The Gains from Financial Inclusion: Theory and a Quantitative Assessment

Timothy Besley  Konrad Burchardi  Maitreesh Ghatak
LSE and CIFAR  IIES, Stockholm  LSE

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Abstract

This paper calibrates a general equilibrium model with contracting frictions, where agents differ in entrepreneurial ability and wealth, to study the benefits of financial inclusion. Alongside frictions due to moral hazard and limited liability, we also vary market access. As a benchmark, we calibrate the model to US default probabilities and the firm-size distribution. The calibrated counterfactuals that we generate show that financial inclusion is quantitatively much more important than contracting frictions. The main beneficiaries from extending credit market access are wage labourers; moving from autarky to full-inclusion increases the wage from 40% to 90% of the US wage.

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1 Introduction

Increasing financial inclusion is now regarded as one of the principal development challenges (see, for example, World Bank, 2014). Although estimates vary, it appears that around half the world’s population do not have access to formal banking services (World Bank, 2014). Not surprisingly, financial exclusion is concentrated among the poorest people in the poorest countries. One of the direct economic costs of such exclusion is a lack of entrepreneurial finance needed to start or scale up the operation of a business.\footnote{Although we do not study it here, financial exclusion also means that individuals may lack the capacity to save in reliable ways can damage the ability to build up assets, smooth against shocks as well as make provisions for old-age.} This can result in misallocation of capital, a distorted occupational choice structure and lower wages.

This paper explores the gains from extending the reach of financial markets with a focus on expanding access to capital for entrepreneurs in a calibrated model of financial contracts. We develop a general equilibrium model with four key features: (i) only a sub-group of the population are able to access financial markets, the remainder being in financial autarky; (ii) individuals who differ in their entrepreneurial talent and their initial wealth make an occupational choice, between being an entrepreneur and a wage laborer; (iii) those who access financial markets, negotiate contracts with lenders where endogenously determined default probabilities affect the allocation of capital; (iii) wages are determined in general equilibrium.

At the heart of the paper is a simple model of credit market frictions in a general equilibrium setting where lenders compete to serve borrowers. Our characterization of optimal credit contracts transparently highlights a range of interesting economic effects. Our approach differs from much of the existing literature which has focused on credit market frictions as ex post repayment constraints.\footnote{For example, Buera et al (2017) allow the possibility that borrowers may renege on their debt and keep a fraction of the capital, and the only punishment they face is their financial assets deposited with intermediaries forfeited as a result. Such models also tend to imply that all borrowers face the same interest rate.} In such models, default is absent in equilibrium.\footnote{Models of moral hazard which include equilibrium default are Paulson et al (2006) and Karaivanov and Townsend (2014).} In our model, ex ante moral hazard leads to defaults in equilibrium, the likelihood of which depends on the extent of collateral a borrower is able to put up. This leads to heterogeneity in default probabilities, and consequently in the interest rates among borrowers who differ in terms of wealth and productivity.

We study how second-best contracting frictions matter quantitatively where the outside option is determined endogenously based on competitive conditions, specifically how the surplus is shared between lenders and borrowers. We explore in our calibrated model how different degrees of competition in the credit market affect credit contracts, particularly the dispersion of interest rates.

Our calibrated counterfactuals also allow us to explore aggregate implications of market imperfections and market access. In our framework, credit market access and contracting frictions, conditional on access, are treated as separate phenomena. We show that, while second-best contracting frictions do affect the design of optimal credit contracts, losses in productivity and welfare are much smaller than those due to limited market access. This suggests that the priority for policy should be on extending the reach of the credit market rather than dealing with the more second-order losses from credit market imperfections. This is consistent with
the message of World Bank (2014) and the empirical findings of studies such as Burgess and Pande (2005). This has a direct bearing on which forms of credit market interventions are likely to be most effective - microcredit, credit bureaus, property titling to facilitate collateralization of assets, expansion of bank branches, and mobile banking.

The model highlights an important channel by which increasing financial inclusion affects the economy, namely through increasing firm size, expanding labour demand, and increasing wages. Since the vast majority of workers are wage labourers, this spreads the benefits of financial inclusion across the economy. As wages rise, there is stronger selection of entrepreneurs from the pool of those who have higher ability which, in turn, leads the size distribution of firms to shift towards larger employers as capital-deepening takes place in the economy, resulting in higher wages. As the financial market access expands further, we get only a small fraction of the population running their own firms with the vast majority relying on supplying labour, but this is good for the workers as wages are higher. While this general equilibrium aspect of the analysis and the labour market channel is in line with the broad thrust of the recent macrodevelopment literature (see Buera et al 2015 for a review), our paper is distinguished by its effort to disentangle the effects of financial access, credit market frictions, and the degree of competition in the credit market.

To get a sense of the quantitative magnitude of these effects, we calibrate the model. In addition to exploring the theoretical mechanism in detail and quantifying the aggregate gains from financial inclusion, we also look at distributional effects across the population with two dimensions of heterogeneity: wealth and entrepreneurial talent. As financial inclusion increases, inequality is influenced more by who has entrepreneurial talent and less by who owns wealth. This approach also allows us to explore how two distinct features of the contracting environment affect the outcomes. The first is the ease with which banks can foreclose on collateral, and the second is increasing competition between lenders. By calibrating the model, we are able to give a quantitative sense of theses effects.

The paper shows that there are indeed large aggregate benefits from extending financial market access. Moving from autarky to full inclusion in our calibrated economy increases wages from 40% of the US wage to 90%, which are quantitatively large effects. However, these are driven almost exclusively through an employment-cum occupational choice channel which emerges from an aggregate general equilibrium framework. When financial inclusion is first introduced into an “unbanked economy”, the most dramatic effect that we can observe is on the proportion of self-employed entrepreneurs in the economy. The big beneficiaries of financial inclusion are workers due to the employment creation that occurs. Also, the size distribution of firms changes with an increase in average firm size, with small firms being squeezed out as marginal entrepreneurs exit and join the labour force. We also show that financial inclusion breaks the link between wealth and occupational choice.

Increasing competition does mean that entrepreneurs who access capital markets get a larger share of surplus. Otherwise, the benefits of inclusion will tend to accrue to lenders. We show that this is mainly a distributional issue between firms and lenders while workers always gain from raising wages. Improving the ability of lenders to foreclose on collateral also matter and increase efficiency but the effect of this and that of increased competition are quantitatively small relative to the effects of expanding access to credit markets.

This paper explores microeconomic factors which determine differences in the level of income per capita. The development accounting literature, such as Caselli (2005), has shown
that it is differences in total factor productivity across economies that are key. Our paper is in the spirit of Hsieh and Klenow (2010) who tied this explicitly to factor misallocation. This links to older and long-standing debates in the development economics literature on how contracting frictions and imperfect markets matter for under-development. For example, authors such as Bardhan (1984) and Stiglitz (1988) have highlighted a range of such frictions but without providing an approach to assess their implications quantitatively.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the extensive related literature on finance and development. Section three then lays out the theoretical framework that we use. Section four moves from the model to the data and shows how it can be calibrated. Section five develops the results, first on the structure of credit contracts in general equilibrium and second on the effects of extending financial inclusion. Section six concludes.

2 Related Literature

The idea that development of the financial sector has important implications for the economy has a long history with pioneering contributions by Gerschenkron (1962) and Goldsmith (1969). Both put the development banking system at the heart of understanding differences in the trajectories taken by economies. A large body of work has established a strong correlation between measures of financial market development and economic performance at the aggregate level (see, for example, Levine, 2005, Cihak et al, 2013). In parallel, there has also been a theoretical literature on the importance of financial frictions in affecting growth and development including Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993). Some of this literature focused on heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability (Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000 and Ghatak et al, 2007 being examples), even though now this has become a standard feature in the macrodevelopment literature (Buera et al, 2015). In our model greater entrepreneurial ability has an ambiguous effect on access to credit, conditional on borrowing. On the one hand, it increases the willingness to lend since the marginal productivity of capital is higher. However, we allow for the possibility that larger firms are more costly to manage, and the risk of default can be higher. Nevertheless, improved financial market access enables more able individuals to become entrepreneurs and hire more workers.

There is also an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on how financial arrangements affect households and businesses, particularly how market frictions due to transactions costs and informational constraints may lead to borrowing constraints, and possibly, to poverty traps (see, for example, Banerjee and Duflo 2010, Ghatak, 2015, Karlan and Zinman, 2009, and Townsend and Ueda, 2008).

A number of papers relate financial frictions to aggregate economic performance in ways that combine theory, data and calibration methods. In Jeong and Townsend (2007), there is a modern and subsistence economy with agents differing in wealth and talent. There is a fixed cost of setting up a firm and some agents, as in this paper, lack access to credit markets. They calibrate the model to Thai data showing that credit access is an important factor in explaining TFP dynamics. Buera et al (2011) also study the aggregate implications of credit market access emphasizing that there may be differences between manufacturing and services. They also introduce a non-convexity due to an entry cost. They model the financial friction as due to

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Reviews of the literature can be found in Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and Matsuyama (2007).
imperfect enforcement which limits the amount of capital that an entrepreneur can use. After calibrating the model to U.S. data, they find that the variation in financial frictions which they explore can bring down output per worker to less than half of the perfect-credit benchmark. Moll (2014) builds on these approaches and explores the implications of productivity shocks which lead to inefficient capital allocation which can persist in the long-run. This provides a link to research which has looked at the macroeconomic effects of microeconomic distortions such as Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). In general, these models do not generate any equilibrium defaults even though they induce capital misallocation.

Our paper builds on these contributions by providing a more complete model of credit market distortions which has the possibility of default in equilibrium due to the presence of shocks, a realistic feature of credit markets. Moreover, the default rate is determined endogenously for each type of borrower in an optimally designed credit contract with outside options determined in general equilibrium. We show that the default rate is a sufficient statistic for credit misallocation for each type of borrower. We then explore the impact of extending the reach of credit markets exploring their impact on the size distribution of firms and equilibrium wages. Our framework allows us to study the effects of financial access, credit market frictions, and the degree of competition in the credit market.

The emerging policy consensus about the importance of financial inclusion builds on these observations and tries to find metrics to study access to different kinds of financial markets. This has highlighted how having large populations of unbanked populations is a key factor constraining development potential in many countries around the world. The Global Financial Inclusion 2014 ("Global Findex") database based on a survey of 150,000 individuals in 148 countries finds sharp differences across countries, showing less use of financial products in poor countries and generally among low income individuals. For example, in developing countries, the top quintile of earners is more than twice as likely to have a bank account than the bottom quintile and the cost of having an account or distance from the nearest branch are frequently cited as the reason (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2013). A number of papers have explored the consequences of rolling out banking services. Burgess and Pande (2005) exploit a natural experiment due to bank-branching rules in India and find a significant impact on agricultural wages. Dupas et al (2017) looked at experimental variation in access to banking services in three countries: Uganda, Malawi and Chile. They suggest that there is a puzzlingly low take-up rate of banking services, further underlining the challenge of expanding the outreach of financial services. Our approach provides a way of looking at the potential gains from expanded financial access if it can lead to greater borrowing.

3 Theory

Starting with a standard model of lending under ex ante moral hazard and limited liability as in Besley et al (2012) we allow for heterogeneity in both productivity and wealth, as well as endogenous occupational choice and wages. A group of agents who are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productivity and wealth can choose one of two possible occupations: becoming an entrepreneur or working as a wage labourer. If they choose to be entrepreneurs, then they have to decide how much capital and labour to employ. Capital can come from their own resources, i.e. their wealth, but can be augmented by borrowing if they have access to financial
markets. However, lending is risky and some entrepreneurs end up defaulting on their loans. Labour is then hired by the successful entrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurs can access credit markets but these are subject to frictions. Entrepreneurial effort that determines the likelihood of project success is unobservable to lenders. Given the lack of sufficient wealth that can be used as collateral, this creates the scope for moral hazard despite all parties being risk neutral by effectively ruling out the possibility of making entrepreneurs full residual claimants. Wealth that can be used as collateral can be limited for two reasons - because the borrowers are intrinsically poor, and because of imperfections in the legal system that limits collateral value of a given amount of wealth. In particular, the ease with which collateral can be transferred from a borrower to the bank depends on how well functioning the legal system. We assume that if a borrower pledges wealth $a$ as collateral to become an entrepreneur, and her project fails, the bank only recovers $\tau a$ where $\tau \in [0,1]$ is the fraction of the value of wealth that disappears due to the legal process of foreclosing on property.

