Department of Economics

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences


Seminar - Upcoming

2013 Asia Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics
Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society 2013
Past Events

Department Seminar


Search direction


Régis Renault
Université Paris Dauphine

Date: Dec 01, Tuesday

Time: 4 - 5:30 pm

Venue: Lim Tay Boh Seminar Room (AS2 03-12)
National University of Singapore
1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570

Chair: Julian Wright


A tractable model of pricing under directed search is proposed and integrated with a position auction for better slots (which rationalizes the consumer search order). Search is always inefficiently low because firms price out further exploration. Equilibrium product prices are such that the marginal consumer's surplus decreases in the order of search. Consumers always find it optimal to follow the order of search that results from whatever allocation rule used to determine firms' positions. optimal rankings that achieve the maximization of joint profit, social welfare or consumer surplus are characterized by means of firm specific scores. In a generalized second price auction, any equilibrium that satisfies a "no-envy" condition always implements the joint profit maximizing order and such an equilibrium is shown to exist for a wide range of parameters characterizing product heterogeneity.