Department of Economics

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences


Seminar - Upcoming

2013 Asia Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics
Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society 2013
Past Events
Department Seminar


A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds


Yeh Chun-Hsien
Academia Sinica


Jul 25, Tue

Time: 4 - 5:30 pm
Venue: Lim Tay Boh Seminar Room (AS2 03-12)
National University of Singapore
1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570

Chair: Ko Chiu Yu


When a group of creditors have claims on a resource that is not enough to honor all claims, how should the resource be divided? This is the so-called bankruptcy problem. A well-known rule to solve this problem is the Talmud rule. We introduce a game that exploits standard consistency properties, as well as properties guaranteeing meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. As we show, the game strategically justifies the rule.