Lenders design contracts that optimize the terms of access to credit to maximize their expected profits, subject to the constraints that entrepreneurial effort is unobserved, the wealth that can be used as collateral to mitigate the moral hazard problem is limited, and that the borrower’s expected payoff must exceed a certain reservation level, which will be endogenously determined from the outside opportunities available to an entrepreneur to be employed as a worker in the labour market. These are, respectively, the incentive-compatibility, the limited liability, and the participation constraints.

The first part of the theory considers optimal credit contracts to reflect heterogeneity in borrowers. In this part of the paper, the outside option of the borrower will be fixed exogenously. Hence, we think of this as a partial equilibrium setting. We show precisely how frictions in the credit market lead to misallocation of capital since lenders have to charge a risk premium to compensate for the probability of default. A high equilibrium default probability leads to less capital being allocated to an entrepreneur. This section also illustrates the importance of competition in the credit market. This is modelled very simply as the fraction of the surplus in a lending relationship which goes to the borrower as opposed to the lender. The more competitive is the credit market, the better the borrower does.

Before proceeding to general equilibrium, we introduce a financial inclusion parameter which, following Jeong and Townsend (2007), denotes the fraction of individuals with access to financial markets. As in Townsend, (1978), we think of this as reflecting a prohibitively high transaction cost which some agents face, for example, due to their geographical location or level of knowledge. The next step is to consider who becomes an entrepreneur as a function of talent and wealth. In general, this will be the most wealthy and productive individuals.

Finally, we consider the aggregate and distributional implications of the model. We consider a small open economy: the opportunity cost of capital is taken as exogenous, but wages are determined endogenously. This appears to be a reasonable characterization of many developing countries. For this quantitative exercise we will make specific functional form assumptions. In particular, we suppose that the production process is a standard decreasing-returns Lucas “span of control” model. This will allow us to characterize the factor allocation. We jointly determine the equilibrium wage and the fraction of agents who become entrepreneurs. This endogenously determines the outside option of agents who borrow to be entrepreneurs.
3.1 Entrepreneurs and Workers

The economy is populated by a continuum of agents all of who are endowed with a unit of labour. All agents are risk neutral. Each agent has a labour endowment of one and can either choose to be an entrepreneur or a worker. Each agent is characterized by an ability level if she becomes an entrepreneur, denoted by $\theta$ and a level of wealth, denoted by $a$. Heterogeneous productivity can be interpreted either as entrepreneurial “ability” or being endowed with a particular production technology. However, should an agent choose to be a worker, then there are no differences in ability. A wage laborer earns $w$ (the wage rate).

Any agent can set up a firm and work as an entrepreneur. Firm success is stochastic and depends on entrepreneurial effort.\(^5\) Specifically, the probability of being able to produce successfully is denoted by $g(e)$ where $e \in [0,1]$ denotes the level of “entrepreneurial effort”. In our model entrepreneurial effort only affects the success probability of firms, not the output conditional on success.\(^6\) Also, neither ability or wealth affects the probability of success. Capital needs to be partly in place (to be clarified below as to exactly how) before the success or failure of the firm is known (and so there is default in equilibrium) but labour is hired only conditional on success.

Conditional on success, an entrepreneur has access to a production technology that allows them to earn a profit by hiring labour to work with the capital that was invested in the first stage. The idiosyncratic ability level $\theta$ of entrepreneurs affects the productivity of their firm. The output price is $p$ which we normalize to 1.

Let $f(k,l;\theta)$ denote the production function where $k$ is the value of capital employed and $l$ is wage labour employed; we spell out its properties in Assumption 1 below. Entrepreneurs will be residual claimants on the firm’s profit stream.

We denote the cost of entrepreneurial effort by $\mu(e;\theta)$ which is assumed to be increasing in $e$ which is a standard assumption and creates the potential for the agency problem. We allow the disutility of effort to depend on $\theta$ as well. Since $\theta$ will affect firm size positively, this formulation assumes that setting up and running larger firms require greater effort on the part of the entrepreneur.

Further properties of $g(e)$ and $\mu(e;\theta)$ are introduced in Assumptions 1 and 2 below. To begin with, we make the following regularity assumption throughout:

**Assumption 1** The following conditions hold for the functions $g(e)$, $\mu(e;\theta)$ and $f(k,l;\theta)$:

(i) $g(e)$ is strictly increasing, twice-continuously differentiable, strictly concave for all $e \in [0,1]$, $g(0) = 0$ and $g(1) \in [0,1]$.

(ii) $f(k,l;\theta)$ is twice-continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in $k \in \mathbb{R}^+$ and $l \in \mathbb{R}^+$, strictly concave in $l$ and is increasing in $\theta$ with $f_{\theta k} > 0$ and $f_{\theta l} > 0$. Further $f(k,l;\theta) \geq 0$ for all $(k,l) \in \mathbb{R}^+ \times \mathbb{R}^+$.

(iii) $\mu(e;\theta)$ is strictly increasing, twice-continuously differentiable and convex in $e$; it is non-decreasing in $\theta$.

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\(^5\)Paulson et al (2006) and Karaivanov and Townsend (2014) estimate models with moral hazard on Thai data with equilibrium default. They do not focus on endogenous wages. However, they have a rich set of household outcomes with endogenous consumption.

\(^6\)If there were a frictionless market for ideas then entrepreneurial ability would no longer matter and ideas would be sold to agents with the highest wealth. Hence, we are assuming that contracting frictions prevent this from happening.
\((iv)\)  
\[ e(e;\theta) = \frac{\mu_e(e;\theta)}{g_e(e)} - \frac{\mu_e(e;\theta)g_{ee}(e)}{(g_e(e))^2} \] is continuous and increasing for \( e \in [0,1] \).

The last part of this assumption refers to \( e(e;\theta) \) which is the derivative of the ratio of the marginal cost of effort \( (\mu_e) \) to the marginal returns from effort \( (g_e) \) with respect to effort. We assume this is increasing in \( e \), which is to say, it becomes more and more costly to elicit effort relative to the benefit for higher and higher levels of effort. It guarantees that equilibrium effort is increasing in the outside option and so the richer is the borrower, the costlier it is to elicit effort. It holds in a wide class of cases such as constant elasticity functions.

### 3.2 Lenders and Credit Contracts

**Wealth and Collateral**  Each entrepreneur has a level of wealth \( a \) measured in units of labour endowment. In addition to their own wealth, entrepreneurs can approach lenders to borrow money. Let \( x \) be the amount that she borrows. Hence total capital potentially available to an entrepreneur is \( k = x + a \). However, collateral is also from individual wealth \( a \). We assume that at the first stage of the process of setting up a firm, an entrepreneur must set her own wealth \( a \) aside as collateral for the lender, and invest \( x \). If the project is successful, then there is no further risk and so \( a \) can be used to augment the capital stock. However, if the project fails, then the amount that was borrowed and invested, \( x \), is lost. The borrower forfeits the amount put up as collateral.\(^7\) Here we assume, as in Besley et al (2012), that only a fraction \( \tau a \) of wealth can be used as collateral where \( \tau < 1 \) captures frictions in the legal system that dissipates a part of the value of the wealth in the process of foreclosing on it as collateral (e.g., because property rights are imperfectly established, transactions costs are high).\(^8\)

**Lenders**  Credit contracts are described by a vector \((x, r, c)\) comprising (i) an amount borrowed, \( x \), (ii) an amount to be repaid if the firm is successful, \( r \), (iii) an amount of financial collateral \( c \). For notational simplicity we will use \( t = (x, r, c) \) to denote a credit contract.

Lenders can all access funds at the same opportunity cost \( \gamma > 1 \), which is the gross interest rate (principal plus the net interest rate).\(^9\) A lender’s expected profit when agreeing to lend to an entrepreneur with collateral \( \tau a \) is therefore:

\[ \Pi(t;e) = g(e) r + (1 - g(e)) \tau a - \gamma x. \]  

(1)

This reflects the fact that, with probability \( g(e) \), the lender is repaid and with probability \((1 - g(e))\) there is default in which case the lender seizes the entrepreneur’s collateral.

There is a finite set of lenders with whom entrepreneurs can contract. To model competition between lenders, we suppose that there is a Bertrand-style price setting game. Imagine

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\(^7\)We can think of capital that is committed to the project to become “clay”, while the part that is not committed yet as “putty”. If the project is successful, all the capital potentially available to the entrepreneur \((k = a + x)\) becomes clay but until the project outcome is known, only \( x \) is converted from putty to clay, with \( a \) set aside as collateral.

\(^8\)An important contrast with Besley et al (2012) is, there \( \tau \) reflects the probability the lender is able to capture \( a \) from the borrower and \((1 - \tau)\) is the probability the borrower gets to hold on to it. Here, \((1 - \tau) a \) simply disappears in the process of foreclosing on collateral and is a deadweight loss.

\(^9\)This could be justified by supposing that this is a small open economy that faces a given international interest rate. Otherwise, we would have to close the model with an edogenous \( \gamma \) which equated the demand and supply of loanable funds.
that there are two lenders with identical access to the capital market, \( \gamma \) and the same enforcement technologies. In principle this should lead to borrowers capturing all of the surplus as lenders compete for borrowers until \textit{ex ante} payoffs are zero. However, there are good reasons to doubt that this is a reasonable model and there are likely to be costs of switching between lenders. Rather than being specific about the friction, we capture imperfectly competitive credit markets by supposing that an alternative lender provides an outside option worth a share \( \phi \) of the total surplus created by their lending contract. If \( \phi = 1 \), then all of the surplus over and above the entrepreneur’s outside option accrues to the entrepreneur rather than the lender. This is the competitive benchmark.\(^{10}\) On the other hand, if \( \phi \) is small, then the lender has a lot of market power.

**Timing** The timing of production for a type \((a, \theta)\) is as follows.

1. Workers choose whether to become an entrepreneur or worker.
2a. If she chooses to become a worker, she inelastically supplies one unit of labour to the labour market.
2b. If she is an entrepreneur, then each lender offers her a contract \((x, r, c)\). After deciding whether to accept this contract, she chooses entrepreneurial effort, \(e\).
3a. With probability \(g(e)\), she is a successful entrepreneur and has a viable project. Then she chooses how much labour to hire, \(l\). Output is realized, wages are paid to workers, and the loan repayment, \(r\), is made.
3b. With probability \(1 - g(e)\), an entrepreneur produces nothing and forfeits collateral, \(c\).

We now work backwards through these decisions to determine the optimal contract. Here, we suppose that the wage rate \(w\) is fixed. We then explore the general equilibrium where these are determined.

**Labour Hiring** With probability \(g(e)\), the firm produces in which case it decides how many workers to hire to maximize profits, i.e.

\[
I^*(k; \theta, w) = \arg \max \{ f(k, l; \theta) - wl \}
\]

and define \(\pi(k; \theta, w) = f(k, I^*(k; \theta, w); \theta) - wI^*(k; \theta, w)\) as the conditional profit function given an allocation of capital \(k\). Throughout we make the following assumption, that ensures well-defined interior solutions.

**Assumption 2** The following conditions hold for \(g(e)\) and \(\pi(k; \theta, p)\):

\(i\) \(\pi(k; \theta, p)\) is strictly concave for all \(k \in \mathbb{R}^+\).
\(ii\) \(g(e)\pi(k; \theta, p)\) is strictly concave for all \((e, k) \in [0, 1] \times \mathbb{R}^+\).
\(iii\) \(\lim_{e \to 0} g(e)\pi(k; \theta, p) - [d_e(e; \theta, p) + g(e)e(e; \theta, p)] > 0\) for all \(k > 0\);
\(\lim_{k \to 0} g(e)\pi_k(k; \theta, p) > \gamma\) for all \(e > 0\).

\(^{10}\)It could also represent the case where lenders are not-for-profit NGOs or government banks.
These regularity assumptions guarantee that there is a unique global maximum level of effort and capital with an interior solution. The last part of the assumption are Inada-like conditions. They are satisfied by the constant elasticity model introduce in the calibration below.

**Choice of Entrepreneurial Effort** We allow lenders to offer credit to entrepreneurs which are tailored to an entrepreneur’s characteristics, \((a, \theta)\). Since entrepreneurial effort is costly and unobserved to the lender, there is the possibility of moral hazard and credit contract that is chosen is designed taking this into account.

