"Existence of Monotone Equilibrium in First Price Auctions with Private Risk Aversion and Private Initial Wealth," with Matt Gentry and Tong Li, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
"Auctions with Selective Entry and Risk Averse Bidders: Theory and Evidence," with Tong Li and Li Zhao, RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles, with Q. Fu and Y. Pan, American Economic Review, 2015, forthcoming.
"Contests with Endogenous Entry", with Q. Fu and Q. Jiao, International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, forthcoming
"Reverse" Nested Lottery Contests (with Q. Fu and Z. Wang), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014, 50, 128-140.
Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Private Information Acquisition Costs, with Lixin Ye, Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 393-408.
Optimal Multi-Stage Contest, with Fu Qiang, Economic Theory, 51(2), 2012, 351-382, Reviewed by NAJ Economics.
Optimal Auctions with Asymmetric Financial Externalities, Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 2012, 561-575.
Incentivizing R&D: Prize or Subsidies?, with Fu Qiang and Yuanzhu Lu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 2012, 67-79.
Micro Foundations for Generalized Multi-Prize Contest: A Noisy Ranking Perspective, with Fu Qiang, Social Choice and Welfare, 38(3), 2012, 497-517.
Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information-Acquisition ", Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 274-289.
Contest Design and Optimal Endogenous Entry, with Qiang Fu, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 80-88.
Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation, with Euston Quah, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(3), 2009, 343-362.
The Beauty of "Bigness": on Optimal Design of Multi Winner Contests, with Qiang Fu, Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 2009,146-161.
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost, Economic Theory, 38(1), 2009: 73-103.
Estimating Risk Aversion Using Ascending and Sealed Bid Auctions: Application to Timber Data, with I. Perrigne, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23, 2008: 871-896.