneity and quasiconvexity in \( P_1, P_2, \) and \( M, \) nondecreasing in each price, and increasing in \( M. \)

**PROOF of Theorem 4**: When \( X (k) = 0 \) we get \( \tilde{Y} = G_k (X_k U_k) + \sum_{j \neq k} G_k (0) = G_k (X_k U_k). \) Define \( \tilde{Y}_k = G_k (X_k U_k). \) It follows that \( F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid x_k, 0, z) = F_{Y_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid x_k e_k, z), \) so \( F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid x_k, 0, z) \) is identified, given by Lemma 1 that \( F_{Y_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} \) is identified. Let \( r = H_k (\tilde{y}_k) \) be inverse of the function \( G_k \) where \( \tilde{y}_k = G_k (r). \) Now consider any particular positive \( x_k \in \Psi_k. \) For that \( x_k \) we have \( F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (y_0 \mid e_k, z) = F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid e_k x_k, z) \) and since the function \( F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} \) is identified, the particular value \( \tilde{y}_k \) that satisfies this equation is identified. Then

\[
\operatorname{Pr} (G_k (x_k U_k) \leq \tilde{y}_k \mid X = x_k e_k, Z = z) = \operatorname{Pr} (G_k (U_k) \leq y_0 \mid X = x_k e_k, Z = z)
\]

\[
F_{U_k \mid Z} (H_k (\tilde{y}_k) / x_k, z) = F_{U_k \mid Z} (H_k (y_0), z)
\]

similarly, if we have a given negative \( x_k \in \Psi_k \) then

\[
1 - \operatorname{Pr} (G_k (x_k U_k) \leq \tilde{y}_k \mid X = x_k e_k, Z = z) = \operatorname{Pr} (G_k (U_k) \leq y_0 \mid X = x_k e_k, Z = z)
\]

\[
1 - \operatorname{Pr} (U_k \geq H_k (\tilde{y}_k) / x_k \mid X = x_k e_k, Z = z) = \operatorname{Pr} (U_k \geq H_k (y_0) \mid Z = z)
\]

\[
F_{U_k \mid Z} (H_k (\tilde{y}_k) / x_k, z) = F_{U_k \mid Z} (H_k (y_0), z)
\]

By invertibility of \( F_{U_k \mid Z} \) these equations show that for any \( x_k \in \Psi_K \) we get \( H_k (\tilde{y}_k) / x_k = H_k (y_0) \) where the \( \tilde{y}_k \) corresponding to the given \( x_k \) is known. Now \( G_k (1) = y_0 \) means that \( H_k (y_0) = 1, \) so \( H_k (\tilde{y}_k) = x_k, \) and therefore \( \tilde{y}_k = G_k (x_k), \) so the value of the function \( G_k \) evaluated at this particular \( x_k \) is known. This holds for any and hence all \( x_k \in \Psi_k, \) so by Assumption A2’ this suffices to identify the function \( G_k \) everywhere, and hence also identifies the function \( H_k \) everywhere.

Given identification of \( F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} \) and of \( H_k (\tilde{y}), \) the distribution function \( F_{U_k \mid Z} \) is identified by

\[
F_{U_k \mid Z} (H (\tilde{y}_k) / x_k \mid z) = F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid e_k x_k, z) \quad \text{for } x_k > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad F_{U_k \mid Z} (H (\tilde{y}_k) / x_k \mid z) = 1 - F_{\tilde{Y}_{1k}X \tilde{Y}, Z} (\tilde{y}_k \mid e_k x_k, z) \quad \text{for } x_k < 0.
\]
PROOF Theorem 5: First observe that Lemma 2 still holds in this model, identifying $F_{U_0 | Z}$ by taking $X = 0$. Similarly, all the interaction terms $X_j X_k$ equal zero when $X = e_k x_k$ for any $k$, so the proof of Theorem 1 goes through to identify each $F_{U_k | Z}$ and $G_k$ function. Next, for each $j, k$ pair evaluate the model at $X = e_{jk}$ to get $Y = V_{jk} + U_{jk}$, where $V_{jk} = U_0 + G_k (U_k) + G_j (U_j)$. At this stage the distribution of $V_{jk} | Z$ is identified (because each component is identified), so $F_{U_{jk} | Z}$ can be identified by a deconvolution of $Y | Z$ with $V_{jk} | Z$.

7 References


Billingsley, P. (1979), Probability and Measure, John Wiley and Sons.