The expected payoff of an entrepreneur who borrows under contract \(t\) is given by:

\[
V(e; t, a, \theta, w) = g(e) \left[ \pi(x + a; \theta, w) - r + c \right] - c - \mu(e; \theta). \tag{3}
\]

Observe that this is decreasing in the amount of collateral, all else equal.

The first-order condition for entrepreneurial effort is:

\[
g_e(e) \left[ \pi(x + a; \theta, w) - r + c \right] = \mu_e(e; \theta). \tag{4}
\]

Entrepreneurial effort is increasing in collateral \(c\) and the amount borrowed, \(x\). However, it is decreasing in \(r\) all else equal, i.e. asking for a higher loan repayment blunts incentives and increases the default rate. Equation (4) is an incentive-compatibility constraint on credit contracts.

**Acceptable Credit Contracts** As well as being incentive compatible, entrepreneurs must enter into contracts voluntarily at stage 2. Hence all credit contracts offered to an entrepreneur of type \((a, \theta)\) must generate a payoff which exceeds what is available elsewhere which we denote by \(u\). The participation constraint of entrepreneurs is therefore:

\[
V(e, t; a, \theta, w) \geq u. \tag{5}
\]

In equilibrium, \(u\) is determined endogenously and depends on \(\theta, a\) and \(w\). It can be thought of as a price which endogenously clears the credit market given outside opportunities available to an entrepreneur. In other words, it determines the expected returns from entrepreneurship striking a balance between the demand and supply for different occupations in the economy, which in turn depends on economic fundamentals, such as the distribution of talent and wealth and the wage rate. Below we will determine \(w\) endogenously but all individuals take wages as given when making their decisions.

### 3.3 Credit Contracts in Partial Equilibrium

In this section, we explore access to credit holding fixed who decides to become an entrepreneur and the wage rate \(w\). We characterize the form of optimal lending contracts beginning with three key observations on the properties of such contracts.

The first observation is that, as long as first-best effort cannot be implemented, the lender will choose \(c = \tau a\), i.e. collateral is set at the highest possible value. As long as \(c < \tau a\) surplus can always be extracted from the borrower more efficiently by reducing \(r\) and increasing \(c\), thereby relaxing the incentive-compatibility constraint and leaving the borrower’s participation constraint unchanged.
Second, when the participation constraint (2) is binding, combining (1), (3) and (4) yields the following equation characterizing the borrower’s optimal effort level is \( \zeta (v; \theta) \):

\[
\frac{\mu_e (\zeta (v; \theta); \theta) g (\zeta (v; \theta))}{g_e (\zeta (v; \theta))} - \mu (\zeta (v; \theta); \theta) = v,
\]

where \( v \equiv u + \tau a \). Under Assumption 2, the repayment probability \( \zeta (v; \theta) \) is increasing in \( v \). This says that any improvement in an entrepreneur’s outside option or her collateralizable wealth reduces default. The intuition is, the lender cuts \( r \) (which reduces \( e \)) if there is more collateral that the entrepreneur can offer or her outside option is higher. When the participation constraint is non-binding, we can combine (3) and (4) and maximize lender profit over \( e \) and \( x \). In this case optimal effort and capital, denoted \( e_0 (\theta) \) and \( k_0 (\theta, w) \), are independent of \( v \).

The value of \( v \) also determines whether the outside option is binding and/or whether the first-best level of surplus is attained, as summarized in our next result:

**Proposition 1** There exists \([\varphi (\theta, w), \bar{\varphi} (\theta, w)]\) such that optimal lending contracts implement effort \( e \) as follows:

\[
\hat{e} (v; \theta) = \begin{cases} 
\breve{e} (\theta) & \text{for } v \leq \varphi (\theta, w) \\
\zeta (v; \theta) & \text{for } \varphi (\theta, w) < v < \bar{\varphi} (\theta, w) \\
\varepsilon^* (\theta) & \text{for } v \geq \bar{\varphi} (\theta, w)
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \varepsilon (\theta) \) is a constant, \( \varepsilon^* (\theta) \) is a constant equal to first best effort, \( \lim_{v \to \varphi (\theta, w)} \zeta (v; \theta) = \varepsilon (\theta) \) and \( \lim_{v \to \bar{\varphi} (\theta, w)} \zeta (v; \theta) = \varepsilon^* (\theta) \).

When \( v \) is high then effort is at the first-best level, defined by:

\[
g_e (\varepsilon^* (\theta)) [\pi (x (\bar{\varphi} (\theta, w) + a; \theta, w); \theta, w)] = \mu_e (\varepsilon^* (\theta); \theta).
\]

That is, \( e \) is chosen to set the marginal benefit equal to the marginal cost when the agent is a full residual claimant. At the other extreme, for low \( v \), the effort level is set so that the outside option does not bind and the agent obtains an “efficiency” utility. This is characterized by

\[
g_e (\varepsilon (\theta)) \pi (x (\bar{\varphi} (\theta, w) + a; \theta, w); \theta, w) = \epsilon (\varepsilon (\theta); \mu_e (\varepsilon (\theta); \theta).
\]

In this case, it is “as if” the cost of effort is increased by the term \( \epsilon (\varepsilon (\theta); \theta) \) which represents the marginal “agency cost” due to moral hazard. At intermediate levels of \( v \) the effort distortion is decreasing in \( v \).

Our third observation concerns the optimal allocation of credit which is determined by maximizing (4) with respect to \( x \), subject to the constraints. We can show the following result:

**Proposition 2** Firm capital, \( \hat{k} (v; \theta, w) \), and therefore the amount borrowed \( \hat{s} (v; \theta, w) = \hat{k} (v; \theta, w) - a \), is defined by\(^{11}\)

\[
\tau \hat{k} (v; \theta, w) = \frac{\gamma}{g (\hat{s} (v; \theta))}.
\]

This is the core equation for capital allocation. It says that capital will be allocated on a risk-adjusted basis to reflect the equilibrium default probability. So the marginal return to capital is not equalized across firms to the extent that there are different probabilities of default. Capital is only misallocated to the extent that capital market frictions lead to distortions in

\(^{11}\)Where \( \hat{s} (v; \theta, p) < 0 \) the entrepreneur has sufficient wealth to self-finance at first best and will not borrow.
e. Misallocation of capital reflects the agency problem relating to entrepreneurial effort and would cease to exist if effort was contractible or if borrowers had sufficient wealth to post as collateral.

The result in Proposition ? perhaps provides a convenient way of summarizing optimal contracts since \( v \) is a sufficient statistic for the efficiency of the lending arrangement, determining the level of effort. This in turn determines the level of capital, as characterized by Proposition (??).

Proposition (??) emphasizes the role that equilibrium default has on the capital available to a firm. Unlike most of the existing literature, (e.g., Buera et al 2011, 2015), the credit market friction affecting capital allocation is determined in equilibrium as a function of the equilibrium price vector and outside option in addition to borrower characteristics \( a \) and \( \theta \). This will also be a feature of the calibration of the model below and we will explore heterogeneity in default rates in this setting.

The repayment \( r \) is determined, conditional on \( \ell(v; \theta) \) and \( k(v; \theta, w) \), from (??) as:

\[
    r(v; a, \theta, w) = \pi \left( k(v; \theta, w); \theta, w \right) + \tau a - \frac{\mu_e(\ell(v; \theta); \theta)}{g_e(\ell(v; \theta))}.
\]

Thus, the interest rate paid by each borrower varies by borrower type and is determined determined in equilibrium as \( r(v; a, \theta, w) / \left[ k(v; \theta, w) - a \right] \). This heterogeneity remains even if there is full competition in credit markets (\( \phi = 1 \)).

Total surplus in a lending relationship is:

\[
    S(v; \theta, w) = g(\ell(v; \theta)) \left[ \pi \left( \ell(v; \theta, w) + a; \theta, w \right) \right] - \mu(\ell(v; \theta); \theta) - \gamma \cdot \ell(v; \theta, w).
\]

The following result gives a characterization of the ranges in which \( v \) can fall in terms of the surplus function, where \( S_v \) denotes the partial derivative of the surplus function with respect to \( v \).

**Corollary 1** The surplus function, \( S(v; \theta, w) \), is increasing in \( v \) whenever \( S_v(v; \theta, w) \in [0, 1] \). For \( v \geq \bar{v}(\theta, w) \) we have \( S_v(\bar{v}(\theta, w); \theta, w) = 0 \). For \( v < \bar{v}(\theta, w) \) the participation constraint of the entrepreneur does not bind, and at \( \bar{v}(\theta, w) \) we have \( S_v(\bar{v}(\theta, w); \theta, w) = 1 \).

Credit contracts will implement first best effort as long as entrepreneurs can provide sufficient collateral, i.e. has high \( a \), or a high outside option. The first of these is standard feature of existing models of ex post enforcement constraints. What the general equilibrium contracting model emphasizes is that whether the first-best is attainable also depends on an endogenously determined outside option which affects the equilibrium default rate. In the intermediate \( v \) range, greater collateral allows for more efficient lending since it relaxes (??). The lender then offers a higher \( x \), which amplifies the effect of collateral on the incentive compatibility constraint. Similarly, a higher outside option increases lending efficiency. The lender has to transfer a greater share of surplus to the entrepreneur, and this is optimally implemented by reducing \( r \) and increasing \( x \), which in turn increases effort. However, for \( v \leq \bar{v}(\theta, w) \) the lender will always implement \( c_0(\theta, w) \). In this range – due to the concavity of \( g(e) \) – a reduction in \( r \) increases surplus by more than it transfers surplus to the entrepreneur. Therefore it is in the interest of the lender to offer a contract which leaves the entrepreneur with an expected income greater than the outside option. It is optimal to transfer surplus by decreasing \( r \). In this region, the lender reacts to an increased \( c \) by increasing \( r \) by the same amount, and leaving both \( e \) and \( x \) unchanged. Surplus stays unchanged, but is transferred from the borrower to the lender.
The Lender’s Participation Constraint  Whether a lender wishes to lend to an entrepreneur of type \((a, \theta)\) depends upon whether they can make a profit by doing so. Hence for an entrepreneur of type \((a, \theta)\) to be offered any credit requires that

\[ \hat{\Pi}(v; a, \theta, w) \geq 0. \]

Determining the Entrepreneur’s Outside Option  The final part of the partial equilibrium analysis is to determine the entrepreneur’s outside option endogenously. This will be the maximum of three things: (i) what she can obtain by borrowing from another lender, (ii) self-financing the project with the (limited) wealth owned and (iii) working for a wage. We now explore this in detail.

Let \(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w)\) be defined by:

\[ \phi \cdot S(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w) = \hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w). \]

This implicitly defines the equilibrium payoff of an entrepreneur if the only outside option is to receive a share \(\phi\) of the surplus in a lending relationship. Note that this is not the payoff from borrowing since the efficiency utility in Proposition ?? bounds the borrower’s payoff from below when \(\phi\) and/or \(\tau a\) are low.\(^{12}\)

Now consider the payoff where the agent chooses to self-finance, i.e. use only their own wealth. This is given by

\[ V_{\text{self}}(a, \theta, w) = \max_{e, k} \{g(e) \pi(k; \theta, w) - \mu(e; \theta) - \gamma k : k \leq a\}. \]  

(7)

Let \(\{e^{\text{self}}(a, \theta, w), k^{\text{self}}(a, \theta, w)\}\) denote the solutions to the maximization problem (??). Lastly the entrepreneur could choose to become a wage labourer. The entrepreneur’s outside option will therefore be given by

\[ u(a, \theta, w) = \max\{V_{\text{self}}(a, \theta, w), \hat{u}(a, \theta, w), w\}. \]

Comparative Statics  We now have the following result for the payoff of entrepreneurs:

**Proposition 3**  For \(v > v(a, \theta, w)\), the entrepreneur’s expected profit increases with more competition (\(\phi\)) and greater wealth (\(a\)). In the absence of further assumptions, the effect of productivity (\(\theta\)) on the outcome is indeterminate.

Thus entrepreneurs benefit from increased competition since they get a larger share of the surplus in the credit market. They also do better when they have more collateral to post. Increasing productivity has competing effects which explains the ambiguous effect on total surplus. On the one hand, profits are higher as firms are more productive. However, the effect on the repayment probability is ambiguous since the cost of entrepreneurial effort in larger firms.

