Department of Economics

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences



Regular Faculty
Visiting Faculty
Other Academic Staff
PhD Students
Admin Staff
Title: Professor
Email: ecsst Office: AS2 06-11
Tel: 6516 6259 Fax: 6775 2646
Degree: PhD, Harvard University

CV: /people/CV/ecsst.pdf

Teaching Areas:
Microeconomics, game theory, mathematics for economists

Research Areas:
Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory

Selected Publications:
Oyama D, Takahashi S: Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games, Journal of Economic Theory, 157:May (2015), 100-127.

Hörner J, Takahashi S, Vieille N: On the Limit Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 85 (2014), 70-83.

Chen YC, Takahashi S, Xiong SY: The robust selection of rationalizability, Journal of Economic Theory 151 (2014), 448-475.

Sugaya T, Takahashi S: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 1891-1928.

Chen B, Takahashi S: A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting, Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012), 571-581.

Hörner J, Sugaya T, Takahashi S, Vieille N: Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: An algorithm for delta -> 1 and a folk theorem, Econometrica 79 (2011), 1277-1318.

Fudenberg D, Takahashi S: Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play, Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011), 100-120.

Takahashi S: Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play, Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), 42-62.

Takahashi S: The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses, Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008), 328-340.