### 3.4 General Equilibrium

So far, we have taken the wage rate \(w\) and the occupational structure as given. Our general equilibrium analysis determines these endogenously.

\(^{12}\)Note that even with \(\phi = 0\), the lender does not necessarily receive \(u\) since, as we observed Proposition ??, the entrepreneur’s participation constraint might not be binding.
Financial Market Access  We assume that a fraction \( z(a, \theta) \in [0, 1] \) of agents of type \((a, \theta)\) has access to financial markets.\(^{13}\) Denote with \( \chi \in \{0, 1\} \) whether any given individual has access to credit markets. Let \( h(a, \theta) \) denote the joint density associated with the distribution of \((a, \theta)\). Total financial inclusion in the economy is defined by

\[
\bar{\chi} = \int \int z(a, \theta) \ h(a, \theta) \, da \, d\theta,
\]

i.e. as the proportion of agents who have market access. If they have access then they can access credit markets as described in the previous section.

Occupational Choice  Let \( \sigma \in \{0, 1\} \) denote whether an agent becomes an entrepreneur, with \( \sigma = 1 \) indicating entrepreneurship and \( \sigma = 0 \) indicating becoming a worker. An agent will choose entrepreneurship when the expected payoff from being an entrepreneur exceeds that from being a wage labourer. Formally,

\[
\sigma(a, \theta, \chi, w) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \chi = 1 \text{ and } \int \int (u(a, \theta, w) + \tau a; a, \theta, w) \geq 0 \\
1 & \text{if } V^{self}(a, \theta, w) \geq w \\
0 & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}
\]

The borrower will always choose to become an entrepreneur if the autarchy payoff is bigger than the wage. If she has access to credit markets, she will also become an entrepreneur if the lender can offer a profitable credit contract (satisfying the borrower’s outside option and incentive constraint). Clearly this depends on the individuals type \((a, \theta)\). Moreover, since the payoff from entrepreneurship is increasing in \( a \) and \( \theta \), if a type \((a, \theta)\) becomes an entrepreneur then so do all individuals with higher wealth and productivity. Hence, there will be critical values of wealth and productivity that define the entrepreneurial class. How dense this is depends on the joint distribution of wealth and productivity.

Equilibrium Wages  To determine equilibrium wages, we need to solve for aggregate labour supply and demand in the economy. This means aggregating over the distribution of wealth and productivity. Aggregate labour supply is determined by the fraction of individuals who choose not to become entrepreneurs, i.e.

\[
L^S(w) = \int \int [z(a, \theta) \{1 - \sigma(\theta, a, 1, w)\} + (1 - z(a, \theta)) \{1 - \sigma(\theta, a, 0, w)\}] \ h(a, \theta) \, da \, d\theta. \tag{8}
\]

Choice of effort, conditional on becoming entrepreneur, is denoted by

\[
\hat{e}(a, \theta, \chi, w) = \chi(\hat{e}(u(a, \theta, w) + \tau a; a, \theta, w) + (1 - \chi)e^{self}(a, \theta, w),
\]

and firm capital, conditional on becoming entrepreneur, by

\[
\hat{k}(a, \theta, \chi, w) = \chi(\hat{k}(u(a, \theta, w) + \tau a; a, \theta, w) + (1 - \chi)k^{self}(a, \theta, w).
\]

To solve for aggregate labour demand we need to take into account the fraction of firms that are operational given the equilibrium default probability which we denote by

\[
\hat{g}(a, \theta, \chi, w) = g(\hat{e}(a, \theta, \chi, w)).
\]

\(^{13}\)We assume that autarky is the only alternative to credit market access. An interesting extension in future work would be to allow an informal sector which could be characterized by a higher cost of funds, \( \gamma \) and would be another potential outside option for the borrower.
Note that this also depends on $w$ through its effect on profits. Labour demand also depends on the amount of labour hired by each firm, conditional on producing. We will denote this by $\hat{l}(a,\theta,\chi,w) = l^*(\hat{k}(a,\theta,\chi,w);\theta,w)$ using (??).

Aggregate labour demand is then given by

$$L^D(w) = \int \int z(a,\theta) \left[ \sigma(a,\theta,1) \cdot (\hat{l}(a,\theta,1,\hat{k}(a,\theta,1,p) + \hat{e}(a,\theta,1,w)) \right] h(a,\theta) d\theta \theta + \int \int (1-z(a,\theta)) \left[ \sigma(a,\theta,0) \cdot (\hat{l}(a,\theta,0,\hat{k}(a,\theta,0,p) + \hat{e}(a,\theta,0,w)) \right] h(a,\theta) d\theta \theta. \quad (9)$$

This is the sum over the labour demand functions of individuals who choose to become entrepreneurs at prevailing prices $w$, characterized by $(a,\theta,\chi)$.

The equilibrium wage $\w$ now equates supply and demand, i.e. solves

$$L^S(\w) = L^D(\w).$$

This depends implicitly on all dimensions of choice: occupational choice, credit contracts which determines use of capital and labour demand. It also depends on the extent of financial access since this will affect who becomes an entrepreneur and the amount of labour demand among those who do, depending on whether they can access financial markets.

### 3.5 Two Benchmarks

Before proceeding to study the calibration of the model, it is worth considering two special cases that will serve as useful benchmarks in what follows: autarky and the first best.

**Autarky** We define autarky purely in terms of credit markets, i.e. to describe a situation where there is only trade in labour and goods markets, but not in capital. Formally, this is a case where $z(a,\theta) = 0$ for all $(a,\theta)$. In this cases, the only way in which individuals can access credit is via their own wealth. The choice of entrepreneurial effort and capital are given by (??). In autarky there can be wide dispersion in the marginal product of capital across entrepreneurs: an entrepreneurs’ firm’s capital is constrained by his personal wealth. Associated with autarky will be a wage rate $w^{aut}$ which clears the labour market given the occupational choice decisions.

By misallocating capital, autarky also results in lower labour demand. This in turn depresses wages. This means that wages will tend to be lower so autarky can actually encourage people to become entrepreneurs compared to a situation where capital markets are functioning well.

**The First-Best** We now consider what would happen with perfect capital markets. This has two dimensions. First, there is complete access to financial markets, $z(a,\theta) = 1$ for all $(a,\theta)$, and there is no moral hazard problem. In effect, the latter implies that a lender can specify a level of managerial input as part of the lending contract.

This would result in effort and capital solving

$$V^* (\theta,w) = \max_{e,k} \{ g(e) \pi(k;\theta,w) - \mu(e;\theta) - \gamma k \}$$
and capital allocation follows
\[ \pi_k(k^*; \theta, w) = \gamma / g(e^*; \theta, w). \]

Note that the first best does have a level of default associated with it. However, these decisions and payoffs are independent of \( a, \) i.e. the entrepreneur’s level of wealth is irrelevant. Occupational choice is given by
\[ \sigma^*(\theta, w) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } V^*(\theta, w) > w \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]
which is also independent of \( a. \) Associated with first-best will be a wage rate \( w^* \) which clears the labour market given the occupational choice, capital allocation and labour demand decisions. The wage rate will be endogenous and set to clear the labour market.

4 From Theory to Data

We use the model to produce a range of calibrated counterfactuals to explore the model’s predictions quantitatively. The framework allows us to think about two main things. First, we can think about the effect of credit market frictions on optimal credit contracts. We can explore the effect of two specific frictions as represented by \( \phi \) and \( \tau. \) Second, we can look at the impact of changing market access as represented by \( z(a, \theta). \)

Changing market frictions affects labour demand for a given wage in (??) through three channels. First, it increases access to capital and this increases labour demand since capital and labour are complements. Second, it reduces the default probability by increasing effort. Third, it lowers the threshold productivity and wealth levels at which agents choose to become entrepreneurs. Increasing \( z(a, \theta) \) has a direct effect on labour demand since some entrepreneurs now get access to more capital.

General equilibrium effects are largely driven by shifts in labour demand and occupation choice which affect the wage which, in turn, feeds back on to the participation constraint of entrepreneurs and hence to the terms of credit contracts. Wages also affect the amount of entrepreneurial effort applied by changing profitability and the amount of capital used.

The model is able to give a clear sense of the different “moving parts” that affect credit market frictions in a general equilibrium model with endogenous occupational choice. Our next step is to put the model to work by exploring different aspects of its quantitative predictions. For this, we will need to give a specific parametrization and simulate the model’s predictions which will give insights in three main areas.

We next describe the specific functional forms that use and then discuss how various key parameters are calibrated.

4.1 Parametrization

The production function, \( f(k, l; \theta) \) is Cobb-Douglas with diminishing returns:
\[ f(k, l; \theta) = \theta^{1-\eta-\alpha} \left( l^{1-\beta} k^\beta \right)^\eta, \] (10)
where \( \theta \) is the firm specific productivity parameter and \( \alpha, \beta, \) and \( \eta, \) all of them belonging to the interval \( (0, 1) \), are parameters governing the shape of the production function, all lying in .
Thus the model is essentially a classic Lucas-style “span of control” model \( \eta \) representing the extent of diminishing returns and pure profits can be thought of as payment to an untraded factor such as technology or ability.

Using this, a firm’s labour demand, conditional on \( k \), is given by:

\[
l^*(k; \theta, w) = \left[ \eta (1 - \beta) \frac{1}{w} \theta^{1 - \eta - \alpha k \eta \beta} \right]^{1 - \eta (1 - \beta)}/(1 - \eta) \tag{11}
\]

and the conditional profit function is

\[
\pi(k; \theta, w) = (1 - \eta (1 - \beta)) \left[ \left( \frac{\eta (1 - \beta)}{w} \right)^{\eta (1 - \beta)} \theta^{1 - \eta - \alpha k \eta \beta} \right]^{1 - \eta (1 - \beta)} \tag{12}
\]

The marginal product of capital is therefore given by:

\[
\pi_k(k; \theta, w) = \eta \beta \left[ \left( \frac{\eta (1 - \beta)}{w} \right)^{\eta (1 - \beta)} \theta^{1 - \eta - \alpha k \eta \beta - 1} \right]^{1 - \eta (1 - \beta)} \tag{13}
\]

In addition to the productivity level \( \theta \), the entrepreneur’s credit market access is dependent on \( v (= u + \tau a) \). It also affects collateralizable wealth as we saw (??) above. In particular, an entrepreneur faces a cost of capital equal to \( \gamma / g(e; \theta, p) \) where \( v \) is determined in a credit market equilibrium and will therefore depend on \( w \).

For the entrepreneurial effort technology, we use a constant-elasticity functional form where:\(^4\)

\[
g(e) = \lambda e^\delta
\]

and

\[
\mu(e; \theta) = \theta^\delta e, \text{with } \delta \geq 0.
\]

We can think of \( \theta^\delta e \) as the amount of entrepreneurial effort required to set up the project given that is going to be successful with probability \( e \). The parameter \( \delta \) governs the dependence of the effort cost of \( \theta \), in effect the link to firm size. If \( \delta = 0 \), then the cost of securing a given level of default does not depend on firm size whereas \( \delta > 0 \) means that achieving the same default in a large firm requires more entrepreneurial effort. The parameter \( \alpha \) in the technology above governs the elasticity of the success probability with respect to entrepreneurial effort.\(^5\)

Together with the assumption in (??) this functional form implies that output has constant returns to scale in entrepreneurial effort (\( e \)), capital (\( k \)), labour (\( l \)), and entrepreneurial talent (\( \theta \)). Finally, the parameter \( \lambda \) captures the general productivity of entrepreneurial effort at achieving project success. In the next section, we will show how to use data on the firm size distribution and heterogeneous default probabilities by firm size to calibrate (\( \delta, \alpha, \lambda \)).

---

\(^4\) An alternative isomorphic specification in terms of effort choice would assume that the contribution of entrepreneurs to project success is smaller in larger firms: \( g(e; \theta) = \theta^{-\delta} \lambda e^\delta \) and \( \mu(e) = e \).

\(^5\) The parameter \( \alpha \) will be chosen such that first best default probabilities \( g(e^*(\theta, p)) \) match their empirical counter-part, including at the highest level of \( \theta \). Both for lower levels of \( \theta \) and in second-best default probabilities, i.e. success probabilities will be lower. Therefore no additional assumption is required to guarantee that \( g(e) \in [0, 1] \).
4.2 Calibration

Without loss of generality, we will take the output price to be the same (and equal to 1) across countries. Since we will think of the price of capital goods (but not necessarily the rental rate) to be equal across countries, we measure capital, $k$, in value terms. Any wage or income level in the distorted model will then be measured relative to the US wage.

**Model Parameters** We calibrate a subset of the model parameters using evidence from existing studies. First, we assume that $\beta$, which in first best measures the share of output paid to capital relative to labour\(^{16}\), is $1/3$ in line with standard calibrations used in the macroeconomic literature. Secondly, we take the marginal cost of capital $\gamma$ to be 1.1, which roughly corresponds to long run real interest rates in the US since the 1980’s (Yi and Zhang, 2016) with an allowance for capital depreciation.\(^{17}\) Thirdly, we set $\eta$ to $3/4$, following the assumption of Bloom (2009) in a related context.

The remaining parameters are chosen by calibrating the model to US data, assuming that this is an example of ”perfectly” functioning credit markets. While this assumption is somewhat extreme, it may still serve as a reasonable approximation of the difference between US credit markets and credit markets in developing countries which is our main focus of attention. What makes this assumption convenient is that all of the model’s predictions are independent of the wealth distribution. This, in turn, allows us to calibrate the unknown parameters without knowledge of the wealth distribution. We can then specify any wealth distribution when we simulate second best outcomes.

**Entrepreneurial Allocation and the Distribution of Productivity** Once we suppose that the US is first best, we can calibrate the distribution of $\theta$ jointly with $\alpha$ and $\delta$. We first show how $\alpha$ and $\delta$ determine the pattern of corporate default rates across firm sizes, conditional on the distribution of $\theta$. The distribution of $\theta$ can be backed out from data on the distribution of firm size, conditional on $\alpha$ and $\delta$. Jointly, these allow to back out the parameters affecting default risk and the cost of effort $(\alpha, \delta)$ and the distribution of $\theta$ from the US firm size distribution and the pattern of corporate default rates across firm sizes.

We normalize, without loss of generality, the US wage to be one. Further we assume $\lambda = 1.05$ for the calibration while in the simulations we will set $\lambda = 1.0$. This assumes that entrepreneurial productivity is 5% higher in the US than in the simulated economy. This is broadly consistent with evidence linking entrepreneurial quality with firm survival. For example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) find the lowest level of management performance in China, India, Greece and Brazil, and the highest level of management performance in the United States. Consistent with our model, they find that in the cross section of firms their measure of management performance is associated with significantly higher firm survival. Quantitatively their results suggests that moving from the average management quality in China or India to the average management quality in the US will increase default rates by about 0.35 percentage points over a horizon of about 5 years.

From the first-order conditions we solve for the first best level of entrepreneurial effort and capital $(e^*, k^*)$ in closed form:

\(^{16}\)Note that this only holds when defining the labor income share as payments to $l$, not $e$.

\(^{17}\)The rates paid to depositors in developing countries are of little guidance to calibrate $\gamma$ if depositors are not the marginal source of funding, or there are transaction costs in financial intermediation.
\[ e^* (\theta, w) = \left[ \theta^{1-\eta-\alpha} \left( \frac{\eta \left( 1 - \beta \right)}{w} \right)^{(1-\beta)} \left( \frac{\eta \beta}{\gamma} \right)^{\eta \beta} \left( \frac{\lambda \alpha \left( 1 - \eta \left( 1 - \beta \right) \right)}{w \theta^\delta} \right)^{1-\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \] \] (14)

\[ k^* (\theta, w) = \left[ \theta^{1-\eta-\alpha} \left( \frac{\eta \left( 1 - \beta \right)}{w} \right)^{(1-\beta)} \left( \frac{\eta \beta}{\gamma} \right)^{(1-\alpha)(1-\eta)(1-\beta)} \left( \frac{\lambda \alpha \left( 1 - \eta \left( 1 - \beta \right) \right)}{w \theta^\delta} \right)^{\alpha(1-\eta)(1-\beta)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \] (15)

Note that for \((\delta, \alpha) = \left( \frac{1-\alpha-\eta}{1-\eta}, \alpha \right)\) the first best effort level, and therefore the default probability, is independent of the scale of the firm \(\theta\). Other levels of \((\delta, \alpha)\) imply that first best default probabilities increase or decrease with first best firm size. Given a distribution of productivities, \(\alpha\) and \(\delta\) can then be chosen such that the implied pattern of default probabilities across firm sizes matches the empirical pattern. In particular, we calibrate \(\alpha\) and \(\delta\) such that the smallest firm in our data. In second best simulations larger firms might emerge to the extend that high productivity entrepreneurs have access to capital and wages are depressed.

Next we show how the marginal distribution of \(\theta\) can be calibrated from data on the distribution of firms sizes, conditional on \(\alpha\) and \(\delta\). Plugging (14) into (15) we can write equilibrium labour demand, \(l^*\), as a function of \(\theta\) up to a constant of proportionality. Inverting this relationship, we have that:

\[ \theta = (l^*)^{\Psi} \cdot \Psi \] (16)

where \(\Psi\) and \(\psi\) are known constants. Equation (15) shows that the distribution of \(\theta\) conditional on entrepreneurship can be backed out from data on the distribution of the firm level labour force, \(l^*\). Empirically the distribution of firm sizes measured in terms of the size of the labour force \(l^*\) is well approximated by a Pareto distribution, with shape parameter \(\sigma_l = 1.059\) (Axtell, 2001). Given the functional form in (15), \(\theta\) also follows also a Pareto distribution with known shape parameter.\(^{19}\) We take both the firm size and \(\theta\) distributions to follow upper-truncated Pareto distribution, where the point of truncation is defined by the largest firm observed in the Axtell (2001) dataset.\(^{20}\) Note that this does not pin down the scale parameter of the \(\theta\) distribution, \(\theta\), since \(l^*\) is only observed for firms with \(\sigma (\alpha, \theta, w) = 1\). We choose \(\theta\) to clear the labour market, i.e. solve \(L^S (w) = L^D (w)\) at \(w = 1\), i.e. we assume that US labour markets are in equilibrium and find the distribution of \(\theta\) such that the equilibrium wage predicted by the model matches the observed US wage.

In what we describe above, the calibration of \((\delta, \alpha)\) is conditional on the distribution \(\theta\), and vice versa. We find the values of \(\delta, \alpha\) and the distribution of \(\theta\) to simultaneously to match the specified pattern of default probabilities, the observed firm size distribution, and imply that labour markets clear at wage equal to 1.

\(^{18}\)Delinquency rates are higher, mechanically.

\(^{19}\)A Pareto distribution with scale parameter \(l\) and shape parameter \(\sigma_l\) has a c.d.f. \(P(L \leq l) = 1 - \left( \frac{l}{l} \right)^{\sigma_l}. \) We find the c.d.f. of \(\theta\) as \(P(t \leq \theta) = 1 - \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta/\Psi} \right)^{\sigma_l} = 1 - \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta/\Psi} \right)^{\sigma_l}. \) This is again a Pareto distribution, with shape parameter \(\sigma_l/\Psi\) and lowest value as \(\theta = \frac{\theta}{\Psi}.\)

\(^{20}\)This implies that in the first best scenario, the largest firm in our simulations is as large as the largest US firm in our data. In second best simulations larger firms might emerge to the extend that high productivity entrepreneurs have access to capital and wages are depressed.
The Distribution of Wealth  We can specify the marginal asset distribution to follow any observed or hypothetical wealth distribution. For our baseline simulations we choose the marginal distribution of assets to approximate the wealth distribution in India. We obtained data on the Indian wealth distribution from the Global Wealth Report 2015 (Credit Suisse, 2015).

This report provides information on the Gini coefficient of the Indian wealth distribution, mean wealth, median wealth and the fraction of the population in four wealth classes: 0-10k, 10k-100k, 100k-1m and over 10m USD. The median wealth in India is 1.75% of median wealth in the US, and the mean wealth is 1.24% of mean wealth in the US.

We assume the Indian wealth distribution to be of the Pareto family, which has been shown to be a reasonable approximation in a number of countries. This reduces the calibration to choosing a shape and scale parameter of that distribution. Moreover, given the Pareto assumption, the shape parameter has a known monotonic relation to the Gini coefficient. We use this relation together with the aforementioned data on the empirical Gini coefficient to back out the shape parameter. Specifically, the scale parameter is chosen to minimize the sum of squared differences between the empirical probability mass and the probability mass of the calibrated Pareto distribution in each of the four wealth categories, where the summation is across wealth categories.

Lastly, we need to specify the joint distribution $h(a, \theta)$ of assets and productivities. This is difficult to back out non-parametrically from data. In a world with first best credit contracts, knowledge of individual wealth levels, occupational status, and the size of the labour force of firms held by entrepreneurs, would be sufficient to back out the joint distribution of $a$ and $\theta$ for the subset of individuals with a $\theta$ high enough to become entrepreneurs. However, for all individuals with a value of $\theta$ that does not lead to them becoming entrepreneurs, $\theta$ is fundamentally unobserved. In our simulations we therefore work with several hypothetical joint distributions.

To this end, we can specify a pattern of dependency between $a$ and $\theta$ using the statistical concept of copulas. According to Sklar’s theorem (Sklar, 1959), the multivariate density function $h(a, \theta)$ can be rewritten as $h(a, \theta) = h_a(a) \cdot c(H_a(a), H_\theta(\theta)) \cdot h_\theta(\theta)$, where $H_a(\cdot)$ and $H_\theta(\cdot)$ are the cumulative density functions of the marginal distribution of $a$ and $\theta$, respectively, $h_a(\cdot)$ and $h_\theta(\cdot)$ are the corresponding probability density functions, and $c : [0, 1]^2 \to R^+$ is the density function of the copula. We assume that the dependency between $a$ and $\theta$ is characterized by a Normal copula. This implies that the only free parameters that have to be specified is the covariance which we choose such that the induced correlation between $a$ and $\theta$ matches one of a range of “target values” of the correlation: $\rho \in \{0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3\}$. As we increase $\rho$ we are postulating a stronger and stronger link between productivity and wealth. Using this approach, we can simulate our model given each value of $\rho$ to trace out the implications of different degrees of correlation between $a$ and $\theta$ for credit market outcomes.

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21 Here we take the joint distribution of productivity and wealth as a primitive. This contrasts with the approach taken in Buera, et al (2011, 2017) where the distribution of productivity is the only primitive, $h(a, \theta)$ then being determined endogenously through the agents’ saving behavior. In a model with default, we would not expect the distribution of wealth to be pinned down only by $\theta$ since it would depend on the history of default which would wipe out an entrepreneur’s wealth in our framework. Introducing savings into our framework is an important future extension. More generally, the framework that we are proposing could handle shocks to the value of wealth due, for example, to asset price fluctuations which hit agents heterogeneously.

4.3 Computation

In order to compute the model, we approximate the continuous distribution of $a$ and $\theta$ by a distribution with 1000 and 10000 discrete values, respectively, both in the calibration and the subsequent simulations. These discrete values approximately represent equally spaced centiles of the continuous distribution.

When calibrating the model we solve jointly for the distribution of productivities, $\alpha$, $\delta$ using an iterative process as follows. We start from an initial trial value of the parameters affecting default risk and the cost of effort, $(\delta, \alpha)$, and then find the distribution of productivity, $\theta$, to match the empirical firm size distribution and ensure that the labour markets clear at a wage $(w)$ of one as described above. Conditional on this distribution of $\theta$ we then update the value of $(\delta, \alpha)$ to generate default probabilities of 0.1 and 0.01 for the smallest and largest firms which are active in the equilibrium. We then iterate this process until the values of both $\alpha$ and $\delta$ converge in the sense that their values change each by less than 0.1 percentage points relative to the previous iterations.

The core problem of the simulations is to find the equilibrium wage at each level of $\rho$, $\tau$ and $\phi$. We implement this computationally using the bisection method. A wage is accepted as a solution once labour demand relative to labour supply deviates by less than 0.001 from 1. Given any $\rho$, $\tau$ and $\phi$ and wage, the simulations involve computing the credit contracts for each of the $1000 \times 10000$ tuples for $(a, \theta)$. In order to speed up the computation, we make use of the result that if a potential entrepreneur decides to become a worker at $(a, \theta)$, all individuals with the same productivity and lower wealth will also choose to become workers.

5 Results

For the results that follow, we will consider an economy where the productivity distribution is based on the US and the wealth distribution on India as detailed in the previous section. The benchmark that we study has no correlation between wealth and productivity ($\rho = 0$). For the core results presented here, we set $\lambda = 1$ so that our US benchmark is 5% more productive than the economy that we are studying translating entrepreneurial effort into repayment success. We then set $\tau = 1$ so that property rights to wealth are perfect, i.e. all wealth can be used as collateral. All of these assumptions will be maintained in what follows unless we explicitly state otherwise. Capital can be acquired by lenders at borrowing rate of 10% so that $\gamma = 1.1$.\footnote{This is the same as the rate assumed by Paulson et al (2006).}

In the first best, the marginal product of capital will be equal to this.

5.1 Credit Contracts

Baseline We begin by looking at credit contracts and capital allocation and how these vary with an entrepreneur’s position in the wealth distribution. In all cases, we take a highly productive entrepreneur (at the 99th percent of the productivity distribution). Since around 5% of the population are entrepreneurs when there is full access to credit markets, this constitutes the top 20% in the distribution of entrepreneurial productivity and corresponds to a firm size of around 9 employees. This may still seem quite small. However, the firm-size distribution
implied by the calibrated values is highly skewed. Such individuals are always active as entrepreneurs in our calibration even if they have little wealth and hence we do not need to worry about their occupational choice as we vary parameter values. In all cases, Figure 1 illustrates the outcome for different values of the parameter $\phi$. Recall that $\phi = 0$ is the lowest level of competition and $\phi = 1$ is the highest. We also give the contracts for a middle level of competition: $\phi = 1/2$, half the surplus goes to the entrepreneur and half to the borrower. Notice that throughout the horizontal axis refers to centiles of the wealth distribution, not absolute levels of wealth. Since the wealth distribution is highly skewed, absolute differences in wealth are fairly small for much of the lower end of the wealth distribution.

When interpreting the figures that follow, it should be borne in mind that there are two effects of changing the level of competition. The first is a direct effect whereby the entrepreneur’s share of the surplus varies. This affects the total amount of surplus to the extent that incentives for entrepreneurial effort vary. The second is a general equilibrium effect of competition. Changing competition affects aggregate labour demand, $L_D$ and hence wages thus also changing entrepreneurial profits.
In the top panel of Figure 1, the default probability which depends on entrepreneurial effort is illustrated for different wealth levels and competition. Two things are immediate. First, the default rates implied by the model are around 15% across the wealth distribution. This reflects the fact that, in general equilibrium, even low wealth entrepreneurs face good outside options (even when competition is low). This is because, for marginal entrepreneurs, this is the option of being a wage laborer and for higher wealth individuals this is the possibility of self-finance. The default rate is flat across most of the wealth distribution but then decreases for very high wealth individuals who are closer to first-best self-financing. Competition does have real effects since default is lower when there is more competition. This is because the payoffs to entrepreneurs from being successful are higher when there is greater competition.

The second panel gives the use of capital as a function of the position in the wealth distribution. We know from equation (??) that the pattern of default across wealth levels is the flip-side of the repayment probability as illustrated in the top panel. A higher repayment rate naturally means more capital as the marginal product of capital will be lower. Firm capital \((k)\) is lower for lower levels of assets.

The effect of competition on firm capital is non-monotonic for most wealth levels. Moving competition from \(\phi = 0\) to \(\phi = 1/2\), decreases firm capital for individuals at most percentiles of the wealth distribution. However, capital usage typically increases for the move from \(\phi = 1/2\) to \(\phi = 1\). At the highest centiles of the wealth distribution increased credit market competition leads monotonically to a decrease in capital usage. Increased capital market competition has two effects on firm capital: it increases capital access, and in general equilibrium it also increases wages. Since labour and capital are complementary in our setting the latter effect depresses capital usage. For some entrepreneurs this latter effect more than offsets the positive effect of increases capital access. For entrepreneurs with high wealth levels the increased capital market competition does not lead to substantially improved credit access, and the positive effect of credit market competition on wages depresses capital usage. Thus the model predicts a heterogeneous, non-linear and often non-monotonic effect of competition on capital allocation which could only be seen by disaggregating by wealth level. That said, the magnitude of these effects is relatively modest, i.e. around a 5% decrease in the amount borrowed for high wealth individuals when competition moves from \(\phi = 0\) to \(\phi = 0.5\).

The third panel gives the amount repaid by the entrepreneur for the loan that she takes out and the fourth panel gives the loan size. The latter shows that the amount borrowed is almost unaffected by competition. Moreover, the amount borrowed does not depend much on wealth except at very high wealth levels where self-financing substitutes for credit. This pattern reflects the fact the marginal product of capital does not move much with assets in our calibrations.

The repayment level varies with the wealth level. High wealth entrepreneurs tend to be offered low interest rates. The lender’s ability to capture entrepreneurial surplus is diminished for high wealth investors since they have a very good autarky outside option and marginal returns to capital are lower at high levels of capital. In contrast to the loan size, the repayment level does vary quite a bit with competition and is highest when competition is low. This reflects the division of surplus between the lenders and entrepreneurs. In highly uncompetitive environments a good amount of the profits that entrepreneurs make are captured by investors. The only limit on this process when \(\phi = 0\) is the outside option available and/or the possibility that an entrepreneur receives his efficiency utility.
In popular discussion, the interest rate is frequently used as a barometer of credit conditions. In general our model shows that this is a poor sufficient statistic for matters which should be gauged from capital allocation and surplus sharing. The reason why the interest rate, \( r/(x - 1) \times 100 \), is a very poor indicator of capital allocation is that both numerator and denominator are functions of the default rate and the underlying source of heterogeneity \((a, \theta)\).

However, it is still interesting to see what the model predicts and how well it relates to efficiency and distribution in the credit market. And we know from many studies of developing country credit markets that interest rates charged by monopolistic borrowers can be very high. With very low competition \((\phi = 0)\), the model predicts an interest rate of between 40% and 150% for almost all wealth classes. Only for very high wealth individuals is the rate less than this and it falls quite rapidly for the top of the distribution even with low competition which is due to the fact that outside options for such borrowers are very good (if they need credit at all). The interest rate profile for middle levels of competition is also comparatively flat but again turns down for very high wealth levels. For the highest level of competition, the interest rate is consistently quite low. So competition does seem to have a significant bearing on the interest rate offered to borrowers.

**Lower Productivity Benchmark** We now consider what happens when we look at a more marginal group of entrepreneurs by focusing on the 96th percentile in the productivity distribution. Such entrepreneurs typically employ around two workers so are a quarter of the size of the firms in the baseline case. We will look at how changing this focus affects credit contracts and credit allocation. These results are depicted in subfigure (B) of Figure 1.

Note first the relationship between competition and default probabilities is much less for these marginal entrepreneurs. However, we still see that at high levels of wealth (above the 80th percentile of the distribution), the repayment probability rises quite steeply. Capital allocation is now much lower (due to productivity being lower) but, in common with the baseline, it is very flat during low levels of the wealth distribution. At the highest levels of the asset distribution both the success probability and the firm capital are independent of assets. Here the first best allocation is achieved. Although repayment and loan size are lower, the same broad relationship with wealth and competition is observed as in the higher productivity case. Interest rates are lower for these less productive borrowers, which is driven by the outside option of both wage labour and self-financing being more attractive in relative terms for these borrowers.

Overall, we find a common pattern that, with optimal second best credit contracts, wealth does not have a strong quantitative effect on the allocation of resources over a wide range of wealth levels. This is because, in a general equilibrium setting, the outside option of wage labour and/or the possibility of receiving an efficiency utility level, does most of the work. This is a general lesson from our model and would only be found by taking a general equilibrium perspective which solves explicitly for the outside options that entrepreneurs face.

\(^{24}\)In a model with endogenous savings, this would give an incentive for such groups to save. However, the equilibrium default in our model would imply that borrowers would periodically have their wealth eliminated when the business fails so zero/low wealth individuals would remain a constant feature of an economy in a framework like ours.
Higher Correlation Between Productivity and Wealth  In subfigure (C) of Figure 1, we look at what happens when we allow for a stronger correlation between wealth and productivity, which increases the density of high wealth/high productivity individuals. The optimal contracts for each \((a, \theta)\) are essentially preserved compared to the baseline. The only exception is a change in the allocation of capital. We now find a monotonic positive effect of credit market competition on firm capital for a wide range of low asset individuals. This is driven by a general equilibrium effect of high productivity individuals having likely also high wealth. This decreases the dependence of high productivity individuals on credit access, and increases wages. Improvements in credit market competition have less of an effect on wages. This in turn means that, for most wealth levels, the positive effect of increased competition on credit access dominates the weak general equilibrium effect on wages throughout all levels of competition.

Frictions in Using Assets as Collateral  We now consider what happens when \(\tau = 0.5\) so that only 50% of wealth can be used as collateral. In effect, collateralizable wealth in the economy is halved. If the source of the friction is imperfect property rights, then this constitutes the de Soto effect in this model. We already have a hint from the first panel that this will not matter much for the lower wealth part of the distribution as we observed that over the range 0 to 80%, most variables – including the repayment rate and capital do not vary with wealth. Given this, we would not expect a strong equilibrium effect in the economy. Subfigure (D) of Figure 1 confirms that this is not the case and there is virtually no effect of changing property rights affecting the use of collateral in this setting. This, perhaps surprising, finding can be put down to the general equilibrium setting where the (endogenous) wage rate plays a key role in determining the outside option of borrowers. Hence, even when competition is low, lenders have relatively little capacity to exploit their market power. Moreover, the possibility of an efficiency utility also limits the impact of the outside option on contracts at lower wealth levels. At higher wealth levels the possibility of self-financing provides a relevant outside option.

The Distribution of Interest Rates and Default Probabilities  Survey evidence that shows high levels and high variance of paid interest rates in developing countries. For example, Aleem (1990) reports a mean interest rate of 78% in his rural lending data with a standard deviation of 38%. Using the Townsend Thai data, Kaboski and Townsend (2012) Table 1 reports a mean interest rate of 9.5% for 1997-2003 with a standard deviation across borrowers in a year of about 10%. They also report an average default rate of 23%. Variation in the interest rates emerge naturally in our model as a reflection in our framework of heterogeneous repayment rates which reflect underlying differences between borrowers along with market conditions.\(^{25}\) Here, we will emphasize the importance of competition in affecting the dispersion of interest rates, with dispersion being greatest when competition is low.

Figure 2 looks at the distribution of interest rates across types of borrowers for different levels of competition. As we would expect from Figure 1, when competition is very high then there is no variation in interest rates at all. A feature of the high competition case is the emergence of a modal interest rate; almost every borrower is being offered the same interest

\(^{25}\)Karaivanov and Townsend (2014) also have a moral hazard model which generates such heterogeneity.
rate. The spread of interest rates on offer starts to increase as competition is reduced. However, with $\phi = 0.5$, there is still quite a bit of bunching.

**Figure 2: Distribution of Interest Rates**

![Graphs showing distribution of interest rates for different levels of competition and collateralization.](image)

**Notes:** All graphs depict the distribution of interest rates ($r/x - 1 \times 100$) paid by individuals who borrow in equilibrium. Subfigure (A) presents the baseline scenario where we impose perfect collateralisability of wealth ($\tau = 1$), assume that the distribution of asset holdings and productivities are independent ($\rho = 0$). Subfigures (B) and (C) preserve the baseline scenario with one exception each: in subfigure (B) we assume that the distribution of asset holdings and productivities are correlated ($\rho = 0.3$) and in subfigure (C) we impose imperfect collateralisability of wealth ($\tau = 0.5$). For each scenario we show the distribution of interest rates for three distinct levels of competitiveness of credit markets: full competition ($\phi = 1.0$, top figure), monopolistic competition ($\phi = 0.0$, bottom figure), and an intermediate level ($\phi = 0.5$, middle figure).

When $\phi = 0$, i.e. no competition, then there is the widest range of interest rates which are essential chosen to extract all of the surplus from a lending relationship between an entrepreneur and lender. This suggests that one factor that could explain the differences in the dispersion of interest rates between Pakistan and Thailand noted above is the competitiveness of credit markets.

Figure 2 also allows these distributions to vary across three cases: higher productivity-wealth correlation and worse property rights. The latter, as above, leaves things almost unchanged. However, the effect of increase $\rho$, which tends to increase the wage, is more visible with a greater spread in interest rates. This partly reflects that a larger number of entrepreneurs has attractive outside options, given our assumption on the correlation of $\theta$ and $a$.

In Figure 3, we look at the distribution of the credit market distortion across borrower types. A sufficient statistic for this is the default probability $1 - g(e)$. We present figures showing this for different levels of competition. When competition is highest (in the top panel), then there is a modal outcome with only a few borrowers having lower default probabilities (those with higher wealth). As competition is reduced across the second and third panels, this mode shifts to the right (higher default) but the same broad pattern occurs. The distribution visibly widens with a greater reduction in default for higher wealth entrepreneurs. When $\phi = 0$ (the lowest panel), i.e., there is no competition, then there is a wider distribution of default probabilities. This spreading out occurs in the right tail as more entrepreneurs who face worse outside options put in less effort. These distributions vary somewhat with a change in $\rho$ but are largely insensitive (as with all of our results) with variation in $\tau$.

**Output** In Figure 4, we look at outcomes among entrepreneurs for the same core parameter values that we looked at in the previous section, i.e., $\theta$ in the 99th percentile. We look at output, labour demand, and the income of entrepreneurs. Once again, we look at this in four main cases – the same as those studied when look at credit contracts and capital allocation.
Figure 3: Distribution of Default Probability

(A) BASELINE  
(B) \( \rho = 0.3 \)  
(C) \( \tau = 0.5 \)

Notes: All graphs depict the distribution of default probabilities \((1 - g(c))\) of individuals who borrow in equilibrium. Subfigure (A) presents the baseline scenario where we impose perfect collateralisability of wealth \((\tau = 1)\), assume that the distribution of asset holdings and productivities are independent \((\rho = 0)\). Subfigures (B) and (C) preserve the baseline scenario with one exception each: in subfigure (B) we assume that the distribution of asset holdings and productivities are correlated \((\rho = 0.3)\) and in subfigure (C) we impose imperfect collateralisability of wealth \((\tau = 0.5)\). For each scenario we show the distribution of default probabilities for three distinct levels of competitiveness of credit markets: full competition \((\phi = 1.0, \text{ top figure})\), monopolistic competition \((\phi = 0.0, \text{ bottom figure})\), and an intermediate level \((\phi = 0.5, \text{ middle figure})\).

Figure 4: Equilibrium Entrepreneurs

(A) BASELINE  
(B) \( \theta = 96\text{TH PERCENTILE} \)  
(C) \( \rho = 0.3 \)  
(D) \( \tau = 0.5 \)

Notes: The figures describe characteristics of the equilibrium firm level outcomes for entrepreneurs across all centiles of the asset distribution, holding constant \( \theta \). Subfigure (A) presents the baseline scenario where we impose perfect collateralisability of wealth \((\tau = 1)\), assume that the distribution of asset holdings and productivities are independent \((\rho = 0)\) and presents results for the 99th centile of the productivity distribution. Subfigures (B), (C), and (D) preserve the baseline scenario with one exception each: In subfigure (B) we presents results for the 96th centile of the productivity distribution, in subfigure (C) we assume that the distribution of asset holdings and productivities are correlated \((\rho = 0.3)\) and in subfigure (D) we impose imperfect collateralisability of wealth \((\tau = 0.5)\). Firm outcomes are shown for three distinct levels of competitiveness of credit markets: full competition \((\phi = 1.0)\), monopolistic competition \((\phi = 0.0)\), and an intermediate level \((\phi = 0.5)\). Expected output is \(e^\theta (\beta_0 + \beta_1k)\), measured in units of average annual wage income. Total expected firm level labor demand is \(e^\theta (\delta + (1 - \phi)\gamma a)\), measured in units of one persons annual labor supply. Expected borrower income is \(e^\theta (\beta_0 (\delta + (1 - \phi)\gamma a) - \tau (\beta_1 k) - \theta^\rho \rho e^{-\gamma a})\), measured in units of average annual wage income. Both are measured in absolute terms and in units of the annual income of a wage laborer in the US.

In the top panel, we look at output (for successful entrepreneurs) for various wealth groups. This shows that output is largely unaffected by wealth up to the 80th percentile of the wealth distribution regardless of the level of competition. However, for the lowest level of competition, output increases from about the 80th percentile onwards. With high competition this
effect is only apparent for wealth levels in the top 5 percentiles of the wealth distribution. One striking feature of this panel is that at the 99th percentile of productivity, output is highest when competition is lowest. This may seem paradoxical. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the wage increases when competition increases which lowers labour demand and hence production of entrepreneurs. So some entrepreneurs actually produce more when competition is lower. Another feature of this top panel is that once again, the effect of changing competition is highly non-linear with an effect only observable between $\phi = 1/2$ and $\phi = 0$.

The second panel in Figure 4 looks at firm size in terms of its labour force. Firms of entrepreneurs at the 99th percentile of productivity are largest when competition is lowest since the wage rate is lowest then. It is clear that taking a general equilibrium model is needed to bring this out. If $\phi$ could be increased for one entrepreneur rather than for all at once, then the wage would be unchanged and labour demand would fall when competition is decreased. The fact that lack of competition is might lead to an increase in firm size for some entrepreneurs is consistent with the empirical work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who find the distribution of firm sizes to be inefficiently concentrated in environments with misallocation of resources. There is no visible effect comparing $\phi = 1/2$ and $\phi = 1$.

In the third panel, we look at the income of entrepreneurs. Naturally this depends strongly on the level of competition as the share of the surplus is affected by this. However, it is fairly flat with respect to the level of wealth except when there is very low competition when it turns upwards at the highest wealth levels.

The remaining panels look at the same variants as in Figure 1. As we might expect, Subfigure (B) shows that having smaller entrepreneurs scales down the size of incomes and labour demand. Competition increases labour demand and income. Increasing the correlation between wealth and productivity implies that competition has a negative effect on labour demand for most wealth levels. This is driven by the same general equilibrium effect that also drives the pattern of firm capital in Figure 2. When competition is low, now labour demand shifts down more noticeably with the level of competition. Finally, in subfigure (D), we continue to see little evidence of a general equilibrium de Soto effect.

### 5.2 Expanding Market Access

In this section, we look at aggregate implications of extending financial inclusion. We consider different values of $z(a, \theta)$ assuming that this is independent of $(a, \theta)$ but we allow credit to be extended to a wider and wider set of individuals.

**Wages and Self-Employment** Figure 5 gives the core aggregate outcomes. The first is the wage as a fraction of the US wage moving from Autarky through to full credit market access. The second gives the fraction of the population that become entrepreneurs. We illustrate this for two cases. The first, the blue lines in Figure 5 sets $\phi = 1$ (full competition) and $\tau = 1$ (full collateralizability of wealth) which is the best possible scenario for credit markets. The second, the red line in Figure 5, sets $\phi = 0$ (no competition) and $\tau = 0$ (no collateralizability of wealth).

The left hand panel of Figure 5 shows that the wage moves from around 40% of the US wage in autarky to over 90% when there is full credit market access. The upward-sloping curve shows a concave relationship. However, there are still good-sized gains when moving
for example, from 40% to 80% access. Comparing the blue and red lines, we find that moving from the least to most efficient credit markets (conditional on a level of access) leads to modest aggregate wage gains although (naturally) the gap between these lines increases as credit market access expands.

The right hand panel in Figure 5 shows the proportion of the population that is an entrepreneur. In autarky this is around 27% of the population. However, it falls rapidly as credit market access expands and the levels off from around 40% access at a little above 5%. Individuals are driven out of self-employment by the increasing wage which makes become a wage labourer more attractive and squeezes the profits of marginal entrepreneurs. This figure illustrates why looking at the rate of self-employment is not a good guide to economic outcomes. Individuals are only self-employed because wages are low and they lack access to borrowing opportunities. Thus, allowing for capital to flow to its most productive uses will ensure that only the most productive entrepreneurs (regardless of their wealth) will become entrepreneurs and employment will be concentrated in such firms. Thus the gain are not because the economy has become more intrinsically productive just because gains from trade in labour and capital are realized.

**Occupational Choice**  In Figure 6, we look at the occupational choice at all points in the \((a, \theta)\) distribution. The blue shaded area illustrates the space in which individuals choose to be workers and the green shaded area where they choose to be entrepreneurs. Almost all of these entrepreneurs choose to borrow. However, those with very high wealth choose to self-finance.

On the extreme left and right hand panels, we illustrate autarky and the first best. The left hand panel shows, not surprisingly, that the low wealth and low productivity individuals are all workers. However, of the 27% or so who choose to become entrepreneurs, this goes quite far down the productivity distribution for people with high wealth. In the first best, only around the top 4% of the productivity distribution becoming entrepreneurs. Moreover, initial
wealth does not matter now since capital allocation in a firm is not dependent on this, only on the productivity of an enterprise.

**Figure 6: Occupational Choice**

(A) AUTARKY  (b) $z(a, \theta) = 0.10$  (c) $z(a, \theta) = 0.25$  (d) FIRST BEST

Notes: These figure depicts the occupational choice and lending decision in the $a - \theta$ space. Throughout we assume $\rho = 0$. In Figure ?? we present the occupational choice in autarky; in Figure ?? we assume $z(a, \theta) = 0.1$ and $(\phi = 1.0; \tau = 1.0)$; in Figure ?? we assume $z(a, \theta) = 0.25$ and $(\phi = 1.0; \tau = 1.0)$; and in Figure ?? we present results in first best. In Figure ?? and ?? blue and green areas indicate individuals who become workers and entrepreneurs, respectively, when they have credit market access. In those graphs the white line indicates the occupational choice of individuals without credit market access: individuals to the lower-left of it become workers, individuals to the upper-right of it become entrepreneurs.

In the middle two panels, we illustrate the occupational choice for two intermediate values of credit market access where credit contracts are second-best optimal. We choose $z(a, \theta) = 0.10$, i.e. 10% of the population has access to credit markets and $z(a, \theta) = 0.25$ where it is 25%. They show how as credit market access expands, there are fewer entrepreneurs. Even with very limited access, there is switch away from low-productivity high wealth individuals choosing to become entrepreneurs. Hence, the selection effect is quite powerful. The line between the blue and green areas is close to vertical. It then shifts to the right as credit market access expands.

**Competition and Distribution** We now look at the division of income between labourers, lenders and entrepreneurs. We will consider this as we vary credit market access, $z(a, \theta)$, and the level of competition, $\phi$. The size of the columns in Figure 7 illustrate the level of income as a fraction of US income.

On the extreme left is autarky. Here, a little less than half of national income is in the form of entrepreneurial profits. The next three bars are for the case where 50% of the population have access to credit markets but for three levels of competition. Note, however, that with $\phi = 0$, then most of the gains from credit markets are appropriated by lenders and entrepreneurial profits are squeezed relative to autarky. The main effect of increasing competition is to redistribute surplus between lenders and entrepreneurs. There is a modest increase in the wage, due to competition with most of the gain (as we would expect from Figure 5) coming from increasing market access. A similar pattern of surplus redistribution is found for the case of full credit market access.

These findings could be relevant for exploring the political economy of credit market expansion and competition. The distributive politics between entrepreneurs and lenders is the most visible dimension of this in Figure 7. But the endogenous wage is also important even though the effects for each worker are small since most of the population are wage laborers;

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26This is similar to the mechanism in Moll (2014) where credit market frictions reduce the wage and induce low productivity individuals to become entrepreneurs.
we should therefore expect voting-based politics (assuming that workers understand this) to favor increased competition in credit markets due to the effect on endogenous wages. This is an example, of the kind of factor price effect that has been studied theoretically in the political economy literature, e.g. Acemoglu (2006) but has not been explored quantitatively. Political economy may also reflect the more concentrated interest of entrepreneurs and lenders and will depend on which interest is better organized for lobbying purposes. Credit markets will remain uncompetitive to the extent that lenders are an organized interest.\footnote{Erosa and Hidalgo (2008) consider how entrepreneurs may have a vested interest in poor enforcement to extract rents. However, they do not consider the role of competition affecting the distribution of surplus between lenders and entrepreneurs.}

**The Distribution of Firm Size** In Figure 8, we look at the distribution of firm size. In each case, we look at variation in market access for four values varying from autarky to full access. Throughout Figure 6, the solid bars gives the distribution in the first best and the colors (green and orange) show deviations in second best from the first best. The left hand panel gives the full range of firms in the economy whereas the right hand panel gives the distribution of largest firms – the upper tail of the distribution. In each panel, we give the first best distribution of firms so that we can compare this to the distribution implied by the second-best.

In the top panel left panel we compare autarky to the first best. Here, we find a very clear shift in the distribution towards small firms. This made even more apparent in the top right-hand panel which shows that there are virtually no large firms in the economy. This lack of labour demand is what keeps the wage low. This broad pattern is found in all of the panels. However, as credit market access varies, the deviation from the “first best” distribution of firm size diminishes. By the time of full credit market access, the first best is very similar to distribution generated by second-best credit markets.

**The gains from credit market access** Figure 9 gives an insight into how the gains from participation in credit markets is distributed across the population. It contains two panels based
on the level of competition. Comparing the two panels, it is clear that the gains and losses of credit markets, relative to autarky, are highly heterogeneous. This is important in thinking about possibilities for targeting market access towards particular sub-populations. That said, a key lesson is that distributional outcomes are largely driven by general equilibrium effects on wages and, to that extent, the specific targeting of credit may be less important on the impact on occupational choice and labour demand.

Those who are workers in autarky are all better off with the possibility of trading in credit markets. However, among those who were entrepreneurs in autarky, a large fraction also lose from the introduction of credit markets due to rising wages. These losses are concentrated amongst entrepreneurs with higher level of wealth, holding $\theta$ constant. These entrepreneurs had good access to capital even in autarky, and benefited from low wage levels. This effect is particularly pronounced in the right hand panel of Figure 10, where we compare payoffs with credit markets (with $\phi = 1$) to autarky. Here, high productivity entrepreneurs with low levels of assets benefit from the increased access to credit, despite the fact that this comes with sizeable wage increases. However, entrepreneurs with similarly high productivity and high levels of assets do still loose out relative to autarchy. For them the increased credit access is less important, since they can to a large extent, just self-finance their investment. In the absence of competition, all of the most productive entrepreneurs lose relative to autarchy, since the increase in wages is not compensated by better credit access.
6 Concluding Comments

This paper has provided a quantitative exploration of the aggregate implications of credit market frictions where agents, who differ in wealth and productivity, make an occupational choice between being a worker and an entrepreneur. The paper has explored optimal credit contracts with the possibility of default due to moral hazard in a general equilibrium setting. It has used the framework to explore implications of contracting frictions in the credit market, the extent to which credit markets are competitive, and the impact of expanding access to finance.

A key finding from the calibrated model is that the wage moves from around 40% of the US wage with no credit market access to over 90% when there is full credit market access. Moreover, it is access to credit markets rather than frictions due to moral hazard which turn out to be quantitatively most important. That said, frictions do matter as default is an important feature of the credit market equilibrium, and there is heterogeneity in default rates and interest rates paid by borrowers, mirroring what we see in survey data.

Expanding market access changes the economy through a general equilibrium channel whereby credit market leads to better selection of entrepreneurs based on their talent and increases firm size, resulting in greater aggregate labour demand and a higher wage. In common with the large literature on the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions (e.g., see the review by Buera et al., 2015), it emphasizes why looking for the impact of credit market distortions only in the operation of capital markets can miss the bigger economy-wide picture. Given that most of the poor in developing countries are dependent on wage labour, the biggest effects on poverty reduction from changes in the financial sector comes through the transformational effect on occupational choice and rising wages.

The paper also reinforces the message in Moll (2014) who has highlighted the importance of diminishing the extent of small-scale self-employment as development progresses with such
individuals mainly switching to wage labour. This is consistent with anecdotal observation and evidence on the structural transformation which takes place alongside extending credit market access. Hence while entrepreneurship is important to development, it is the capacity of the market system to allocate capital to those entrepreneurs with high productivity that matters the most. When market access is limited, many of them have to rely on their own wealth and resources which implies that they cannot operate at an optimum scale.

The paper has focused on differences in the level as opposed to the growth of income. A natural next step in the research agenda is to look at dynamic implications. Once there are new technologies and shocks to individual firm productivity due to this, the economy has to continuously re-allocate capital. Limited market access plays a role in constraining this aspect of resource allocation too if those who currently enjoy market access can get credit and those with new technologies are excluded. This will affect the ability of the economy to benefit from growth opportunities.

More generally, it would be interesting to develop a dynamic version of the model with saving and wealth accumulation. Developing this aspect of our model would be interesting but also challenging; having a positive level of business failure among entrepreneurs would add an interesting new dimension since even talented entrepreneurs might sometimes find themselves with zero wealth. So saving could not in our framework fully alleviate credit market imperfections. If there were also aggregate shocks to business conditions which affect default, these could have a persistent effect on economic performance even in the absence of serially correlated technology shocks. Such an effect is likely to be relevant in understanding the experience of low productivity following the recent financial crisis.

There are many other potential avenues for developing the ideas in this paper. One key role of theory is to provide a way of studying heterogeneity across economies and individuals in the impact of increasing access to credit. While we have shown that the gains from market access differ across wealth, productivity and aggregate features of the economy, there is more that can be done to explore heterogeneous returns as a means of informing policy priorities. This for example could inform where to roll out our credit programs geographically to extend the outreach of markets. And there may be scope to target specific unbanked populations based on the heterogeneous gains in different environments predicted by a model like ours.

Another interesting direction for work in this area for which a model along the lines developed here could be useful is exploring complementarities between extending credit market access and other things that governments do to raise productivity such as providing infrastructure or increasing human capital.

The framework that we have proposed has put a spotlight on the behavior of lenders. Our focus here has been on competitive conditions in credit markets which does not appear to have received much attention. But it would also be interesting to explore other frictions. One is the idea that lenders are subject to behavioral biases as in the animal spirits model of Akerlof and Shiller (2009). Irrational exuberance or caution in lenders’ estimates of default probabilities could have real effects on the economy. Exploring this quantitatively would be an interesting extension of the framework.

Finally, we have used a specific technology for providing credit where limits on conventional collateral create a friction, conditional on having access to credit. In ongoing work we are exploring the potential gains from expanding collateral to non-pecuniary punishments, often referred to as “social collateral” which are folded into many microcredit programs. This
would allow us to link the paper to discussions about the role of microcredit in development. We plan to explore, using the framework developed here, the quantitative implications of such programs and to address the question of why the returns found in such programs are so heterogeneous in randomized interventions.
References


A Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition ??: The proof is a generalization of the proof of Proposition 2 in Besley et al (2012) in two ways: first, \( \pi(k; \theta, w) \) is allowed to depend on \( \theta \) and \( w \), and \( \mu(e; \theta) \) on \( \theta \); second, \( \mu(e; \theta) \) is not necessarily linear in \( e \). The first generalization is trivial, since the lender and borrower take \( \theta \) and \( w \) as given in a given contracting problem. These are therefore additional multiplicative constants, not affecting the proof. The second generalization does affect the proof, though in a straightforward way.

First, when the participation constraint is non-binding (Step 3 of the Proof of Proposition 2 in Besley et al (2012)), we can use the binding participation constraint, incentive-compatibility constraint and the lender’s objective function, the optimal contracting problem can be written as:

\[
\max_{(e,k)} g(e) \left[ \pi(k; \theta, w) - \frac{\mu(e; \theta)}{g(e)} \right] + \tau a - \gamma k.
\]

Now \( g(e) \pi(k; \theta, w) \) is strictly concave by Assumption ?? (ii) and \(-g(e) \frac{\mu_e(e; \theta)}{g(e)}\) is strictly concave by Assumption ?? (i), (iii), and (iv). Therefore the maximization problem is well-behaved, and by standard arguments, a unique global maximum \((e_0, k_0)\) exists. The first-order necessary conditions for an interior optimum are:

\[
g_e(e_0) \pi(k_0; \theta, w) = \mu_e(e_0; \theta) + g(e_0) e(e_0; \theta)
\]

\[
g_0(e_0) \pi_k(k_0; \theta, w) = \gamma.
\]

We have the following: \( e(e; \theta) = \frac{\mu_e(e; \theta)}{g(e)} - \frac{\mu_e(e; \theta) g(e)}{[g(e)]^2} > 0 \) since \( g(e) \) is strictly concave, \( g(e) \) and \( \mu(e; \theta) \) are strictly increasing and \( \mu(e; \theta) \) is weakly convex. By Assumption ?? (iii) the unique global maximum \((e_0, k_0)\) is then an interior solution.

Secondly, if the participation constraint is binding (Step 4 of the Proof of Proposition 2 in Besley et al (2012)), we can use the binding participation constraint, incentive-compatibility constraint, and limited liability constraint to find optimal effort \( \xi \) defined by:

\[
g(\xi(v; \theta, w)) \left[ \frac{\mu_e(\xi(v; \theta, w); \theta, w)}{g_e(\xi(v; \theta, w))} \right] - \mu(\xi(v; \theta, w); \theta, w) = v.
\]

We have \( \xi_v(v; \theta, w) = g_e(\xi) \left[ \frac{\mu_e(\xi; \theta, w)}{g_e(\xi)} \right] + g(\xi) \left[ \frac{\mu_e(\xi; \theta, w)}{g_e(\xi)} - \frac{\mu_e(\xi; \theta, w) g_e(\xi)}{[g_e(\xi)]^2} \right] > 0 \) by Assumption ?? (iv), and the fact that \( g(e) \) and \( \mu(e; \theta) \) are increasing.

Proof of Proposition ??: When the participation constraint is non-binding, capital is defined by (??). When the participation constraint is binding, effort is pinned down by (??). Using the incentive compatibility constraint and the lender’s objective function, the optimal contracting problem becomes

\[
\max_k g(\xi(v; \theta, w)) \left[ \pi(k; \theta, w) - \frac{\mu_e(\xi(v; \theta, w); \theta, w)}{g_e(\xi(v; \theta, w))} \right] + \tau a - \gamma k.
\]

The first order condition with respect to \( k \) again takes the form:

\[
g(\xi(v; \theta, w)) \pi_k(k; \theta, w) = \gamma.
\]

Proof of Corollary ??: The proof is directly analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in Besley et al (2012).
Proof of Proposition ??: We use the fact that
\[ \phi \cdot S(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w) = \hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w). \]

Now differentiate \( \hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) \) with respect to the various parameters to yield
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w)}{\partial \theta} = \frac{S_{\theta}(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w)}{1 - \phi S_v(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w)} > 0, \]
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w)}{\partial a} = \frac{S_v(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w)}{1 - \phi S_v(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w)} > 0, \]
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w)}{\partial \phi} = \frac{S(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w)}{1 - \phi S_v(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w)} > 0. \]

The inequalities follow noting that \( 1 - \phi S_v(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w) > 0 \) for all \( v \in (\hat{v}(\theta, w), \hat{\theta}(\theta, w)) \) and \( 0 \leq S_v(\hat{u}(\phi; a, \theta, w) + \tau a; \theta, w) \leq 1 \). Further we can derive
\[ S_{\theta} = [g_e(\hat{e}) \pi(\hat{k}; \theta, w) - \mu_e(\hat{e}; \theta)]\hat{e}_{\theta} + g(\hat{e}) \pi_e(\hat{k}; \theta, w) - \mu_e(\hat{e}; \theta), \]
where we use the first-order condition with respect to \( k \). We have \( g_e(\hat{e}) \pi(\hat{k}; \theta, w) - \mu_e(\hat{e}; \theta) > 0 \) as long as the first best effort is not implemented; \( g(\hat{e}) \pi_e(\hat{k}; \theta, w) > 0 \) by Assumption ?? (i) and (ii); \( -\mu_{e}(\hat{e}; \theta) < 0 \) by Assumption ?? (iii). From (??) it is straightforward to show that the sign of \( \hat{e}_{\theta} \) is indeterminate and depends on \( \mu_{e0}(e; \theta), \mu_{e}(e; \theta), \) and the shape of \( g(e) \). Examples can be constructed where \( S_{\theta} > 0 \) and \( S_{\theta} < 0 \).